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ABSTRACT
Innovation is a key driving force of economic growth in the United States and
other developed countries. A wide range of public policies seek to stimulate growth
while curbing its excesses. As the rate of innovation continues to slow across many
industry segments, state and federal policy makers continue to look for new ideas to
stimulate growth. Between the extremes of antitrust and industrial policy lies a fertile
and mostly unexplored area where government and industry may collaborate.
Industry-government collaboration so far has had mixed success. Innovations in
organizational form that utilize networks to link entrepreneurs, publically funded
research, and industry firms can provide a new way for policy makers to stimulate
innovation. This research describes a new organizational design called an industry-scale
open innovation network (OIN) that links the innovations of small firms with the systems
integration, scaling, and distribution strengths of larger firms.
The heart of the OIN design is a dynamic two-sided market for innovation with a
specialized intermediary called a hub firm orchestrating the deal flow. Over time, the
OIN is theorized to accelerate the rate, lower the cost, and improve the effectiveness of
innovation in select industries. Clemson University and the American Society of
Mechanical Engineers (ASME) designed and demonstrated the anchor service for an
open innovation network with the US automotive industry. This demonstration, called
the AutoVenture Forum (AVF), marks the first time that an open-innovation service has
been attempted at the industry level.
ii

The first demonstration of the AutoVenture Forum was held near Detroit,
Michigan on 22 September, 2010. Key findings for managing open innovation at the
industry level include (a) the tiered supply industry forms the essential link between the
original equipment makers like GM (OEM) and the entrepreneurs because it solves the
scale-up issue; (b) supply chain innovation builds job creation; (c) a high-quality flow of
deal-ready entrepreneurs is essential to attract industry participation; and (d) industry
leadership will be required to establish the complete innovation network.
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CHAPTER ONE

OPEN INNOVATION AT THE INDUSTRY SCALE

Introduction
Since the successful introduction of low cost, high quality imported vehicles into
the US market in the late 1960’s and the oil crises of the 1970’s, the US auto industry has
been subjected to an array of external stresses (Brown, Rusin, & Rakouth, 2010).
Gasoline price volatility created instability in customer purchase decisions. Customers
would purchase fuel efficient small cars when prices were high, yet shift back to larger,
less fuel efficient vehicles when gasoline prices retreated. Regulatory interventions by
the federal government and the State of California pushed vehicle makers to reduce
fatalities and injuries from crashes, reduce tail pipe emissions, and improve fuel
economy.
But between 1983 and 2001, the industry’s more fundamental problems were
masked as the US economy expanded first under Reagan and then under the Clinton
administrations. The auto industry lost money in recession years but otherwise made
money in most years. Underneath the veneer of profitability, there were signs of failing
industry innovation. First, the industry continuously lost market share against Japanese
firms at the low end of the market. In 1984, the industry lost its lead in US automotive
patents issued. The gap in patents issued between foreign and domestic firms has
continued to widen.
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In the early 1990’s, state and federal policy makers attempted to use both
coercion and collaboration as incentives to the move the industry away from oil
dependence and toward a more sustainable form of transportation. California attempted
to force the US manufacturers to build and market electric vehicles via legislation.
General Motors eventually introduced the EV-1 into the California market in the late
1990’s. The California mandate, along with EV-1, came to a halt in 2001 as both EV-1
leases and support for the state mandate failed after a legal challenge.
The Federal government, lead by the Department of Energy, created a
collaborative program in 1993 called the Partnership for Next Generation Vehicle
(PNGV) with industry to pursue hydrogen technology. Despite careful oversight and
substantial investment from taxpayers and industry,

PNGV and its successors have not

achieved the breakthrough next generation vehicle.
The final countdown for industry collapse began in 2001, as gas prices began their
constant upward movement. Since 2001, the US auto sector experienced continued loss
of market share and accelerating financial losses as sales of profitable trucks and SUVs
declined. High pension costs negotiated in the expansion years and falling sales of the
most profitable vehicles began driving the industry toward insolvency. The auto sector
reached its nadir in 2009 when the federal government was asked by the industry to lead
a financial bailout of all three of the top original equipment manufacturers (OEM) and
provide federally guaranteed working capital loans to many of the suppliers and dealers.
This crisis also brought another major change that the industry had been unable to
accomplish for many years: as part of the bankruptcy filing of General Motors and
2

Chrysler, the federal government allowed pension costs for retirees to be transferred to a
third party trust. In addition, many unprofitable manufacturing lines and brands were
shut down. After many years of confrontation between the auto sector, its unions, and the
federal government, the US automotive OEMs achieved cost parity with their global
competitors in a weakened and vulnerable condition but with essentially the same
innovation system that had contributed to their collapse.

Towards a Better, Faster and Less Costly Innovation Process
The US auto sector faces a challenging future beyond the restructuring of 2009.
Despite achieving manufacturing cost parity for the first time, the industry continues to
be challenged by emerging US energy and regulatory policy, rising fuel prices, intense
global competition for customers, and the emerging threat of substitution by electric
vehicles. The industry must find ways to adapt to the turbulent environment and innovate
more rapidly than its global competitors if it is to survive.
There are numerous barriers to faster and less expensive innovation process in the
auto sector. First, the sector will continue to face regulatory requirements to reduce
externalities associated with vehicle use. Since the 1960’s, the industry has chosen
confrontation over collaboration with regulators and policymakers on issues of public
concern such as safety, pollution and fuel economy. A more collaborative approach from
both government and industry could lead to more innovations reaching the market at a
faster pace.
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The second barrier is the industry’s evolving structure; a vertical hierarchy of
firms and tiered suppliers. While the traditional closed innovation process worked well
until the early1980’s, it has proven to be too slow to respond to the rapid shifts in
consumer preferences for more fuel efficient and environmentally friendly vehicles.
While some industries have been able to work collaboratively with their supply chains,
the American OEM’s cost-driven negotiating strategy has been a strong disincentive for
innovation from the supply chain. Now that cost pressures have been dramatically
reduced via government intervention, the US firms could try to repair their relationships
with their suppliers.
Third, unlike other high technology industries that thrive on the innovations from
small entrepreneurial companies, the automotive sector never developed a vibrant and
healthy ecosystem of spinoffs, startup companies, and venture capital to draw on for new
ideas and radical innovations. The auto manufacturing market, because of its closed
innovation process and the tendency to be risk averse, is a difficult market for young or
early stage companies to enter. Long lead times, challenging payment schedules and
extensive testing can squeeze small company cash flow to their breaking point. The path
to the auto industry for the small companies is through the tiered supply chain. Should
the OEM-supplier relationships become more progressive, it could create an opening for
more entrepreneurial startup firms to contribute to the auto industry’s resurgence.
Finally, the most challenging barrier is the auto firms’ inability to capitalize on
emerging technologies, with few exceptions such as the GM Onstar™ system. While
often demonstrating concepts years ahead of competitors, the US auto industry often
4

lagged smaller and more nimble rivals. New knowledge-intensive business models are
now emerging in the marketplace that leverage the convergence of semiconductors,
software, and wireless communication to create value for car companies, public utilities,
insurance companies, and government. Collectively known as “the connected vehicle”,
these new opportunities bring information and entertainment into the automobile and
allow drivers to interact with the infrastructure around them. These same technologies
can also be used by regulatory agencies to collect dynamic vehicle and traffic data for use
in reducing transit time and traffic jams.

The Purpose of this Research
The central question of this research is: how can industry-scale open innovation
networks accelerate the rate and lower the cost of innovation across the US auto industry?
One promising field of research that has had success in other industries is open
innovation (OI). Open innovation theory and practice emerged in the past decade after
researchers noticed that many large and prominent firms were radically altering the way
research and development was being performed. Rather than relying on large internal
R&D staffs and budgets, these leading companies are leveraging the knowledge of many
external collaborators to develop new products and business models. The majority of
existing OI research has been focused at the firm, not the industry-scale.
This research seeks to answer the research questions using an exploratory case
study methodology. The case chronicles the creation and experimental testing of a new
concept called open innovation networks (OINs) to investigate how open innovation
5

could be applied at the industry level. An experimental OIN, called the Innovation
Network for Sustainable Mobility (INSuM), was developed by Clemson University
researchers and tested in an event called the AutoVenture Forum (AVF) held in
September, 2010.

The design and execution of the forum was funded by the US

Department of Energy and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers. The forum
was planned with advice and support from senior managers within the auto industry.

The Public Policy Context- Industrial Policy
Industry scale open innovation networks are a possible method to bypass the
historical problems associated with industrial policy discussions because they focus all
stakeholders, private and public, on solving industry-framed problems. Historically, the
argument of market failure vs. government failure has not lead to solutions, but to an
invisible “developmental state” (Block, 2008). As the brief litany of policy and market
failures highlighted at the beginning of this chapter demonstrates, there is ample blame
on both sides for the collapse of the US industry in 2009. But, there is no simple answer
to the question of what caused the US auto industry to collapse: was it market failure,
network failure (Huggins, 2000) , or government failure? Nor is it clear from existing
research into industry structure and innovation why only the US industry (both OEMs
and many of the suppliers) failed, while other North American auto firms, Magna in
Canada for example, seemed to weather the financial crisis intact. Further, other
industries that make so-called "complex assembled products" also did not collapse.

6

Industry level collaboration and competition within the same network
organizational form creates new questions for existing competition and intellectual
property law, which are both federal policies. In addition, the success of an OIN calls
into question the continued viability and purpose of existing pre-collaborative publicprivate collaborations, such as the US Council for Automotive Research and other
organizations that have their genesis in the 1984 National Cooperative Research Act.
The concept of “innovation failure” is used in this research to describe both the
cause of the problems within the industry and also suggest that a major hole exists in
federal policies that ostensibly are in place to prevent such a failure. State and Federal
policy needs to encourage firms to stay on the “innovation frontier”. The purpose of the
OIN is to bring the cutting edge innovations from entrepreneurial startups, the “frontier”,
into direct contact with the larger existing firms that can scale up the innovations.
Federal support for industry R&D has its place in supporting innovation over the long
run, but it will not, as the auto collapse shows, keep an industry alive or competitive.

Significance of this Research
This research has very important implications for US energy policy, job creation,
regional economic development strategies, and the long term competitive strategy of
manufacturing intensive sectors of the US economy. A successful industry-scale OIN
may be able to better leverage collaborative relationships with government as
demonstrated. Better relationships with government can lead to less costly and more
effective ways to achieve energy and sustainable mobility goals. Job creation may be
7

accelerated as the large automotive firms learn to leverage and scale up innovations from
small entrepreneurial companies. Industry scale OINs can leverage existing regional
economic development organizations as partners and sources of new startup firms.
Finally, open innovation implemented at the industry scale may be able to leverage a
truly unique American asset: the tens of thousands of high technology startup companies
created each year. All of America’s competitors can buy the same tools, learn the same
management methods, and gain access to financial leverage. But no other country, per
the Acs/Szerb Global Entrepreneur Index, has the depth and breadth of both individual
and institutional culture to support entrepreneurs (Acs, 2010).

Outline of the Dissertation
This introduction is followed by a literature review. The literature begins with a
brief overview of the original INSuM concept. From the conceptual model that INSuM
suggests, the literature review investigates five different areas of research that are
relevant to open innovation implemented at the industry scale. A key focus of the
literature review is the role of innovation intermediaries. The literature review closes
with a summary of gaps in the existing literature and areas where a new theory can be
developed.

Chapter three starts with the findings from the literature review and build

the outline of a qualitative theory of industry-scale open innovation networks. The theory
is constructed using a series of clarifying questions about the design, organization, and
operation of open innovation networks.
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Chapter four is the case study of the startup and operation of the INSuM concept
and its first embodiment: the AutoVenture Forum. The first section of the case study is
focused on the period of 2007 to 2009: a troubling period in US economic history when
the US auto industry collapsed in conjunction with the US banking crisis. The second
section of the case documents the design, development and operation of the AutoVenture
Forum over the period from 2009 to 2011. The case closes with an analysis of the case
study data and compares the lessons learned from the AutoVenture Forum to the theory
defined in chapter 3.
Chapter five analyzes the results of the case study and compares to them to
several different types of innovation schemes and their applicability to the auto industry.
Chapter six examines the open innovation network concept from a policy perspective.
Chapter seven summarizes the results of the theory building for open innovation
networks, the policy analysis and recommends areas for further research.
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CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

An Overview of the INSuM Concept
The INSuM concept, a new type of organization, was developed by Dr. David
Bodde of Clemson University over a two year period, from 2008 to 2010. The operation
of INSuM was documented in a series of presentations, white papers, proposals and
related documents (D. L. Bodde, 2009; D. L. Bodde, 2009). The model claims to create
value by adding a complementary component to the existing innovation processes within
the auto industry: an “industry-scale” network that connects the auto industry firms to
the small, entrepreneurial startup companies. A complete description of the INSuM
model is included in Appendices A through E.
The method for bringing the two sides, entrepreneurial firms and larger auto
firms, relies on a network organization mediated by specialized intermediary firm. While
the concept derives its inspiration from a wide range of business experience, teaching,
and perceptions, existing research in management or organizational theory do not
adequately describe or model the behavior of the proposed organization.
The concept describes the industry-scale open innovation network as having four
primary economic actors: industry partners, entrepreneur partners, the INSuM
organization (the “hub firm”), and federal agencies. The term “industry-scale”, as
compared to firm-scale, means that all existing suppliers and OEMS in the auto industry,
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some bitter rivals, are open to collaborate and compete within the network. The expected
size and constitution of the network in the model is unknown. INSuM can be considered
a “hub firm”, following the description given by Dhannaraj (2006). Unlike other existing
networks, the primary goal of the network is to facilitate deal flow or R&D collaborations
between the small entrepreneurial firms and the established industry firms.
The focus on deal flow leads to the creation of a value-added services group,
managed by the hub firm, to encourage and streamline the deal flow. Services organized
and brokered by the hub firm can be investment oriented or more technical support
functions that are primarily targeted toward helping the startup firms better demonstrate
the viability of the technology.
Numerous case studies have been published about single-firm open innovation
practices. The majority of case studies are essentially firmed centric- an innovation
ecosystem built around a single firm. No case studies currently explore how the OI
theory could be applied at a larger scale. The industry-scale focus of the INSuM, by
comparison, creates the potential for a new conduit for policy makers to create public
value. However, very little is known about how public policy and open innovation can or
should interact (de Jong, Kalvet, & Vanhaverbeke, 2010).

Introduction to the Literature Review
The INSuM concept described above and the descriptive name used to describe its
function derive some of its conceptual framework from the a priori theories and practices
of open innovation, corporate venture capital, and existing innovation intermediaries. A
11

role for public policy is indicated but is not thoroughly explained. From the description
provided in the INSuM documents, some of the existing economic, management, and
organizational theories that could apply toward describing the behavior of the INSuM
organization include:
•

startup companies as suppliers of innovation

•

suppliers as part of the innovation network,

•

use of an intermediary to facilitate transactions, and

•

a brokerage function.
But the INSuM concept poses many challenges and creates some opportunities

that do not exist in the majority of existing research on single-firm open innovation
networks or collaborative networks. These include:
•

creation of two-sided market to overcome the challenges of dealing with
thousands of potential small startup firms,

•

both collaborators and competitors are present in the network,

•

economic actors in the network are firms, not individuals,

•

a focus on early stage startups as the source of innovation,

•

a potentially much larger and more complex network structure,

•

Third party intermediary, and

•

A way for government to participate in the network
I will first review the typology, functions, and roles that hub firms are known or

theorized to play as innovation intermediaries. For hub firms and their networks to be
successful, they must actively work to create value for network members via
12

collaborations between firms. The collaborations in OINS are typically between very
large and very small entrepreneurial firms. Attempts by the OIN to foster these types of
asymmetric relationships can face a number of known challenges. A review the existing
literature on asymmetric relationships can help inform how OINS can overcome these
challenges.
OINs may be successful in some industries and unsuccessful or unnecessary in
others. An extensive literature exists on industry structure and innovation. Some of these
reviews have a more traditional or static view while others acknowledge the dynamic
nature of competition and innovation. Many studies also point to the importance of the
institutional environment that surrounds an industry in driving organizational behavior
and innovation.
The final section of this chapter will review existing studies on innovation policy
and how they might connect into OINS to accomplish their goals. Because OINs operate
at the industry level, they potentially create an efficient conduit to channel public
demands directly into the innovation process in order to create public value. The chapter
will close with a summary of the key findings from the literature.

Typology of Innovation Intermediaries
Individual firms pursue outside source of innovations for many reasons. One
reason is based on the heuristic that if technology change is high and the change is widely
dispersed, then no single firm can keep up with all the innovations. This is the driving
force behind a broad number of R&D collaborations (Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr,
13

1996). While the Powell-Koput study of biotechnology industry was influential, the
conditions that prevail in the biotechnology sector may not be present in other industries.
Therefore, other methods may be needed to spur innovation.
Chesbrough, the leading authority on open innovation, has taken a different
approach. He has shown that firms, from low tech to high tech, can benefit by leveraging
external collaborators in the R&D process. Many studies have documented benefits that
have accrued to companies pursuing this strategy. He has also recommended that
scholars explore open innovation at the intra-organizational level and network level
(Chesbrough & Crowther, 2006), rather than just the firm level. Industry-level, as used
to describe the organization under study, includes all competitors and suppliers within an
industry.
Collaborative knowledge networks (CKN) are a type of innovation network that
share some similarities with open innovation networks (De Maggio, Gloor, & Passiante,
2009). Dimaggio and Gloor define CKNs in the following way:
…are made up of groups of self-motivated individuals, linked by the idea
of something new and exciting, and by the common goal of improving
existing business practices, new products or services for which they see a
real need. Their strength is related to their ability to activate creative
collaboration, knowledge sharing and social networking mechanisms,
affecting positively individual capabilities and organizations’
performance.
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There are some important differences between CKNs and OINs. The key actors in CKNs
are individuals rather than corporations. There is no mention of competitive behavior in
CKNs. Further, there is no mention of cost, a marketplace, or motivations of the actors
other than a joint vision. However, the motivations that drive the creation of CKNs and
OINs as an organizational type are similar. Both organizations appear to have evolved
as a response to their institutional environment and subject to the “the complexity of
political, regulatory, and technological changes” (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).
Three further distinctions between CKNs and OINs are important. First is the
concept of virtualization or online communities. Individuals in collaborative networks
routinely work together in a virtual environment enabled by sophisticated
communications technologies. However, some collaboration among corporations,
especially in the investment field, still relies on much more traditional protocols that
employ face-to-face communication. The second area is the mediating function
performed by the hub firm. Second, collaborative networks may be governed more by a
seniority system and operated according rules such as “respect your elders”, while the
OINs are expected to be managed and operated by an intermediary or hub firm. The third
difference is collaboration. Open innovation networks are highly competitive as firms
search for the best deal flow while CKNs are strictly cooperative. This does not preclude
incorporation of cooperative behavior among industry firms in the future.
OINs are also members of a class of organizations called information
intermediaries (Chesbrough, 2007) in the existing literature. Chesbrough (2007) cites
five issues facing open innovation practices that intermediaries may be able to resolve:
15

(a) managing and protecting identity; (b) managing contamination risk; (c) identifying
useful, non obvious sources of innovation; (d) fostering a two-sided market; and (e)
scaling efficiently with volume. Because OINS had not been designed as of 2006,
Chesbrough’s first problem of “managing identity” refers to the for-profit intermediaries,
discussed later, that seek to keep the identity of larger firms hidden. In an OIN, all of the
companies are aware of the other players. Contamination risk, the accidental release of
proprietary information, is a concern to nearly all major companies.
Winch’s review of innovation brokers, provides a typology that assists in comparing and
contrasting the OINs in this research against other types of intermediaries that may work
at the industry-scale (Winch & Courtney, 2007). The term broker in this context is
derived from social network theory and describes a person or actor that links other actors
together. Further, innovation broker is defined initially in the paper as a firm that is
specifically designed to broker new ideas between innovation suppliers and users or
consumers of innovation. Winch does not provide any insights into the rate or cost of
innovation facilitated by these organizations nor does he analyze any interactions with
public policy.
OINs do not share many characteristics of knowledge brokers. Knowledge
brokers (Hargadon, 1998) typically are consultancies that create their own solutions to
customer problems in the public or private sector. A typical firm would be a product
design firm that uses its specialized knowledge to provide solutions to others but does not
enter into manufacturing or marketing.
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Another form is the so-called technology broker. Technology brokers may
include a wide range of firms operating one-sided markets that seek to sell or license
patents and know how. For example, most universities operate some kind of technology
transfer office. The office conducts out-bound marketing efforts to find customers for
university developed technology. Unlike OINS, technology brokers operate more as
virtual store front and do not attempt to create a specific type of market in innovations.
OINs are also very different from so-called co-operative technical organizations
(Winch & Courtney, 2007). These organizations can be standards societies, professional
associations, or technical committees within either organization. The primary form of
network behavior is collaborative and the output of the collaboration is a joint product
such as a new industry standard. However, innovations usually occur prior to
standardization and frequently must compete for supporters before a dominant design and
subsequent standardization is established.
The formal definition of innovation broker that is finally developed (Winch &
Courtney, 2007)is closer to the current conceptual definition of OINS:
An innovation broker is an organization acting as a member of a network
of actors in an industrial sector that is focused neither on the generation
nor the implementation of innovations, but on enabling other organizations
to innovate.
However this definition has a few shortcomings. It lacks mention of a mechanism for
sourcing innovations, designing an innovation marketplace that is efficient and effective,
or leveraging network effects (Katz & Shapiro, 1994).
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A new type of for-profit intermediary has emerged in the past decade. Typified
by firms such as NineSigma™ and Innocentive™, these firms seek to develop a webcentric platform for the trade in technology and related knowledge. Terminology is again
a very important discriminator in the description and functional description. This trade is
primarily in knowledge, know-how or intellectual property. There is no specific mention
of the brokering innovations between small companies and large companies.
Lichtenthaler and Ernst (Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2008) note that these organizations have
not been subjected to any formal economic analysis as very little data exists.
In the Lichtenthaler and Ernst qualitative study of the NineSigma and others,
twenty-five different European firms were analyzed with respect to their experiences in
the Internet based technology marketplaces. Of these, only two of the twenty-five were
interested in further exploration. A return on the licensing firm investment was
considered very low. The authors’ discussion of yet2.com is telling: they find that t the
firm had 90,000 users and successfully brokered 10 technology transfer agreements in
2004. But Lichtenthaler cites that licensors, the potential “customers” of technology
trade, were critical of Internet marketplaces as “unsystematic”. This criticism suggests
that many technologies were available but there was no specific focus. The authors’
further claim that many of the technologies offered in these marketplaces were not core
technologies, possibly reflecting organizational resistance to using the platforms.
The commentary infers that the licensor and licensee firms are caught in Arrows
Information Paradox: if transactions are dependent upon the revealing of proprietary
information, then disclosure can cause the good being exchanged to rapidly lose value,
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while not enough revealing can prevent a transaction from occurring (Arrow, 1962).
Chesbrough also makes this point in his discussion of open business models and
problems creating a market for innovations (Chesbrough, 2007).

Functions Performed by Intermediaries
Howells (Howells, 2006) provides a comprehensive review and integrative
analysis of the role of intermediaries. The key distinction made earlier between OINs
and other intermediaries was that OINS attempt to create an innovation marketplace and
that the marketplace follows the dynamics of two-side markets. Howells does extend
Winch’s classification by adding some additional types of intermediaries such as third
parties, “bridgers”, and superstructure organizations. It is his description of the
functions performed in the innovation process that more definitive statements about
intermediaries are found. Key functions performed by intermediaries are (a) foresight
and diagnostics; (b) scanning and information process; (c) knowledge processing,
generation and combination; (d) gate keeping and brokering; (e) testing, validation and
training; (f) accreditation and standards; (g) regulation and arbitration; (h) intellectual
property; (i) commercialization; and (j) assessment and evaluation.

Most of these are

descriptive enough, but none of them identify the key discriminating features of OINS.
Dhanaraj and Parkhe (2006) provide the most comprehensive theoretical
treatment of intermediaries and incorporate the concepts of firm’s behavior in innovation
networks. A working definition of innovations networks is also provided: “they are often
being viewed as loosely coupled systems of autonomous firms”. The term “hub firm” is
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used to describe the function of innovation intermediaries in a network. The hub firm’s
perspective must be the creation of value and the ability of member companies to extract
value from it. Dhanaraj proposes that while interactions, called collaborations in this
research, between firms are expected, it is highly likely that the hub firm can accelerate
these or intentionally create barriers that make them difficult.
A framework is presented to organize and characterize the functions that the hub
firms. Three major types of functions are performed by hub firms: network design,
orchestration processes, and outcome. Network design functions including managing the
membership in the network and managing the structure. Key processes within the
network that are managed by the hub are knowledge mobility, innovation appropriability,
and network stability. The most important process orchestrated in an OIN is deal flow.
Collaborations facilitated by the hub firm demonstrate knowledge mobility. Firm-to-firm
collaborations constitute the essence of knowledge mobility innovation networks.
It is not clear why the hub firm may be able affect the appropriability regime,
especially between companies that are so different in size. In an OIN, there is strong
asymmetry in the two sides of the market. Many of the large firms on one side are
publicly traded or private with sales in the billions of dollars, suggesting substantial and
established intellectual property regimes. The small companies may or may not have
issued patents but clearly are at an extreme disadvantage in a dispute. Given that large
firms voluntarily join the network and accept its formal or informal social contract, it is
unlikely that they would engage in behavior that would prejudice the network against
them. The essential point in Dhanaraj is that opportunistic behavior has to have a check
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and balance system. Limiting opportunistic behavior is an issue of governance of the hub
firm and the network.
The opportunity for the hub firm to engage in principal-agent behavior such as
adverse selection, moral hazard, and opportunism is clearly present in OINs as a type of
network (Jarillo, 1988). The hub firm will be in a position from the accidently spillover
of trade secrets and other proprietary knowledge from the continuous deal flow.
However, like investment banks that are privy to inside firm knowledge, the OIN could
quickly lose its membership if trust is not maintained within the network.
Dhanaraj further suggests that hub firms can facilitate deal flow by focusing on
processes that collectively comprise an informal social contract: trust, procedural justice,
and joint asset ownership. Some of these components of the social contract may be
affected by high sensitivity of the members to the pricing model used in the multi-sided
market.

Value Creation in OINS
Value creation in an innovation network is a process that begins with the hub firm
facilitating beneficial collaborative relationships between small firms and large firms.
The hub firm’s recruitment, selection process, and heuristics (Åstebro & Elhedhli, 2006)
helps to overcome many of the problems associated with the “informal venture capital
market” (Sohl, 1999). Over time, these collaborations, fostered by the network, convert
into more formal ties via contracts or equity investment. Large firms are motivated to
join and participate because the network hub can create a high quality deal flow of
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potential candidate small firms which reduces transactions costs associated with search
and validation (Pyka, 2002) of potential investment by larger firms. The value of
reducing the search costs may be substantial. More than 60,000 firms are funded
annually by angel investors, while typically only 3000-4000 firms may receive venture
capital.
The hub firm, when attempting organize an OIN for the first time, is immediately
faced with a problem of developing an effective incentive structure to bring the two sides
of the market place together. The second challenge is the nature of the market: a market
for innovations can be defined using existing financial terminology as a “thin market”
(Roth, 2008) , as providers of innovations and seekers of innovation may be widely
dispersed, prices and valuations are highly volatile and never cross paths without some
kind of intermediation. Thus, hub firms have to solve both problems simultaneously if
collaboration and value creation are to occur.
Creating an innovation network from existing industry players will tend to
reproduce the existing social networks that already exist (Walker, Kogut, & Shan, 1997).
If a firm with extensive social capital enters the network, it may dominate inside the
network also. However, social capital theory predicts that the small firms or those with
limited social capital that have the most to gain (Walker et al., 1997)
The “thin market” problem has been widely studied and solved in the field of Ecommerce. E-commerce terminology refers to the intermediary as the “platform”
(VanHoose, 2003). Vanhoose provides four basic types of two-sided markets: (a)
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matchmakers, (b) audience-making, (c) shared input market, and (d) transaction based
markets. Figure 2 shows a simple schematic of a two-sided market.

Figure 1. Basic Two-Sided Market
OINs are designed to fulfill the match-making function by helping companies find each
other. In this respect, the OIN is similar more in concept to the dating club (Evans &
Schmalensee, 2005) than the financial intermediaries discussed by VanHoose.
In the E-Commerce world, transactions costs are highly specific and narrowly
defined. For example, the platform’s major goal is enabling buyer-seller payments via an
automated electronic clearing mechanism. There is no information asymmetry in the
transaction. In the market for innovations, there are fewer transactions to cover the
transaction costs, and many different types of knowledge goods being brokered.
Information asymmetry can be very high because none of the goods, innovations from the
small startup companies, are standard or have known value ex ante. While transactions
costs are often studied in innovation networks (Pyka, 2002), there is limited overlap with
the E-commerce model.
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Only a handful of papers have been published that study how two-sided markets
are coordinated by innovation intermediaries. Lopez and Vanhaverbeke (Lopez &
Vanhaverbeke, 2009) define these more specialized innovation intermediaries in the
following way: “platform providers in two-sided innovation markets created to coordinate the flow of innovation requests and solutions across distinct, distant and
previously unknown innovation actors”. Their insistence on the use “distinct, distant”
and the requirement of “previously unknown” shows that they are primarily referring to
the for-profit intermediaries mentioned earlier.

Management of Asymmetric Relationships
Dhanaraj has pointed out that a key function of the hub firm is maintaining
network membership. In the industry level OIN in this research, this means fostering
collaborations and relationships between very small start companies and the much larger,
established industry firms. These types of collaborations between small entrepreneurial
companies and larger firms can be described as asymmetric relationships (K. Blomqvist,
2002). The asymmetry refers to not only to size, but sophistication, access to resources,
maturity of management team, and other attributes. Minshall et all (T. Minshall,
Mortara, Elia, & Probert, 2008; T. Minshall, Mortara, Valli, & Probert, 2010) studied the
problems that occur when startups and large firms attempt to collaborate and defined a
linear continuum that describes how firms may proceed from informal introductions to
formal relationships. These papers are useful for from a practical sense but do not
address the context of collaborating within an innovation network environment.
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Informal associations like OINs imply the existence of a social contract as a
governance mechanism. The role of trust and contracts in asymmetric relationships was
studied by Blomqvist (K. Blomqvist, Hurmelinna, & Seppänen, 2005). The author
defines the general problem of initiating asymmetric relationships succinctly:
Small firms entering an asymmetric partnership often stake their reputation and
future on the large partner’s integrity and willingness to find win–win solutions. Large
companies may not have as much to lose, and they have better chances of avoiding
opportunism in that they have more resources for instituting legal actions, and they can
refuse further transactions and find other partners instead.
This suggests that yet another feature of these collaborations are the “credible
commitments” of the larger firms to engage in meaningful discussions with the smaller
firms. Firms that can develop trust can reduce contracting costs and related transactions
costs of doing business (K. Blomqvist et al., 2005). A major limitation of the paper is
that it is based on a single case study of two Scandinavian firms: one large and the other
small.
The previous definition is useful when describing collaboration within OINS but
it does not follow that transactions costs explain why firm collaborate. A network view
(Chen & Chen, 2002) of asymmetric alliances takes a different view. Strategic alliances
are “a situation where two or more firms unite to pursue a set of agreed-upon goals, in
which they share the benefits; and in achieving these goals, partner firms independently
control over the performance of assigned tasks and contribute on a continuing basis in
one or more key strategic areas”.
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A more dynamic and network view of firm collaboration was first offered by
Granovetter (1983). According to this view, all firms are embedded in one or more
networks in which they collaborate with others to create value. Chen differentiates
between the static implications of the transaction cost view versus the more dynamic
network view from Granovetter. However, the dataset and analysis in Chen’s analysis,
while extensive, is focused exclusively on the role of smaller domestic Taiwanese firms
and their relationships with larger international firms.

Industry Structures and OINs
A number of studies have been published on the open innovation practices in
automotive industry (Brown et al., 2010; Ili, Albers, & Miller, 2010), consumer products
(Dodgson, Gann, & Salter, 2006), telecommunications (Dittrich & Duysters, 2007), and
open source software (West & Gallagher, 2006) to name a few. Industry structure is
especially relevant to the operation and success of OINs. The role of industry structure
and its effect on innovation is sometimes associated with the emergence of dominant
product design. A dominant product design can alter the structure and nature of
competition and innovation within an industry (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). The net
effect on the industry is standardization (Suarez & Utterback, 1995), which shifts the
industry toward price and performance-based competition. This shift toward a more
stable form of competition can force small innovation firms out of the market until a
major technological change or disruption starts the competitive process once again.
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Other outcomes of the dominant design include a shift by the industry toward a
more hierarchical and bureaucratic form (via emphasis on structure, rules, and goals)
where larger firms vested in the dominant design seek to capture and control value in the
supply chain (Abernathy & Utterback, 1978) . This description of technological change
on industry structure has strong overlap with the concept of punctuated equilibrium
(Gersick, 1991) as applied to organizational theory. Theories about organizational
change within the firm are shaped by how one views the process of change. Punctuated
equilibrium states that organizational structure will be resistance to major change,
allowing only incremental change. Revolutionary or disruptive organizational change
brought on by technological change can cause sudden shifts in how firms organize.
Overtime, firms adapt to this new perturbation and the tendency to allow only
incremental change sets in once again.
Industries vary dramatically in their adoption of technology and their
manufacturing or process methods. This research paper is primarily focused on what are
called “complex assembled products” (Utterback, 1994). The opposite of the complex
assembled products would be non-assembled products such as continuous processes that
produce chemicals. This particular distinction has its disadvantages as the industries
chosen for study by Utterback and Abernathy were primarily focused on electromechanical assemblies. An argument might be made that complex drugs are assembled
from a set of precursors. However, drug manufacturing does not entail the large
investment in manufacturing assets typical with vehicles, aircraft, or large electromechanical equipment.
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Industry innovation may also be driven by modularity (Langlois, 1999). Product
modularity utilizes standard interfaces that enable “autonomous innovation” to occur in
any or all of the modules. Langlois (1992) review of stereo components and personal
computer industry suggests that “innovation in a modular system can lead to vertical and
horizontal disintegration, as firms can often best appropriate the rents of innovation by
opening their technology to an outside network of competing and cooperating firms.”
This same approach was used (Galvin & Morkel, 2001) in a study of the bicycle industry,
a type of complex assembled product. In this study, the early standardization of the
bicycle has lead to the disintegration of the supply chain as predicted by Langlois and
reduced innovations beyond the basic component level.

Open Innovation Case Studies and Empirical Data
Classification of the industries is one way to discuss the role of OI. R&D
intensity, defined as the total of direct and indirect R&D expenses divided by sales, is
generally accepted by the OECD and the US government as separating industries in a
“low-medium-high” technology classification system (Acs & Audretsch, 1987; NSF,
2008; Peneder, 2003; Thornhill, 2006). Low technology firms have R&D intensities of
less than 1%, low-medium are between 1 and 2.5 percent, medium technology firms are
2.5 to 7 % while high technology firms are considered greater than seven percent. It is
not clear from the existing literature if open innovation is migrating out of the high
technology segment into other segments.
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Proctor and Gamble, the consumer products company, was one of the early case
studies in the implementation of successful OI practices (Dodgson et al., 2006). The
company has developed an innovation process known as “connect and develop” that
enables the firm to work with external researchers and contributors to create innovations
and solve problems for the firm. P&G operates in six NAICs codes which have R&D
intensities ranging from 0.7 (Food) to 7 (chemicals). Using the OECD criteria, P&G has
business units operating in all four technology sectors. Since the case presented by
Dodgson does not break out OI success by sector, it is difficult to draw conclusions from
this study about which line of business is benefitting most from OI practices.
Telecom firms have been studied to examine individual firm strategy. Dittrich and
Duysters (2007) studied how the mobile telecom firm Nokia used a combination of
“explorative and exploitive” methods to find and collaborate with external partners. The
case study concluded with the following quote (Dittrich & Duysters, 2007):
This study also illustrates that Nokia effectively uses an open
innovation strategy in the development of new products and services and
in setting technology standards for current and future use of mobile
communication applications.
Within the telecom industry, Nokia is considered a high-technology company because of
the percentage of sales per net revenue that is applied to research and development, a
quantity often called “R&D intensity”.
At the other extreme from Nokia but within the same industry, the German
telecom giant Deutsche Telecom was profiled in a case study in 2009 (Rohrbeck, Hölzle,
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& Gemünden). The authors cited existing news sources that the firm was a “dinosaur”
and on “verge of extinction” in 2005. The authors further note that: “Throughout the
study, various examples have been identified that documented that the open innovation
instruments are applied very effectively in this corporate R&D unit”. With R&D
intensity in the telecom industry of just above 1.0 or low technology, Deutsche Telekom
might be a candidate for a lower technology successful implementation.
Comparing and contrasting the Nokia and Deutsche Telecom case studies shows
that open innovation seems to work well at firms that have very different R&D
investment strategies, even in the same industry. Thus R&D intensity may not be a
defining factor of which firms or industries are better able to take advantage of open
innovation. Nokia, considered high tech because of their high R&D intensity, uses OI
methods throughout the firm’s product development processes. According to the authors
of the Deutsche Telecom study, the larger German firm is using OI methods in a variety
of business segments.
Open innovation in its current state is subject to external validity challenges
(Chesbrough & Crowther, 2006; Yin, 2009). Many of the studies of OI implementation
used industry leading companies, a form of selection bias, as examples of successful
implementation, and nearly all examples came from the high technology industry already
known for cutting edge innovation and management practices. Other critics have argued
that OI is really just “old wine new bottles” (Trott & Hartmann, 2009).

Startup Companies-Suppliers of Innovations
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Startup companies must be recruited for the network to operate. Because the
network primarily seeks to recruit from the early stage or pre-venture capital funded
ranks of companies, there is a search problem. One problem is finding qualified
companies for the network is the lack of a master list or database of early staged,
investor-financed firms. Another problem with finding small viable firms is the well
known “Darwinian Sea” that separates early stage startups from financial and market
success” (Auerswald & Branscomb, 2003). The Darwinian Sea metaphor suggests that
only the strong survive, or only the most capable and adaptable firms can reach the
financial security that comes with profitability and growth.
The vast majority of venture capital firm avoid early-stage investing. The void or
lack of early-stage, high risk capital is filled by corporate venture capital, non-equity
corporate partnerships, angel investors, matched by state and federal grants. This earlystage market is highly inefficient for three reasons (Sohl, 2007): (a) angel investors are
difficult to find due to their desire for anonymity, (b) a high level of search costs for both
angels seeking investments and small companies seeking angels limits the quantity of
deals that can be managed by investors, and (c) there is an inadequate amount of earlystage capital.
The literature on corporate venture capital is a major pillar of the empirical
support for open innovation networks. It is well known that corporate investors in small
firms may invest for other reasons than just financial gain. One major driver of corporate
investments (CVC) is to gain the knowledge and innovations that lie outside the firm in
small companies (Dushnitsky & Lenox, 2005). Dushnitsky goes on to show in a
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longitudinal study over twenty years that firms that engaged in CVC had higher levels of
patenting than firms that did not use CVC.
Entrepreneurial startups are likely candidates for larger firms to acquire new
innovations and knowledge. Shane (2001) demonstrates that high value technological
innovations are more likely to come from new firms (startups).

Public Policy and Industry Innovation
The process of innovation has been described by a wide range of models. The
one most commonly cited or implied in policy documents and congressional testimony is
the linear model. The linear model explains innovation as a process that begins with
investments in education and research. This leads to the creation of inventions and new
ideas. New ideas are then matched with problems and opportunities by private sector
firms to create new products. When new products are introduced into the market place
the model stops.
Understanding the assumptions in innovation models is important to public policy
as they often shape how policy makers respond to macro economic trends. There are
several key assumptions that underpin the linear model. The first is that the federal
government should intervene in the creation of new knowledge via research funding
because the private sector will tend to underfund the more risky basic research that
governments traditionally sponsor. The private sector under invests R&D because it
cannot capture all of the value due to direct or unintentional spillovers. The second
assumption is that the return on public R&D is extremely large, larger than even the
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return on private R&D. Jones and many other have calculated the social return to R&D
at a minimum of 30% (Jones & Williams, 1998). This second assumption assumes that
the benefits associated with the commercial introduction and scale up of a new invention
accrue domestically.
When innovation is defined using the linear model, policy makers generally have
only one response to public concern over the rate of innovation: increase spending on
education and R&D, the primary inputs to the process. This was clearly on display in the
recent study produced by the National Academies of Science (Augustine, 2005). Yet
this logic is challenged by other, more current reports that show that the amount of R&D
(Jaruzelski, Dehoff, & Bordia, 2005) spending by major US corporations is no longer
strongly correlated to increases in revenue. This last point also challenges one of the
major assumptions, that the linear model drives the creation of public benefits.
Other studies suggest that even if the linear model does explain some of the
innovation behavior, it has a fatal assumption about what happens after the innovation
enters the marketplace. Grove (2010) explains that introducing a new product is not
enough from a policy perspective. How and where that innovation is scaled up matters
greatly. If publicly funded research is converted into new products but those products are
then manufactured off shore, the linear model essentially fails to generate the expected
public benefits and the US is denied the social return on the original public investment.
In the private sector, the innovation model for a single product is not considered
linear, as in a simple sequence of well known processes. Some products may reach the
market place via a linear model but many products follow a very different path. Von
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Hippel (2007) describes user driven innovation where interaction with lead customers
drives the next generation of products, not R&D. Some contemporary models describe
the recursive nature of some innovations. In these models, experience with early
products is used to alter existing research or development priorities and create the next
generation product.
All of these existing models share a common bias. They assume that the
innovations originate from inside the firm. New data and research suggests that this
once dominant paradigm is beginning to change. Studies of corporate venture capital
behavior indicate that many firms are actively looking outside the firm’s boundaries to
find complementary research and innovations that can be combined into a new product or
service. Other scholars have pointed out that public-private partnerships are often formed
because neither the private firm nor the government has all the resources internally to
create a new invention (Stiglitz & Wallsten, 1999).
Policy makers at all levels continue to be highly motivated to encourage domestic
industry innovation. Many of the existing policies are rather blunt objects and not
targeted at a specific industry. Operating an open innovation network at the industry
level may create a new type of “conduit” for state and federal policymakers to learn from
and contribute to the success of an industry, while bypassing many of the traditional
problems where agencies try to pick and choose technology winners (Dobrinsky, 2009).
Dobrinksy’s analysis maintains that a knowledge oriented industrial policy in contrast to
traditional industry policy approaches may be a better way for the public sector to engage
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with a major industry. The term knowledge oriented industrial policy is defined in the
following way (Dobrinsky, 2009):
…to denote a new brand of public sector interventions targeting various
structural aspects of the economy through transmission channels and
mechanisms that hinge on the driving forces of knowledge flows and stock
and incorporating a system understanding of the policy rationale.
The discussion in Dobrinksy comparing traditional industrial policy and knowledge
oriented policy mirrors the larger discussion between traditional neoclassical economics
and institutional economics. Of specific importance to this study is that traditional
industrial policy views innovation as a linear model where the government supplies
complementary investments into basic research and education at the beginning of the
model. This leads, over time, to commercialization of technology or the sale of
innovative new products and the introduction of new process technology. A knowledgebased view of industrial policy acknowledges the importance of networks and the “highly
uncertain” nature of innovation outcomes.
De Jong et al (2010) have a more specific approach to analyze what kind of
policies affect open innovation in general. The authors state that entrepreneurship, tax,
research, investment, education, labor markets, and competitive (anti-trust) policies can
affect the individual components of open innovation. While this is a useful
categorization of the policies in use, there is no data provided that suggests that one
policy is more successful than another in encouraging open innovation or any kind of
innovation.
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A good example of the lack of data on the effectiveness of innovation-related
policies is in intellectual property. Strong appropriability regimes and their enforcement
are considered essential to a broad knowledge commons and the ability of firms to earn
economic rents from their patents and know-how (Teece, 2010). However, weak
appropriability regimes may actually be more conducive to innovation. By comparison,
zealous and uncompromising enforcement of intellectual property can lead to legal
stalemates because of the limited monopoly rights given to patent holders.
There are a broad number of policies that have been enacted to encourage
innovation in general. A smaller number of policy instruments have specifically targeted
an industry or a specific problem within an industry. Prizes and advance market
commitments (AMC) are two highly specific instruments that attempt to advance the
state of art in a specific application. Kremer (2010) argues that patents are one type of
award but have problems of inefficiency. Prizes are effective in focusing innovation on a
single problem but there is no follow-up and the resulting innovation maybe more of a
demonstration project than something that can be scaled up through the industry.
Advance market commitments (AMC) are legal commitments by government to purchase
a substantial number of a given product if the “prize” conditions are met. This policy
should lead to greater level of commitment by the industry to scale up the innovation.
The implicit assumption is that prizes and AMCs should be targeted at the industry.
Trying to spur innovation using an external mechanism can be problematic. The
Progressive Automotive X-prize was a multi-year competition, hosted by a non-profit
organization that ostensibly tried to spur innovation in the automotive industry by
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awarding monetary prizes to firms that could break a 100 miles per gallon (equivalent)
performance barrier while meeting a subset of the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards (FMVSS). No US automotive OEMs or major suppliers participated in the XPrize. Only two of the one hundred and thirty entrants into the X-Prize have made
progress toward commercialization. By contrast, the two leading companies in the
electric vehicle market, Tesla Motors and Fisker, have received major support from the
US Government, Toyota Motors and General Motors respectively (Audretsch, Link, &
Scott, 2002).
Government funded research projects primarily target specific firms through a
competitive bidding process. The Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program
is funded by appropriation of the R&D budgets for major agencies. SBIR grants have
been instrumental in helping launch high technology companies (Audretsch et al., 2002;
Audretsch, 2003) . Considering the sheer number of firms funded by angel investors
each year (more than 60,000), the few thousand firms funded since the beginning of the
SBIR program represent a small fraction of the available startup firms for a network.
Any public support for an open innovation networks may have to resolve potential
conflicts with the current administrative focus on regionalism and clusters (Munro,
2010). Cluster theory is well established in the economic literature (Porter, 2008).
Clusters and regional economic networks primarily seek to foster the formation of new
companies. But regionalism does not have to be in conflict with the purpose of
innovation networks. Using a network view, OINs would treat regional economic
organizations as innovation suppliers for industry networks.
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Key Findings from the Literature
The literature review clearly shows that the OIN concept is a kind of “bridging”
theory that interconnects many areas of existing research. Studies of existing
intermediaries are a valuable contribution to the understanding of how OINs should
work. While no existing research has specifically studied “deal flow” in the context of
this research, the type of deal flow in the OIN is unique and presents several challenges.
Throughout the INSuM documents and the existing literature is the implicit assumption
that these small, early stage firms are abundant enough and contain enough latent value to
justify the existence of an OIN.
The existing literature on relationships between the US auto industry and
government does not support an optimistic view about industry cooperation with
government participation in the OIN. This is primarily due to the history of
confrontational relations between the auto industry and government. The literature also
suggests that strong government participation, as evidenced by the close relationship
between the semiconductor industry and the biotechnology in industry, can be beneficial
to industry. However, the bailout sought by the auto OEMs and their suppliers required
extraordinary concession by the management, the unions, and the government to reach a
final deal. This “near death” experience may have changed the industry permanently
and put it on a more collaborative footing.
The existing literature is also very thin on key topics relevant to OINs. The
economics of networks are suggested in the literature but not really tested. The
preliminary results about third party intermediaries are not promising. The literature
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inter-organizational collaboration does not define an OIN as used in this research. This
may be due to the problem that “industry “failure”, as evidence by the collapse of the
US auto industry in 2009, is unprecedented in modern US economic history.
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CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY

The Central Question
The central question of this research is: how can industry-scale open innovation
networks accelerate the rate and lower the cost of innovation across the US auto industry?
This research uses an exploratory and qualitative, single case study methodology (Yin,
2009) to build a theory of industry scale open innovation networks.

Research Questions
The central question in a qualitative research study can be further focused through
a series of exploratory questions about industry-scale open innovation networks, as
suggested by existing qualitative research methods (Creswell, 2009). The questions are
designed to probe the role of the hub firm and its relationship to other members of the
proposed network, the nature of the deal flow as a value creating process, the importance
of startups as the primary source of innovations, the underlying economic theory, and to
better understand how public policy can or cannot be accommodated via the INSuM
concept.
Open innovation networks are expected to have characteristics of both
collaboration and competition. At face value, this immediately raises a concern that an
OIN, as described in the INSuM project documents, may run afoul of competition
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(antitrust) policy. Existing competition policy only allows industry competitors to
collaborate under carefully controlled circumstances (Brooks, 1993). In the initial view
of the OIN, the large firms collaborate to specify the investment focus of the deal flow
process. The larger firms also compete to attract the most compelling candidate small
firms into collaborations. Therefore, the OIN may be managing an innovation brokerage
service. But the goods being exchanged in the marketplace do not have a clear value ex
ante. Once collaboration occurs, it maybe months or even years before the value of the
collaboration is known ex-post. A necessary first step in determining if industry-level
OINs are really a new type of organization is to compare the proposed OIN in this
research to other types of collaborations that target innovation.
Q1 What are the expected differences and similarities of OINS from other
types of open innovation or innovation networks?
The second question probes into the primary goal of the proposed network:
creating value by facilitating collaborations between small firms and large firms. The
INSuM documents assume that the larger firms, which traditionally have eschewed
relationships with startups, will find value there now. But the INSuM concept does not
suggest how value might be accumulated within the OIN, or how the various network
members can appropriate value. For example, if General Motor’s venture capital
subsidiary is able to cherry pick all of the best firms or outbid other firms because of their
size, this could lead to other firms exiting the network. Clearly the startup firms win in
any bidding contest. The concept also claims that the OIN will be complementary to
existing firm-centric innovation efforts. The documents do not describe the boundary
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between the firm’s participation in the OIN and their own innovation ecosystems. The
boundary that is implied is via the type of firm that the OIN seeks to bring to the network:
early stage startups. This is a significant boundary as these firms vastly outnumber the
more prominent and well known firms that have raised significant venture capital.
The INSuM documents do not suggest that value is created solely by the amount
of a transaction that was brokered by the hub firm. The source documents leave open the
possibility that the two sides of the market may find different types of value in their
participation. The INSuM proposal also does not rule out the possibility of a wide variety
of value creation mechanisms. For example, should the number of startup companies
admitted into the network gain enough size and momentum, the hub firm may be able to
create a situation where multiple startups are encourage to work together to solve more
complex auto problems than a single firm could manage. In summary, there are many
ways that the hub firm may create value but it is not clear which should come first or
which can be monetized.
Q2 How does the hub firm create value?
The third question examines the incentives that bring together the two-sides of the
proposed primary value creation mechanism: R&D collaborations between small
entrepreneurial firms and the larger industry firms. Unlike existing private and public
equity markets, the market managed by INSuM is about making new relationships.
Consummating these types of relationships does not contain an immediate payoff for a
third party investor.
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The institutional arrangements that the hub firm creates to operate the market
define the limits of who is considered part of the network. An explicit selection process
exists for the startup firms but one is not specified for the larger industry firms. The
challenge for the hub firm is that the larger OEMS bring with them their own supplier
networks. Each of the companies in the supplier network brings their set of existing
relationships. Ford has a major telematics partnership in place with Microsoft.
Google™ also has a major investment in automotive infotainment. Likewise, Denso of
Japan and Robert Bosch of Germany also sell to the US OEMs. The presence of some of
these players might be an incentive for small companies to seek admission to the network
but it could also cause other firms to drop out for competitive reasons.
For the network to create value for any of the large firms, the hub firm must be
able to provide a unique deal flow of small firms that is not available through existing
methods, or is too costly or time consuming to acquire. A small firm can be considered
unique if the larger firms have not previously had any detailed interactions with the
smaller firm.
Motivation for the early stage companies and their investors to join the networks
may be driven by a multitude of factors. Keeping the small firms engaged in the
network over time may be dependent on the hub firm’s ability in attracting and keeping
senior representatives of industry firms in the network, suggesting that some aspects of
two-sided markets may be present.
Q3 What are the factors that motivate and incentivize R&D collaboration
between the two sides of the network?
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The literature on the economics of networks is vast. The unique model proposed
by INSuM creates a problem in defining the economics of the expected deal flow. First
of all, there is no real pricing mechanism described. Startups prepare their own
documentation. Documentation is validated by the hub firm but no financial valuation is
done on the startup company.
The older and more established method of evaluating why an inter-firm
collaboration, like those described by INSuM, involves the reduction of transaction costs.
A second reason is the acquisition of resources. Combining the large firm’s resources
with the small firm resources could create value that is larger than value of the two
resources considered separately.
A third method of examining the economics of collaborations is through an
analysis of risk and uncertainty. One method to value these kinds of strategic choices
from the perspective of the large company is through real options. Real option reasoning,
applied in this case, places a value on what the industry firm can learn through
participation in the INSuM network and from collaborations initiated with the small
firms. The economics of real options as applied to open innovation networks can be
explained as a series of call options that are purchased by the larger firms. The call
options have no expiration date but provide the option owner with a “right” to future
investment.
From the perspective of the hub firm, real options also suggest a way to value
the INSuM network and its operation because:

44

•

each large firm that joins the network buys a call option to participate in the
network,

•

the cumulative value of the initial call options reflect the value of network
membership , and

•

as individual large firms begin to exercise call options on the deal flow provided
by the hub firm, the value of the network should increase.

Firms that exercise their membership option can reduce uncertainty about the direction
and path of technology development. Firms that engage in the collaborations with small
firms from the network can teach more about a specific technology that firms that do not
collaborate.
A fourth way to evaluate the economic theory at work in the OIN is drawn from
so-called network effects (Katz & Shapiro, 1985). Katz and Shapiro refer to goods that
increase in value with the number of economic agents consuming the good. Inferring
from the INSuM model, large industry firms are expected to collaborate when defining
the scope of the deal flow and then compete for whatever the hub firm brings to them. If
the OIN can document a series of successful collaborations that lead to new value
creation within the firm, the other large firms may become more motivated in developing
collaborations.
Q4 What economic principles govern the operation of an open innovation
network?
Many industry studies point out that industry structure can impact innovation and
the sources of innovation (Robertson & Langlois, 1995). “Complex assembled products”
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such autos, aircraft, electric machinery, process equipment, military weapon systems, and
ships are integrated systems built from a network of vertically organized and dedicated
suppliers (Suarez & Utterback, 1995; Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). Modular systems,
such as personal computers, are built by assembling units from modules that interconnect
via standard interfaces and are produced through a horizontal supply chain. Nonassembled products such as those found in biotechnology may benefit from OINS but this
area has not been studied.
Finally, the industry or industry value chain appropriability regime may be the
most important factor in defining the OIN concept. When large firms such as GM and
Ford do not control either the upstream or downstream innovation, an opportunity should
exist for small companies to enter into the market and create value.
Q5 What factors of industry structure affect the design and operation of an
OIN?
Government agencies are specified in the INSuM concept as being key members
of the network. Yet, it is not clear exactly how and why an agency would participate in
an OIN. Traditionally, government agencies have encouraged innovation, most directly,
through a variety of programs that encourage the licensing of federal technology to
private firms. At the other extreme, agencies have intervened directly in the marketplace
to accelerate adoption of emerging technologies in areas of national interest, such as
loans made to electric vehicle makers and advanced battery companies and subsidies for
the production of ethanol. Agencies may enter directly into agreements with one or
more industry partners via a CRADA. In other cases, agencies may provide discretionary
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funding for specific projects, such as the DOE’s $5M funding for the Automotive X-Prize
technical infrastructure. Finally, the government can drive down manufacturing costs of
a new vaccine by issuing a binding contract to purchase economically valuable quantities
should the vaccine meet the prize requirements.
All of these previous mechanisms are based on established benefit-cost analysis
(BCA) or similar methods of thinking. Applying BCA to justify agency participation is
problematic for the reasons mentioned earlier. It is difficult to put a dollar value on R&D
collaborations. Real options, one of the methods for valuing collaborations between
industry firms, might be a better way for agencies to evaluate participation in the OIN.
The Department of Energy is already an avid user of real options (Hand, 2001). Given
the high levels of risk and uncertainty now present in the US auto industry, an ideal
environment for real options reasoning, agency financial support and participation in an
industry-scale OIN could be a low cost way to both encourage innovation and decrease
uncertainty. The agency benefits by supporting the OIN financially and learns how to
differentiate between real R&D problems and simple industry intransigence. If the
agency learns that there are many ways to achieve social value, it needs only to
encourage industry along a viable path.
The ITS or “connected car” paradigm is an example of the problem and the
opportunity. Cost-benefit analysis currently does not support implementation of ITS via
regulatory mandate. The social planners at the Department of Transportation could
sponsor an INSuM event or series of events that focus on the generation of data needed
by the DOT to implement some of the ITS goals. Sponsoring the events, a form of
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buying a call option, is much less expensive that engaging in a regulatory battle with the
entire auto industry or attempting to pass on the costs of a massive infrastructure project
to taxpayers via higher vehicle taxes or other charges. Should OIN (the real option
purchased by the agency) not produce the value that the social planners want, they can
always resort to regulatory mandate.
Q6 How can government agencies create social value by participating in an
OIN?
Having government agencies involved in the OIN immediate creates a potential
for conflict with existing auto industry firms over governance. Regulatory agencies that
act as consumer advocates such as the EPA and NHTSA could bring a chilling effect to
innovation. But other agencies that have more collegial ties to the industry such as the
Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, and the Department of Commerce can
bring considerable subject matter expertise to the OIN. If agency staff were granted a
position on a board overseeing the OIN, the agency might be tempted to push for a more
public value agenda.
If the primary contribution from the public sector is government technical
expertise, this will tend to benefit the small firms more than the large firms. This is
simply because many of the largest auto firms have had extensive working experience
with major agencies since the 1960’s. The hub firm might consider brokering access to
existing government initiatives that encourage the formation and growth of high
technology startup companies such as “Startup America”, the Small Business
Administration’s new loan program, or the Department of Energy’s program to license
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some 15,000 patents to small companies for $1000 per patent (USGOV, 2011). It is
sufficient to say that there are many possible ways that the federal government may
engage with the OIN that could create social value without creating conflict or causing
market distortions. But, fund raising is not the sole purpose of the OIN and would be
redundant to existing efforts. Fund raising for promising small firms has traditionally
been the responsibility of the firm’s principals, their board of directors, local investors,
and regional and state economic development organizations.
Q7 What forms of collaboration between government agencies and the OIN
maximize innovation and minimize conflict?

Research Methodology
The research uses an exploratory case study to build the initial theory about
industry-scale open innovation networks. Case studies are well established in theory
building (Eisenhardt, 1989; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009). The case study
documents the design, startup and operation of an experimental open innovation network
over the period of 2008 through 2011. A key part of the case study was the planning and
execution of the experimental OIN’s first event called The AutoVenture Forum™ held in
Novi, Michigan on 22 September 2010. See appendices A, B, and C for details of the
planning of the event.
The unit of study in this case is the network created by the research team at Clemson
University. There are five major sub-groups or economic actors within the network: the
hub firm, the large industry companies, the startups, venture and angel capital funds, and
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broker/specialists. The network communicates through a variety of external networks,
via information brokers, to find network members and resources.
The sampling strategy of this case study is to acquire data and documents from all
those who participated or somehow influenced the formation of the network and the
AutoVenture Forum (AVF) event. Design documents and discussion are documented in
emails, proposals, presentation slide decks, and white papers exchanged between the
INSuM team members and external organizations.
Data were collected on the startup companies that were recruited for the project.
Of the twenty-nine that applied, twelve were selected to present their business plans to
the auto industry. These documents provided by the applicants prior to the AVF event
include executive summaries and presentations. Analysis of the executive summaries and
selection of presenting companies was accomplished via a company evaluation process
developed by the project team. Investment data about the companies was also acquired
through search of the US Securities and Exchange Commission Form D: Notice of
Exempt Security Offerings and through a variety of databases that track early stage
company formation and fund-raising activity. The University of Connecticut’s Center for
Venture Research was approached as a collaborator but my request for background data
was declined.
Data collection included two surveys of participants. After the first event, an
Internet based survey using the Survey Monkey™ online survey tool were conducted of
attendees. This first survey contained eight questions and was conducted 30 days after
the event. The second survey was much more detailed. The survey instrument was
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prepared specifically to generate data to provide answer to the research questions. The
instrument was reviewed and approved by the Clemson University Internal Review
Board in April 2011. The survey was then administered to the attendees from April
through June of 2011. In some cases, large companies limited my ability to contact
attendees to a single representative.
The most comprehensive data comes from second survey: the telephone survey
of participants of the AutoVentureForum. Attendees were contacted via email or
telephone to setup an interview time. Once an interview time was established, a case
study protocol document was sent to the attendee via email. At the beginning of the
conversation, each interviewee was advised of the rules of data collection and the steps
taken to insure their privacy.
While a few interviews were done without recording, this procedure was stopped
as manual transcription by phone proved inadequate. A protocol change was made to
allow recording of interviews. This was approved by the University’s Internal Review
Board. A voice-over-IP recording software package was purchased and installed. A
commercial VOIP application was used to call the attendees. Once the conversation was
completed, the recording was stored on a server. At a later time, the recording was
played back and the audio tracks were manually transcribed into a text document.
The primary analytical technique used to analyze the case study is the use of an
organizational-level logical model (Yin, 2009). A logic model was developed within the
original research on the INSuM project. The logic model can be captured in the
following statements:
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•

The traditional closed innovation process within the auto industry is no longer
competitive

•

The US auto industry is under persistent external stresses and must evolve

•

A method must be found both accelerate the rate lower the cost of innovation

•

Small, entrepreneurial firms can provide a source of external innovation

•

Open innovation networks can couple the strength of the small firms to the needs
of the industry firms

The model was shared collaboratively with the auto industry’s senior executives in a
January 2010 meeting. As Yin states (Yin) “Evaluators also have demonstrated the
benefits when logic models are developed collaboratively- that is, when evaluators and
the officials implementing a program being evaluated work together to define a
program’s logic model”. For example, the INSuM project suggests that the resulting
OIN will behave according to two-side market theory. I can test the survey data for
evidence that these dynamics exist. Likewise, the logic model’s outcome is new, unique
collaborations between a small firm and a large automotive industry partner. Evidence of
this collaboration would support the logic model.
Logic models as an analytical approach can benefit by the use of rival models or
explanations (op. cit.). There are several rival views about innovation in the auto
industry that are helpful in testing the solution proposed in this research. First, advocates
of the “linear model” of innovation focus their attention to increasing the inputs to the
innovation process, principally increasing R&D spending. Some data supports this view.
Another view of auto innovation is that government intervention into the market place
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raises domestic industry costs and creates competitive disadvantages vis-à-vis
international competitors. Reducing regulation on the industry would make the industry
more competitive and more innovative. An area closer to this research claims that US
auto industry OEM-supplier relationships are at the center of their innovation problems.
Extensive survey data supports this view. Improving relationships between the two could
solve the innovation problem by leveraging more supplier-driven innovation (Henke &
Zhang, 2010).A final view is that the industry simply refuses to accommodate any notion
of sustainable transportation, is tone deaf on issues of pollution or health issues, that
gasoline consumption is a critical issue, or that climate change is at best, irrelevant.
Proponents of this view generally argue for heavy government intervention into the
marketplace (Sperling & Gordon, 2009) as these symptoms point to massive market
failure.
The case study data was organized into families. Each family represents a
specific sub group or economic actor within the OIN. For example, all of the
entrepreneurial startup company documents are collected into a single family. The
families of documents are indexed and relationally linked together using a software tool
called Atlas.ti.
Using the research questions as a guide, a coding strategy was developed.
Documents in the families were coded using the Atlas.ti tool. The codes represent key
concepts from the theory and the research questions. The documents can then be
searched for codes and groups of codes to extract content about a specific question.
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The codes can also be grouped together to locate higher order concepts. This is
especially useful in analyzing the recorded interviews. For example, INSuM model
makes a claim that innovation markets behave more like two-sided markets. This can be
tested by grouping the answers to the survey questions about two-sided markets and
comparing the different views. The differing views can be used inductively to give
support for the two-sided market claim.

Case Study Data Collection
Case study evidence consists of internal and public documents. The pre-AVF
event data included:
•

correspondence among the INSuM team members from March 2009 through July
2011,

•

presentation slides given by various INSuM team members throughout the case
study period,

•

white papers and briefing documents published by the INSuM team,

•

summary documents of meetings held with auto industry staff and others,

•

copies of marketing literature used to recruit companies,

•

application documents from the 29 startups that applied for the first AutoVenture
Forum,

•

INSuM team analysis of the 29 startup company documents,

•

trip reports by team members throughout the period,

•

econometric data about the industry, and
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•

Center for Automotive Research Annual Management Briefings.

The post-AVF event data included:
•

structured survey document used in the interview process,

•

initial survey response data from the October 2010 online survey,

•

recordings and transcripts from the 35 interviews conducted in the April to June
2011 timeframe,

•

opinions and discussions among team members and participants, and

•

three academic papers published by the INSuM team at symposia and other
meetings around the country about the INSuM concept and the AutoVenture
Forum.
The email correspondence was used primarily to document dates of decisions,

trips and meetings. The INSuM model was documented directly the original materials
published at Clemson University.
Data about the number of startups companies was generated from documents
published by the Angel Capital Association, the Center for Venture Research, and various
state level venture capital organizations.
The analysis of the interviews generated a number of different documents in
addition to the transcripts. A spreadsheet was created that contained a synthesis of data
about the startups. Some of this data was extracted from transcripts and other data was
collected from Internet sources. Some of the external Internet sources included the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) website, company websites, and databases
containing published articles.
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The online survey tool, SurveyMonkey™ that was used in the October 2010
survey provides details of those who answered the survey. Data from the survey were
copied from the PDF report and pasted into a spreadsheet program, and the same charts
were re-generated for easy incorporation into the final document.
A pre-AVF list contained 139 names of attendees. The registration documents for
the AVF only showed 78 names. Numerous attendees entered the conference during the
day and did not register with the ASME staff. The estimated total number of attendees at
any one time was approximately 90, done by visual count. A substantial number of
attendees did not or would not leave their email or telephone information. Of the 52 that
did leave their information, I gained access to 35 total or 67% of the available attendees,
or 44% of the registered attendees. Twenty one different companies and organizations, in
addition to the startups were present. The companies represented are listed in Table 1:
Ford Motor Company
Chrysler Motors
BMW
Delphi
GM Ventures
Connected Vehicle Trade
Association

General Motors
USCAR
Faurecia
Robert Bosch
Michelin
Specialty Equipment Marketing
Association (Automotive
aftermarket)
Hughes Telematics
Yazaki
Alion
OSU
Autoharvest
Kauffman Foundation
Sunny Acres Engineering
Detroit Regional Economic
Development Association

Intel
Autonet Mobile
Visteon
Magnet
Infield Capital
Automation Alley
TAU Engineering
Raravis/Grupo Antolin
University of Michigan
Table 1. List of Companies Attending
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In some cases, a department or company had sent multiple attendees. In these
organizations, I was assigned one person by the firm to respond to my request for
interviews. One of these organizations provided an interview and the other sent back a
written answer to the questionnaire. The latter written answers were answered with
responses such as “yes”, “no”, or “I have no experience to answer this question”. The
poor quality of this response was in stark comparison to many senior executives who
stayed on the phone for an hour or more.
The recorded interviews totaled about 150 MB of data or 30 hours of voice
recording. The interviews were transcribed using simple MP3 playback software and
headphones. In numerous cases, the recordings contain echoes or garbled information.
These were noted in the raw transcript files using ellipsis (…) or question marks. When
the interviewee made an off-hand remark or shifted toward a passive voice, a clarifying
comment or word in parenthesis was annotated via an inline text comment. Clarifying
questions in the transcript would start with a “Q” and then be followed by a shorthand
version of my question.
In most of the interviews, the interview departed from the survey to ask follow-up
questions to purse specific points. This became extremely valuable as the wording in the
questionnaire was sometimes confusing for the interviewee. On occasion, additional
examples of specific topics were provided and the interviewee was asked to comment.
For example, when questions about the role of government in the OIN were asked,
respondents frequently asked questions such as “can you give me an example?”
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A final step in organizing the interview data was assigning alphanumeric codes to
each of the interviews in order to insure privacy of the interviewee. While this technique
is problematic in some types of qualitative research, the benefits to this research project
were much more detailed answers to some of the exploratory questions.

Case Study Organization
The case study is organized into three sections. The beginning of the case study
starts in 2007 with the US auto industry heading toward bankruptcy. Data from the US
Bureau of Economic Analysis, US Census, and the US Patent Office document the key
indicators of the declining rate of innovation in the domestic auto industry. Also data
extracted directly from the Center for Automotive Research Annual Management
Briefings in 2007 and direct quotes from the presentations from the auto industry were
used to describe the predicament of the auto industry “in their own words”. This set the
stage for the need for a transformative innovation process. The second section in the case
study documents the startup of INSuM, which began in 2009. This section carries
through to October 2010. The third section analyzes the results of the surveys. The final
section identifies some key learning from the case study about the INSuM model.
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CHAPTER FOUR

THE INSUM CASE STUDY

Introduction
The importance of successful innovation as a “game changing event” is well
known. In 1941, the US Army Air Force entered World War II at a disadvantage: many
of its planes could not climb high enough or turn fast enough to out maneuver Axis
aircraft. Over a very short time, American ingenuity and manufacturing, backed by
extensive Federal investment, radically improved our combat aircraft fighting capability.
By 1944, US fighter planes were superior to all existing enemy aircraft (Chambers &
Anderson, 1999) . Speed of innovation can also be a deciding factor and in some cases,
more important than quality. In the fighter plane example, the outcome of the war would
probably have been very different if US aircraft manufacturers finally delivered a
superior fighter plane in 1950. The speed of innovation can lead to domination of the
battlefield and often in the marketplace.
The cost of innovation is a different matter. Not all challenges faced by US
industries can be approached with the single minded dedication and an unlimited budget,
typical in global warfare. In business innovation, the rate and cost of innovation is
affected by many different parameters such as industry structure and the presence of a
dominant product paradigm.

The government roles in innovation are to create and

maintain the institutions that enable economic and social progress to occur together. In
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the US auto industry, for example, most innovations have originated from inside the
industry’s research labs. These new ideas, along with the thousands of other components,
must find their way through the hierarchical tiered supply chain, be integrated into a
subsystem, and eventually make their way out to the customers into a fully assembled
vehicle.
Innovation in the auto industry can be affected by existing and emerging
regulatory requirements. New vehicle designs must be flexible enough to incorporate
these requirements. Ideally, regulators would enact new or more aggressive standards to
accommodate public demands, such as lower traffic fatalities or higher gas mileage. The
industry would then be expected to leverage the competitive forces of the marketplace to
create the most efficient solution. But regulators can also ignore competitive forces and
attempt to force adoption of a specific technology.
For more than a decade, the National Highway Transportation Safety
Administration (NHTSA) has pursued an Intelligent Transportation System (ITS)
research agenda to make cars safer and reduce congestion. In the past, the agency had
scored some major successes with the introduction of seat belts and airbags. But with
ITS, the agency insisted upon its own implementation and custom radio communication
system. The proposed system is complex, currently unfunded, expensive, and with many
parts of the concept still undefined.
At the same time, Ford and GM, developed and have put profitable systems in
place that that could be leveraged by NHTSA to achieve some of their goals. Other
vehicle manufacturers have also developed proprietary in-vehicle sensor systems that
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employ short range radar with rear facing cameras to warn drivers of potential dangers.
Complementary system suppliers to the auto industry such as vehicle navigation
companies are planning their own methods to improve safety by using their existing invehicle displays and networks to warn drivers of approaching dangers or traffic jams, and
offer alternative routes. Still other companies avoid new on-vehicle hardware all
together and simply use smart phone technology, existing pervasive cellular networks,
and crowd-sourcing software to allow commuters to share traffic updates as they see
them.
This brief example illustrates the nature of many of the problems between the
auto industry and its regulators. The plethora of solutions reminds one of the accepted
heuristic in the high technology world: there are many smart people working on these
problems and most of them don’t work for any one auto industry firm, or for the
government. It makes sense to find a way to get the smartest people from across industry
and government to collaborate on potential solutions at the industry level but leave the
implementation or the “how” to the competitive forces in the private sector and ensure
that consumers have a choice of different solutions to accommodate the government’s
desire to reduce the cost and frequency of vehicle crashes.
Open innovation, an emerging management theory, advocates that firms should
take these very steps and leverage these external sources of knowledge to create new
value for their customers (Chesbrough, Vanhaverbeke, & West, 2006). And, where a
firm has unused technology, that technology should be marketed outside the firm to
create new value in collaboration with others. These external sources of innovation can
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exclude existing public or private research laboratories, universities or startup companies.
Firms can also combine internal resources with external resources to create a new firm, if
that pathway creates more value.
But all firms, regardless of size, are limited in their ability to find, sort and
identify the most promising solutions that lie outside the firm or the industry. Social
networks and existing networks of innovators can be leveraged to find these potential
partners. New concepts called open innovation networks or OINs are emerging around
large diverse technology firms as a kind of innovation ecosystem (Adner & Kapoor,
2010). Typically the large firm will divert some of its earnings to cultivate a private
ecosystem that is designed to support or enhance the large firm’s products directly or
through complementary products that drive demand for core products.
But these networks suffer from a common problem: their ability to attract the best
and most innovative external partners is limited by the amount of investment dollars,
expertise, and management time that the focal firm can apply to managing the innovation
ecosystem. The focal firm must absorb all transaction costs and manage the search for
new technologies. If one or more of the small companies or research labs in its personal
ecosystem fails to deliver, it can create substantial problems for new products or erode
confidence in the ecosystem as a source of innovation. A kind of innovation “fatigue”
may set in, putting additional pressure on the ecosystem organizers and managers
(Mcgregor, 2007).
However, the search for new innovations can be separated from the ongoing
maintenance of the single firm’s innovation ecosystem. Major industry firms can work
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together to consolidate their search processes to create a constant flow of innovative, new
companies. Similar to the collaborative or “pre-competitive” research allowed by the
National Cooperative Research and Production Act (1993) (NCRPA), an industry-scale
open innovation network can be managed by third party intermediary to find and evaluate
the promising technologies and present them to industry members.
The OIN concept in this research is similar to the NCRPA but also has some
major differences, see Table 2.
Attribute
Scope

NCRA authorized Joint Ventures OIN
Federal Agency and Private
Industry-Scale
Industry
Goal
Coordinate pre-competitive research Create an industry scale
market for innovations
Source of new ideas Research labs at Universities,
Early Stage Startup Firms
federal labs, private firms
Table 2. CRADA versus OIN
The primary goal of the OIN is to accelerate innovation across the domestic industry,
where the goal of NCRPA is to coordinate and allocate research funding. Second, the
OIN concept focuses on innovations: technologies that have already entered the
marketplace in the form of new services or products rather than funding promising
research. Third, the OIN looks for innovations primarily within the population of angel
and venture capital backed startup firms. There are a large number of possible firms and
innovations. In addition, these firms need a partner that can scale their innovation, a
capability of the larger auto firms. Fourth, the primary work of the OIN is the constant
search, validation, selection and presentation of new startup companies into the network.
By viewing the OIN as a two-sided marketplace, the work of the intermediary or hub firm
is to balance the incentives, costs and value so that both the large firms and the small
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firms stay engaged and benefit from their participation in the network. The ongoing
selection and presentation of new candidate startup companies is a type of “deal flow”,
similar to the processes that exist in investment banking.
Industry-scale OINS have not been developed, implemented, or studied in the
literature. Some practitioners in Europe have been experimenting with a type of industry
scale innovation network. One example is the Network of Automotive Excellence
(NOAE). NOAE manages innovation competitions that seek innovations from small
firms. NOAE, a nonprofit, is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Economics and
Technology. The ministry’s industrial investment is draws from the eight regions of
Germany and focuses the innovation effort on nine different “thematic” areas or
“clusters”.
The actual role and internal organization of the proposed innovation intermediary
in the proposed network is unknown.

Further, it is not clear if existing theories of

innovation and inter-firm organizations can model or predict the behavior of OINs.
Finally, very little research has been published on early stage firms as a source of
innovation for large firms. An experiment is needed to test the conceptual model
developed by the research team and Clemson University.

Case Study Purpose
The purpose of this case study is to test how an industry-scale open innovation
network can increase the rate and decrease the cost of innovation, while accommodating
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the needs of regulatory agencies to create public value. The study focuses heavily on the
role of the innovation intermediary in managing the activities of the OIN.
The auto industry was chosen as the target industry for several reasons. First, the
industry size and importance to the economy makes the test important for public policy.
The auto industry is the largest component of the manufacturing sector of the economy
and a major consumer of many other manufactured goods and services. Next, the
industry is at the center of numerous regulatory and incentive programs. OINs could
become a new policy tool if it can be demonstrated that government policy goals can be
addressed collaboratively. Finally, the industry has extensive experience with many
types of joint ventures and a major public-private partnership. The industry’s
participation in the project can provide additional insight into how the OIN, as an
organizational form, compares to other types of collaborative inter-organizational
alliances.
The case analyzes the origins, design and execution of an experimental open
innovation network. The organization, called the Innovation Network for Sustainable
Mobility or INSuM, was funded by a grant from the United States Department of Energy,
the American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Clemson University, and benefitted from
the full cooperation of the United State auto industry and their major suppliers.

The US Auto Industry in 2007
The University of Michigan’s Center for Automotive Research (CAR) has been
hosting its annual management briefing seminars for the auto industry for the past forty65

five years (CAR, 2011). The content of the week-long series of briefings reflect many of
the contemporary issues facing the auto industry. In 2007, the auto industry was rapidly
heading into a financial crisis, gasoline prices hit their all time high mark, and it appeared
that bankruptcy of General Motors and others was a possibility in the near future. A now
prophetic session called “Innovate or Die” was included in the weeklong agenda.
Hosted by CAR’s David Cole and Richard Gerth, the introduction to the session had this
to say about the importance of innovation:
With the dramatic rise of low labor countries, organizations in high labor
countries must develop strategies that prevent their products from becoming
commodities. Strategies based on improving time and reducing costs, while
necessary, are not sufficient; new strategies must be based on innovation.
Innovation should exist in all areas of an organization ranging from products,
services, manufacturing processes, and strategies to business models and
organizational processes. Further, the knowledge that is driving innovation, while
growing at an exponential rate, is not being implemented as fast as it is being
generated, creating an increasingly large implementation gap.
The “gap” metaphor implies that there is abundant knowledge in the marketplace for the
auto companies to access but the industry must look at new business models and the
entire value chain to identify where the new value can be best used. These observations
are entirely consistent with the theory of open innovation.
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The organizers of the “Innovate or Die” session were on point. Since 2001, the
auto sector had experienced a continued loss of market share and a string of financial
losses as shown as shown in figure 3.
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Figure 2. Automotive Sector vs. Durable Goods Profits

Employment over the same period dropped rapidly beginning in 2005 as shown in figure
4.
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Figure 3. Employment in the US Auto Industry
As gas prices rose to record levels, customers switched their purchases away from the
highly profitable SUVs and minivans to more fuel efficient vehicles, usually imports.
Combined with high pension costs and falling sales of the most profitable vehicles, the
industry began a descent toward insolvency.
The auto sector finally reached its nadir in 2009 when the federal government
had to lead a risky financial bailout of all three of the top US original equipment
manufacturers (OEM) and provide federally guaranteed working capital loans to many of
the suppliers and dealers (Webel, 2011). The crisis also brought another major change
that the industry had been unable to accomplish for many years: as part of the
bankruptcy filing of General Motors and Chrysler, pension costs were transferred to a
third party trust and many unprofitable manufacturing lines and brands were shut down.
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After many years of confrontation between the auto sector, its unions, and the federal
government, the OEMs reached cost parity with their global competitors (McAlinden,
2010). In less than a decade, the largest manufacturing segment of the US economy had
transitioned from profitable to completely incapacitated.
Formation of the AutoVenture Forum
In March 2009, while the auto industry was going through the bailout process,
researchers at Clemson University proposed a radical concept to revitalize innovation in
the auto industry (D. L. Bodde, 2009). The paper advocated the creation of an open
innovation network that brings a previously under-utilized source of innovation to the
auto industry: high tech startup companies. The project received initial funding from the
US Department of Energy. The lead investigator on the project, Dr. David Bodde of
Clemson University, was well known to the US auto industry. Dr. Bodde had served on
the National Academy of Sciences team that conducted annual reviews of the CRADA
between the US DoE and auto industry called FreedomCAR and Fuels Partnership.
The INSuM white paper lead to a series of meetings with senior executives in the
auto industry including the US Council for Automotive Research (USCAR) during
second quarter 2009. Because industry-scale open innovation networks were an untested
and unknown concept at the time, the auto industry and the Department of Energy
suggested that the Clemson team conduct a first test of the concept prior to engaging in
longer term collaboration.
In June 2009, the lead investigator was encouraged to approach the American
Society of Mechanical Engineers senior management as a possible sponsor for the
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project. ASME had been investigating new ideas for innovation through their
Breakthrough Innovation Fund. The proposal from Clemson University was evaluated
and selected for funding. The project funding also included logistical support from
ASME and assignment of a senior staff member to support the project.
The ASME link brought several advantages. First, ASME has more 120,000
members, including many in the automotive industry (ASME, 2011) . Second, their
location in Washington, DC provides easy access to federal policy makers and other
organizations involved with innovation policy. Third, the ASME executive proved to be
invaluable in all areas of organizing and managing the first investment event.
At Clemson University, a cross disciplinary team consisting of Dr. Bodde, one
doctoral student, a senior staff member of ASME, and staff from the South Carolina
Institute of Energy Studies (SCIES) was formed in 2009 to begin project planning and
startup. The starting point of the project was a white paper written by the lead
investigator (D. L. Bodde, 2009). The paper introduced the concept of the AutoVenture
Forum (AVF): a type of networking and collaboration event to test the central concepts
in the INSuM project. The introduction of the paper succinctly defines the scope and
intent of the research effort:
We propose a fundamentally different innovation process for the transition
to sustainable mobility—an open-source innovation network that would enable
collaboration among entrepreneurs, corporate innovators, technologists, investors,
and customers independent of their location. The network could speed the
sustainability transition by connecting the innovative capacity of entrepreneurs
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with the systems integration, manufacturing, and market channels of the industry
incumbents.

One of the most challenging aspects of the proposal was the source of new
innovation: fast growing startup companies. The existing auto industry, based on the
internal combustion engine, has traditionally not been an attractive partner for new
startups for numerous reasons: (a) the industry is generally a “late adopter” of new
technologies(Gassmann, Enkel, & Chesbrough, 2010), (b) the industry had developed a
reputation of sourcing its innovations from its own research labs and engineers
(Gassmann et al., 2010) , (c) lead times between design wins and first production orders
can be years apart, and (d) safety and performance validation of new components is
costly and time consuming. Finally, the auto industry historically has swapped or cross
license patents rather than acquire patents from outside the industry (Merges, 1999)(W.
M. Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000).
The term “sustainable mobility”, a prominent concept within the model, was
further defined in the white paper as:
We use the term “sustainable mobility” to include three essential goals:
(a) improving national and economic security by depending less on oil, (b)
reducing the environmental footprint of road transportation, and (c) building an
economic and profitable auto sector with the help of more agile innovation
processes.

71

This particular definition of sustainable mobility is written using a private sector
perspective. This definition also lacks any mention of two other major externalities from
surface transport: the medical cost of traffic crashes and the lost productivity due to
traffic congestion.
This perspective also assumes that public sustainability goals can be achieved
primarily through product and process innovation in the private sector. However, the
auto industry history shows that this is not always the case. The industry has traditionally
fought against all types of safety, emissions, and fuel economy regulations (Sperling &
Gordon, 2009), despite the remarkable success of emissions and safety regulations. Yet,
at the same time, the industry has maintained a cooperative research and development
agreement with the Department of Energy for eighteen years to pursue advanced
technologies for fuel cells and batteries, to name a few.
The sustainable mobility claims of the INSuM team generated a challenging
problem. Given the history of confrontation between the industry and government, the
organizational form, and the unique pairing of large companies and startup companies to
drive the innovation engine within the model, how then can government become a partner
in innovation rather than an opponent? If the well documented battles over corporate
average fuel economy regulation and other major policy conflicts cited by Sperling were
any indication, it would seem government was going to turn a blind eye toward industry
innovation driven solutions and exercise regulatory authority to get what it wanted.
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The INSuM Model
Design of the network began in Q2 2009. The features of the initial network
design are shown in Figure 3 (D. L. Bodde, Skardon, & Byler, 2011). The model
portrays INSuM as the central hub firm that coordinates industry partners, federal
agencies, entrepreneurial companies and partners, and external service providers. The
primary operational goal of the network is to create unique and high value deal flow of
early stage companies to the industry firms.

Figure 4. The Original INSuM Model
The model proposed that value and service are created for each “side” of the
market via deal flow or collaborations between startups recruited by the entrepreneur
partners and the existing industry firms. The primary deal flow events would be
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quarterly forums where INSuM would work with industry to identify key needs. INSuM
would use this list of needs to solicit, evaluate and select 8-12 candidate companies to
present to the assembled group of industry companies.
The attraction for entrepreneurs and their companies to attend the event was the
opportunity to present their company to the senior managers from several major industry
companies at a single time. Collaboration with a major firm could be a prelude to
investment and possible profitable exit for investors. Therefore the startup companies
had much to gain from participation and very little to lose.
From the industry perspective, the two-sided nature of this “innovation
marketplace” created some challenges. Bringing in the major OEMs and suppliers into a
two-sided marketplace also brings in the industry’s competitive structure and its
institutional values, norms and beliefs. To execute on the INSuM model, the individual
industry players would need to accept both a collaborative and competitive role in the
network. The collaborative role had already been established when the INSuM chose to
approach USCAR for guidance. The competitive role would start once engagement with
the startups was initiated by the INSuM team. From meeting summaries and discussions
with team members, the informal expectations were that ex post, future events would
primarily be paid for by the larger firms. Thus, the larger firms would be subsidizing the
recruitment of the smaller firms. This dictated that the most important network task
would be to gain the commitment of the major industry firms to attend the conference in
good faith. Once the major firms had committed, their commitment could be leveraged
to motivate the startup companies to apply.
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Another issue facing INSuM was the use of the OIN as the organizational form.
Previous industry-scale collaborations such as FreedomCar had been unsuccessful in
preventing bankruptcy of the industry or driving innovation. The traditional closed
innovation process of the major firms had also been unable to satisfy customers and fend
off foreign competition. The INSuM concept implied that the auto industry needed to
look outside its traditional organizational and institutional boundaries to find the
innovations needed to survive. This view was consistent with Langois and Robertson
(Langlois & Robertson, 1995) :
We argue that the choice of an organizational form suitable for a particular
context depends, among other things, on the nature of the innovation, the uses to
which it will be put, and the existing distribution of available capabilities in the
economy, including sources of information. Because of the variety of possible
forms and the importance of on-the-spot knowledge, the choice among
organizational forms should not be tightly constrained by government policy but
should be left to firms to adopt the arrangements that best suit their individual
circumstances.
More flexibility by government regulators to achieve their goals is also needed.
The government’s preferred method of encouraging commercialization of public
research, cooperative research and development agreements (CRADAs) created by the
Federal Technology Transfer Act (1986), may need to give way to more flexible and less
costly methods such as prizes and advance market commitments (Kalil, 2006). Prizes
could be integrated into the operation of the OIN. The INSuM proposal sees the Federal
Government as a partner in innovation, not an opponent, but that view may not be shared
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by the industry participants in the OIN.

The challenge for the INSuM team is to find the

right set of institutional incentives that can motivate industry and government to
collaborate while enabling an increase in deal flow in the proposed innovation network.
The implied contractual relationship between the OIN participants and the hub firm
indicates the possibility of principal-agent issues as discussed in Chapter 2.
Gaining Entrepreneurial Partner Participation
The source of innovation in the INSUM model are the many startup and early
stage companies that are funded by angel investors each year. But there are several
problems with finding and recruiting these companies: (a) the geographical distribution
of these companies has not been studied at this level of detail, (b) the small company’s
willingness to establish affiliations with Internet accessible databases is unknown, and (c)
there is no comprehensive search engine that can identify these early stage startups. The
Securities and Exchange Commission does track private investment. Private companies
are required file a Form D for any investment over $1M. Form D filings can be searched
electronically from the SEC (SEC, 2011) and other fee-based search engines. However,
the average angel investment is typically less than this amount.
The INSuM solution was to develop a channel to the entrepreneurial companies
via three groups of organizations that are normally involved with funding and supporting
entrepreneurial startup companies. The first group includes the local, state, and regional
economic development networks that actively work to encourage startup formation and
growth. The second group consists of the angel capital associations or investor networks
that provide the early stage funding. The third group of channel partners are the
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technology transfer organizations that are common to all federal research labs and most
research universities. The technology transfer offices are primarily a source of spinouts:
new companies that have licensed technologies from the laboratory or the university.
Angel investors dominate the funding for startups and early stage deal flow.
Approximately 60,000 startups and early stage ventures are funded each year (ACA,
2010) while technology transfer spinout companies are estimated at 500 companies a year
(AUTM, 2010). Angel investors provide more 95% of early stage funding with venture
capital firms funding the remaining 5%.
The INSuM team believed that expending time and effort on developing
relationships with these organizations could develop into a low transaction cost method
for finding and recruiting new startup companies for the network. However, to get the
voluntary support of these diverse organizations, the INSuM team would have to
demonstrate that the industry-scale innovation network approach could create novel
collaborations between the auto industry and the entrepreneurial startups.

Gaining Industry Participation
Building a marketplace like INSuM requires a careful balance of incentives, value
propositions and pricing. Because the network operates at the industry-scale, fierce
industry competitors will be “in the same” room with the small startup companies, along
with government representatives. The hub firm, the organization that embodies the
INSuM concept, must accommodate both sides of the market and gain participation. The
Federal government, as a partner, creates a unique challenge as it does not participate in
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any deal making but could provide incentives, intellectual property, and access to
resources that can enable some of the collaborations to complete. Unfortunately,
government agencies that might contribute funding to the network could also be very
disruptive and destroy the innovative culture within the network by attempting to use the
network as a way to create or push a specific flavor of industrial policy. A current
example of government agencies pushing policy over innovation is the Intelligent
Transportation System (ITS) intent to issue rule making in 2013 to require automakers to
install a government designed radio into each vehicle to transmit and receive traffic data.
Gaining initial industry support and participation for the INSuM innovation
network was made easier because of the existence of USCAR. By approaching USCAR
first, the INSuM team was able to reach senior thought leaders in the industry quickly.
This access was facilitated by the lead investigator’s prior working relationship. This use
of social capital is a key point in the successful startup of the new network. Had the team
not had this prior relationship, the ability to gain support may have been more time
consuming and less effective.
Governance and oversight of the hub firm was planned to include major
participants from the industry and other stakeholders. An informal governance council
was created in Q4 2009 that included representatives from USCAR, the venture capital
community, and automotive OEMs and the Tier 1 suppliers. INSuM staff worked with
the governance council to shape and narrow the focus of the first investment event,
subsequently called the AutoVenture Forum. By the end of Q4 2009, the INSuM team
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had gained the support of the industry and USCAR for the first event. Planning for the
event began in earnest.

Gaining Government Support
Government support was already in place for exploring innovation in an award
made to the South Carolina Institute for Energy Studies, the organization that managed
the INSuM project as part of a larger Department of Energy grant. The original award,
made in 2008 was to fund a hydrogen fueling station study. INSuM was partially an
outgrowth of the 2008 award. However in 2009, the incoming Secretary of Energy
dramatically reduced the priority and funding for hydrogen related transportation, citing
many unsolved challenges (Blanco, 2009). To some degree, this left the project a bit
stranded. The principal investigator and the lead investigator contacted the program
manager at the Department of Energy and gained their approval to focus part of the grant
more generically on the problem of innovation.
The more serious challenge to the continuation of the INSuM project was the
absence of a major incentive for the Department of Energy or the Department of
Transportation’s Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) Initiative to become involved or
express their interest in the formation of the network as a possible new conduit for policy.
Part of the incentive problem was due to the mixture of agencies involved with the
transportation system. The Department of Energy is heavily involved with research
while NHTSA is primarily a regulatory agency that does not conduct its own research.
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The INSuM team attempted to counter this problem by working closely with
USCAR as documented earlier. USCAR was the auto industry partner for the
Department of Energy’s CRADA with the US auto industry and had been closely
involved with the DOE in joint research since 1993. To some degree, sustainable
mobility, as defined by the INSuM team, included fuels and vehicle technology. This
research area was clearly under the auspices of DOE. But the project also had claims
that related directly to intelligent transportation, an area held closely by the DOT.
The team at Clemson reasoned that without industry support or a viable
demonstration that an open innovation network could create value and drive deal flow, it
made no sense to approach the federal agencies for support. If the first test of the concept
was successful, then the agencies should be approached to participate. However, a major
concern faced the INSuM team: given the sometimes combative relationships between
the auto industry and government, inclusion of government as a partner in the innovation
may cause some or all of the larger firms to back out. This would have to be tested in the
first experiment.

Planning
A planning meeting was held in Detroit on 20 January 2010 to discuss the
implementation of the first investment forum. In attendance as an informal advisory
committee were executives from USCAR, the major US OEMS and suppliers. The
meeting reinforced the fundamental concepts and purposes why the industry should
establish an industry-scale open innovation network. Two example startup companies
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were discussed as typical of the kind of pre-competitive technologies that were in the
marketplace. September 22, 2010 was set as the date of the pilot for the AutoVenture
Forum.
The initial event was planned by INSuM as a one day investment forum and dealmaking. The INSuM team would be responsible for managing all aspects of event
management, selecting the startup companies that would present their business plans, and
writing a follow-up analysis of the event. The industry’s primary contribution was to
send senior executives to attend the forum, meet with companies that they found
compelling, and assess the dynamics of the event.
During the day, selected startup companies would have fifteen minutes to present
their company’s solution for the auto industry and then have five minutes to answer
questions. Several breaks were planned to allow networking and the one-on-one
interactions. No attendance fees were charged to either side but attendance was by
invitation only. Startups would have to pay their own way to the conference. The agenda
was set, communicated to the informal industry governance council and the recruitment
process started.
Industry executives at the meeting also introduced a new industry sponsored open
innovation-related effort called AutoHarvest. Autoharvest was formed in 2010 to create
new markets for existing auto industry intellectual property and facilitate collaborations.
The company is lead and advised by former auto industry executives and researchers.
Autoharvest is initially focused on making a market in advanced manufacturing
intellectual property developed by the auto industry along the lines recommended by
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Chesbrough (2003) and following, to some degree, the example of existing intellectual
property intermediaries (Lichtenthaler & Ernst, 2008)
The emergence of AutoHarvest lends support to the concept of “industry scale
open innovation”, the fundamental principle behind this research. But it is not clear that
INSuM and AutoHarvest are complements. The Autoharvest initial business model is
primarily targeted at finding licensing partners for automotive intellectual property, or an
inside-out focus (Pankin & Stief, 2011). INSuM is more outside-in focused; looking to
bring new externally created technology and know-how into the auto industry. A major
difference in the two approaches is that INSuM seeks create an innovation market by
matching technology providers to the explicit needs of the industry.
A concern arose among industry and INSuM during the initial meeting and in
subsequent discussions about how to control and define the scope of technologies that
would be present at the event. The auto industry is huge, spanning many continents, with
most companies operating a global supply chain with hundreds of suppliers. How could
the first INSuM event be focused so that (a) it could narrow the scope of the
technologies, (b) would still be of interest to the enough of the auto industry to still attend
and (c) stay away from technologies involved with individual core competencies such as
engines and drive-trains?
The answer from the industry was to focus on the interface between the vehicle
and its external environment: an information intensive area called telematics. Four
concepts were agreed upon to focus the event and recruit startup companies: (a) vehicleto-vehicle communication (V2V), (b) vehicle-to-infrastructure communication (V2I), (c)
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Vehicle to Grid (V2G), and (d) human-vehicle-interface.

Collectively these were

named “V2X” technologies. According to project documents (Leitner & Bodde, 2010) :
“No automotive technologies will be excluded from consideration. However priority will
be given to companies with emerging technologies”.
Many types of value chains may exist within the V2X concept. Good examples
that many car-buyers are familiar with are the ONSTAR™ navigation and crash reporting
system and the newer Ford Sync program. An emerging profitable business model is the
pay-as-you-drive concept, where electronics in the vehicle monitor driving behavior and
car insurance rates are lowered for good driving.
All of these programs can be viewed as operating across a series of interconnected
value added components. A generic value chain model, drawn from industry and
confidential sources, can be assembled to illustrate (see Table 3).
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Table 3. Existing Telematics Applications
In general, data moves bi-directionally in the model between the Human Interface
and the Content Provider. Some specific or dedicated flows also occur. Part of the
ONSTAR crash detection system automatically routes information from the Electronics
Module to the Customer Center and to local EMS/Fire and Rescue.
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The first block in the model is the Human Interface. In currently equipped cars,
this is a built in dashboard display that responds to either touch or voice commands. It is
primary way the driver interfaces with the rest of the system. The Electronics Module
controls the Human Interface and interfaces to the Communications Management section.
The Electronics Module can also connect data dynamically from the vehicle while in
operation from the on board diagnostic port (OBDII) located under the steering column
on all US passenger cars sold since 1997. Software is separate system that connects all
the in-vehicle systems together.
The Communications Management section varies by application and vendor.
Some systems, such as PAYD insurance have a dedicated communications hardware
module. Ford’s Sync system uses the owner’s smart-phone. The Secure
Communication block contains the embedded encryption and verification software that
allows the in-vehicle systems to communicate with the Customer Center. The Customer
Center normally is the human operated call center that responds to specific requests or
events, such as crashes or being locked out of the vehicle. Content Management and
Content Provision are normally associated with pushing information and entertainment to
the Human Interface. In the PAYD insurance systems, driving behavior data is collected
by a secure, proprietary system.
Fundamentally, the industry executives that met with the INSuM were skeptical
that the event could create any unique opportunities. After all, as one of the largest
manufacturing industries in the world, the auto industry had no shortage of new suppliers
trying to gain admission into the tiered supply chain. The auto companies and several of
84

the suppliers conducted ongoing technology scouting operations and sent staff to all
major conferences regarding new technology that could have impact on the industry.
Some of the larger auto industry players also staffed corporate venture capital
departments that specifically targeted emerging technologies and companies. Industry
opinions were mixed about the chances that any unique deal flow would occur through
this new organizational form. The lead investigator spent considerable amount of time
and travel attempting to manage the expectations from the auto industry.
As the event began to take shape, two concerns became dominant within the
INSuM team. First, would the hub firm find enough “quality” startup companies for the
event? Secondly, would the event result in any kind of unique collaborations or potential
deals? INSuM knew that there should be enough startups. While tens of thousands of
new startups are funded each year, the problems would be finding and recruiting those
that met the investment criteria. Collaborations, the second concern, between the small
companies and the large industry firms would be driven two factors: (a) the credible
commitment of the auto industry to come to the event in good faith, but also (b) the
ability of INSuM to generate quality deal flow of attractive technology based startup
companies that were either new or unique to the existing auto industry scouting efforts.

Recruitment of Early-Stage Ventures
The INSuM initial plan to recruit startup companies combined a mixture of
presentations at major events with conventional outbound marketing and web based
registration intake. The focus on V2X technologies included a range of possible
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companies from wireless technologies, software to manage wide area networks,
enterprise class databases, and information-entertainment content provision
(infotainment). V2X was also a good choice as it is platform agnostic: it can be applied
to existing vehicles in the form of after-market products, designed into new vehicles, and
also applicable to emerging electric vehicles.
The INSuM team developed a plan to generate deal flow of candidate companies
(Byler, 2010a). The plan targeted a specific list of existing innovation related content
providers, events, industry organizations, and investor organizations such as the Angel
Capital Association. The two senior members of the team then developed a schedule
covering the February to July 2010 timeframe to make presentations at major events
about the pilot program. However, the lead investigator indicated that direct contact with
potential startups may be the most effect way to generate deal flow in the first
AutoVenture Forum, at least in the first experimental event.
The lack of a clear and effective channel to quickly locate and contact early stage
companies that met the investment criteria was a challenge. This “search problem” is
driven by two fundamental attributes of early stage companies: the tendency toward
regional affiliation, and the quirks and idiosyncrasies of angel investors as compared to
venture capital firms. Early stage startups affiliate more with regional economic
development networks than national networks (Brenner, Cantner, & Graf, 2011; Lechner
& Dowling, 2003; Lee, Florida, & Acs, 2004). This regionalism is due, we think, to the
regional nature of angel investors. Sohl (1999) has commented that angel investors
avoid public scrutiny while venture capitalists are prominent in many innovation and
86

technology related venues. The least controversial of Shane’s treatment of the angel
investing community and startups in general, suggest that most angel investors are very
“hands off” in their approach and do not participate the day to day operation of the
startup (S. Shane, 2009; S. A. Shane, 2008). The regional nature of startups creates a
challenge when recruiting nationally or internationally for an open innovation network
like the AVF. This is in stark contrast to the highly visible nature of venture capital
firms.
Some early stage ventures are difficult to find because of the development status
of their product or service. Established companies ensure that their products are listed in
appropriate buyer’s guides, Internet search engines, and can be found easily by potential
customers. On the contrary, early stage company software and Internet based services
may only exist as a prototype being tested at a larger firm under strict disclosure
conditions. Search engines cannot differentiate between established and early stage
ventures.
Weak or pending patent protection can affect the small company’s decision to
release information. This can be a major concern if the product is directly competitive
with existing larger company offerings. However, discussions with both the
entrepreneurs and the industry attendees at the first AVF suggest that both sides wanted
to avoid an intellectual property conflict. But the industry attendees insisted on the
startup companies agreeing to some form of explicit acknowledgement about avoiding
disclosure of proprietary information.
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In summary, a number of challenges existed for finding and recruiting startup
companies for the innovation network. The companies are locally focused in fundraising, suggesting that a direct approach to the hundreds of local angel groups may be
necessary to find candidates. The startup companies appear to affiliate regionally with
economic development agencies and network but the extent of this affiliation is
unknown. Many of the regional economic development organizations and networks are
mostly technology agnostic, making it quite difficult to identify a potential candidate
company nationally for a specific application. Finally, early stage companies often keep
information about their product development efforts concealed in a way that restricts the
ability to find them. This has the effect of increasing the time and costs absorbed by the
INSuM team in finding candidate companies.

The Selection Process
As the senior team members began to make presentations around the country to
drive applications for admission to the network, the rest of the development team focused
on the selection process. The selection process is a key part of the hub firm’s ability to
create value for two primary reasons. First, if the deal flow is marginal and simply
insufficient to justify the time for industry executives to attend, it can trigger an exit of
the major industry players from the network. Second, the deal flow within the network
needs to complement existing firm efforts and not simply re-introduce existing
technologies using a different format.
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The ideal company for the network’s selection process had four primary
attributes: pre-competitive, deal-ready, early stage, and “first professional money in”.
The term “deal-ready” is used in many of INSuM’s documents and presentations and
describes a company that has the basic components of business in place. These include:
(a) a viable value proposition for the auto industry, (b) some form of third party
validation that the technology or product works as described in the company literature,
and (c) the product is ready for testing and evaluation by the industry. A final category
was used to discriminate between companies that met the basic four investment criteria
and those that also targeted the investment theme of the first AVF event, vehicle
connectivity.
The term “pre-competitive” research was used by the INSuM team to describe
early stage companies that have licensed basic research from federal or university
laboratories. Later this phrase is also used to describe the small technology startups, in
general. Under the auspices of the NCRPA however, the term “pre-competitive” is not
defined.
“Deal-ready” implies that the candidate startup company has enough
organizational structure and product infrastructure to be a suitable partner for a larger
firm. Corporate investment into startup companies can occur at any stage from inception
forward. The preference of the INSuM staff was to find companies that could
demonstrate a product or technology capability to the larger firms’ satisfaction. For
example, early stage spinout firms, usually run by researchers that have left their position
at a major lab to start a company, may be too early for the auto industry. In the life
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sciences market place, the existing R&D structure within the larger firms may prefer to
partner with these very early stage firms. Finally, a deal-ready startup can clearly explain
how its product or technology can create value for the auto industry. This requires an
understanding of the business models and so-called value chains at work in the auto
industry.
Early stage companies that have raised some amount of angel capital are an
example of “first professional money in”. Generally, professional venture capital
investors avoid so-called early stage companies, preferring to fund the expansion of firms
that have cleared the many product and technology validation hurdles that exist in the
market place. Some early stage companies are funded by the entrepreneur herself or
through friends and family. The primary reason for using these criteria was that angel
investors do conduct some due diligence on the early stage candidate companies prior to
committing capital. This prior due diligence should lower the cost of validating the
candidate company for entry into the network, according to discussions within the
INSuM team.

Operation
The INSuM model became public and operational in March 2010 with the launch
of the organization’s website, hosted by ASME. A variety of outbound marketing efforts
ensued. The proposed channels to the startup companies were activated through a series
of presentations by the two senior staff members of the INSuM team. Press releases
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under both ASME and Clemson University letterhead announcing the first event were
sent to a broad range of media outlets.
Response from the auto industry was encouraging and immediate as expected by
the INSuM team. A number of organizations that had participated in the planning
meetings and conference calls in January of 2010 announced their intent to attend. These
companies also gave permission to use their corporate logos in the recruitment process
for small companies.
The initial outbound marketing plan to reach out to startups began in mid –April
2010 with presentations in the Detroit area. Presentations in April and May of 2010
coincided with the annual Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) annual meeting. SAE
is the largest of the three professional organizations that have a primary or secondary
focus on the automotive sector. The meetings and presentations in Detroit were
followed by presentations from April through July at the annual meetings of major
organizations such as the Angel Capital Association and conference calls to a broad array
of federal laboratory facilities and organizations that are tightly connected to the federal
technology transfer system (Byler, 2010d).
While the outbound marketing event was underway, there was considerable
concern within the INSuM team that the “message” about the AVF was not reaching the
startup companies or, would not reach the entrepreneurs in time. Part of this delay was
expected as INSuM was attempting to create a new marketing channel (Byler, 2010b)
using an unknown and untested venue as the draw for small companies. However, some
preliminary feedback from sources close to the team suggested that the investor
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community might be disinterested or unwilling to recommend the event to startup
companies in their networks.
The problem of locating, contacting and recruiting early stage companies became
a focal issue during the April to July 2010 timeframe. The team had prepared a list of
V2X related startups from culling a wide range of Internet and print media sources. A
secondary list of companies that had received Small Business Innovative Research
(SBIR) grants was generated from federal government sources. Of the 378 companies in
the two lists, only one company would end up applying and presenting at the
AutoVenture Forum in September 2010: Power Tagging of Boulder, Colorado.
By early June 2010 (Byler, 2010c) the AutoVenture Forum had begun to take
shape. Nine entrepreneurial firms had signaled their intent to apply. A list of candidates
included thirty-two startups culled from various sources along with a short list of twentysix SBIR funded companies. This list was still considerably short of the mark. The team
had estimated that at least twenty five viable applicant companies were needed to select
twelve presenters.
The decision was made in early July 2010 to begin direct marketing to potential
attendees using a post card format document that could be mailed or used to direct the
recipient to the AVF website for registration. Another decision was made to alter
slightly the rather narrow descriptions of the targeted firms in the post card marketing
piece. This had the downside of potentially driving an extremely large number of
applicants however the other criteria might also restrict the number of applicants. The
direct mail post card coupled with phone calls to key executives within the angel capital
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networks was successful. The field of applicant companies swelled quickly to twenty
nine by the end of July and the submission process was ended.
The geographic distribution of the candidate companies by state is shown in
Figure 4. A majority of the firms that applied were from Michigan, which was expected.
Also, South Carolina had 3 firms in the applicant pool. The dominance of these two
states, not generally known as major producers of angel backed startup companies, in the
distribution immediately raised the possibility of selection bias within the team’s
discussions.

Figure 5. Applicant Count by State
However, given the small size of the sample and the unknown population of startups that
had seen or been exposed to the literature about the event, making any preliminary
judgments about bias were not pursued.
The distribution of the applicants by targeted area was a surprise. Figure 5 shows
the percentage of applications by major technology area.
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Figure 6. Applicants by Technology Area

The high percentage of applicants that were outside the criteria may be endemic
whenever an open call for candidate companies is used.

The largest group of candidates

was in the telematics area. Only a single company, Power Tagging, truly fit the category
of V2X as their business model is targeted at electric vehicle-to-grid integration.

Selection and Coaching
The selection process began in late July. Two team members reviewed all of the
documentation submitted by the candidates. The selection criteria, mentioned earlier,
were used to evaluate each company. Two staff members reviewed the company
literature and supporting documentation such as patent filings available via Internet based
search engines. The lead investigator served as a third vote and tie breaker in the event
that the two staff members disagreed on a nomination.
A number of candidates were eliminated quickly. Two candidates had already
taken in major venture capital funding, while eleven companies had viable business
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models but were outside the focus on vehicle connectivity in the upcoming event. Four
companies were either too early stage or submission documents were so poorly written as
to prevent any validation on the technology, business model, or the key staff. The good
news in this data was that the majority of the candidates matched the type of company the
INSuM team was targeting in their outbound marketing program.
The companies selected for the event were then subjected to a more detailed due
diligence analysis, prior to notification. For example, the US Patent office database was
used to validate the claims of issued patents or patent applications filed. A number of
other checks were made on the companies. No major discrepancies were found but total
available market and projected market share claims were heavily discounted as a
criterion. Much greater scrutiny was applied to the business model being proposed and
the underlying value proposition. No further companies were eliminated in this phase but
several of the companies either did not or could not fully explain why their value
proposition would be of interest to the auto industry.
Two of the team members then arranged conference calls and webinars with all
selected companies to rehearse their presentation and review the disclosure rules for the
Forum. The rehearsal was used to insure that (a) there was a clear and compelling value
proposition for the auto industry to start a collaboration, and (b) that the individual
companies explicitly stated what kind of relationship they were seeking. All presenting
companies were required to agree to the disclosure rules and a “hold harmless” clause.
Once the coaching was completed, the presentations were bound together and an
overview of the companies was sent to the auto industry and the other attendees. The
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auto industry used the INSuM team’s summary to select the appropriate staff to send to
the event. Notifications were sent out to all firms in August 2010 and the agenda and
presentation sequence was completed.
The disclosure agreement and hold harmless clause was a major concern for the
auto industry, and not simple formality. Because of the industry’s size, major auto OEMs
and suppliers are often targets of lawsuits, some from jilted inventors. The auto industry
is cautious and risk adverse in its collaboration with outsiders, such as the startups
coming to the AVF event. As an example, several of the major auto OEMs required their
staff not to open email, letters or acknowledge any correspondence that may contain
“unrequested” confidential information. Thus we required each participant to certify the
following:
All participants understand and agree that (1) no proprietary or
confidential information will be exchanged or otherwise transferred in the course
of any workshops, meetings, discussions or other communications sponsored,
facilitated or otherwise promoted by the AutoVenture Forum; (2) any and all
information disclosed to other participants is provided without any restrictions
whatsoever on its use or further distribution; and (3) it is the responsibility of each
participant to avoid disclosure of any information which it considers to be
proprietary or confidential until such time as a specific bi-lateral confidentiality
agreement is concluded between any participants who may wish to carry the
discussions into areas or levels of detail requiring such protection.
The second requirement, the hold harmless clause, protects the organizers of these
events:
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Participation in the AutoVenture Forum (AVF) does not ensure that
presenters will find the customers, capital, talent, technology, or other resources
they are seeking. AVF does not participate in the selling of or solicitation of
offers to purchase technology, rights, or securities. AVF does not offer any
opinion regarding applicable intellectual property or securities rights or laws.
Participants in AVF should obtain legal advice and other professional counsel
regarding applicable laws. Participants remain responsible for the accuracy and
completeness of the presentation and any representations it makes to the
conference. If any purchase, investment, collaboration, or technology transfer
occurs as a direct or indirect result of AVF, it will be solely on the initiative and
responsibility of the participating entities.
Alternatives to the INSuM Model Emerge
During the startup and operation of the INSuM network in the April to July 2010
timeframe, two new automotive innovation concepts emerged. The first of these two
alternatives was the Progressive Automotive X-Prize™ (Maxmen, 2010). This
competition began its final year of testing evaluation in 2010 for a vehicle that could
exceed 100 miles per gallon (equivalent) and still pass most of the federal motor vehicle
safety standard tests (FMVSS). The X-Prize committee would award $10 million in
prizes to the top finishers in three different classes of vehicles. The second alternative to
INSuM was the formation of the AutoHarvest Foundation. AutoHarvest was formed as a
non-profit organization to leverage automotive patents and know how into other
industries.
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INSuM staff was invited to attend the Automotive X-Prize final competition held
at the Michigan Motor Speedway in July 2010. At this point in the X-Prize competition,
the field of contestants was down to sixteen vehicles. Funding for the program had come
from a number of private donors. The US Department of Energy contributed $5 million
dollars to pay for technical infrastructure. No US automotive companies or suppliers had
any visible presence at this three year long event that had considerable visibility from the
Obama administration.
The AutoHarvest Foundation was formed as a legal entity in early 2010 by auto
industry veterans (Pankin & Stief, 2011). The foundation has received support from
Ford Global Technologies, LLC, The Chrysler Group, LLC, General Motors Company,
Covisint (an enterprise-class supply chain management system with origins in the auto
industry) , the University of Michigan, The Ohio State University - Center of Automotive
Research, C.S. Mott Foundation, Ann Arbor SPARK, Michigan Economic Development
Corporation and others not mentioned by name.
The AutoHarvest team made contact with the INSuM team directly. Discussions
between the two organizations quickly lead to a memorandum of understanding and an
agreement to collaborate. AutoHarvest attracted a board of directors with extensive
experience in the Auto industry. Directors of the company have prior experience with the
Center of Automotive Research at the University of Michigan, Nippon Denso, Delphi,
and General Motors among others.
The stark differences between these two organizations illustrate the bipolar world
of innovation in the auto industry. The industry tends to drive innovation internally,
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hence the lack of support for the X-Prize. And second, the relationship between the
industry and government has varied from collaborative, such as FreedomCar, to direct
confrontation with numerous administrations, regulatory agencies and Congress over
safety, fuel economy, and emissions. The X-Prize organization had no visible support
from the US auto industry but had highly visible support from the Obama administration
and the Department of Energy. No studies have yet been done on the effect of the XPrize on automotive innovation, despite the prominence of innovation prizes and
alternative incentives play in the Obama administration. AutoHarvest, by contrast, has
not received funding from Congressional or agency sources but is heavily vested with
auto industry support.

The Presenters and Attendees
The startup companies are mapped by the business models along the connected
vehicle value chain introduced earlier, as shown in Figure 6. Each of the companies is
represented by a random alphanumeric code such as “Pn”.
P27, P30,
P24

P10,P3,
P20

P4, P11

Vehicle
Microelectronics

P13,
P29,P17
Telematics and V2X

Smartphone
Human
Interface

Electronics
Module

P1,P6

Software

TELCO Cellular Provider
Comm
Mgt

Secure
Comm.

Figure 7. Simplified Connected Vehicle Value Chain
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The attendees at the event were represented the auto industry, consultants, angel and
venture capital firms, academia, regional economic development organizations, and
researchers representing military vehicle research programs. Attendees by category are
listed in table 4:
Category

Companies Represented

Automotive OEMS

4

Tier 1 Suppliers

5

Telematics

3

US Military

1

University

2

Early Stage Venture Capital

3

Regional Economic
Development
Non Profits

2
1

Table 4. List of Attendees by Category

Execution
The first INSuM event, the AutoVenture Forum, was held on 22 September, 2010
at the Rock Financial Showplace in Novi, Michigan. Approximately 90 people total
attended the event. The event was moderated by the lead investigator. Attendees were
limited to 15 minutes of presentations and five minutes of follow-up questioning from the
audience. Tables for the presenting companies were setup around the edge of the
conference room. After four companies presented, a networking break was used to allow
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more one-on-one discussions. Lunch was provided and additional time for networking
was added to the lunch break. In general, the breaks were extremely busy with all
startups getting ample visitors from the audience.
Three tables were set aside at the front the conference room, closest to the stage
for General Motors, Ford and Chrysler staff. Each of the auto OEM tables was well
manned with six to ten employees. The major suppliers such as Delphi Automotive
generally sat at a table together. Startup company representatives and the remaining
attendees, while not presenting, sat dispersed through the audience.

Immediate follow-up
An online survey of attendees was prepared by the INSuM staff using the Survey
Monkey™ tool. Approximately thirty days after the event, an email was sent to all
attendees of record with a link to the survey. Most questions also had room for
comments. The survey instrument is shown in Appendix G. Of the 90 attendees, 26
responded, for a 29 % response rate.
Some of the questions from quick survey provided preliminary validation for the
basic concept of INSuM: creating new collaborations between the auto industry and the
high technology startup companies. Question 1 asked the each presenter to identify their
role in the AutoVenture Forum.
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Figure 8. Question 1 from the Follow-up Survey
Question 2 asked if the attendees found the forum valuable. No respondents rated the
event low or none.

Figure 9. Question 2 From the Follow-up Survey
Question 3 asked: “what was the primary value obtained from the meeting?” The initial
responses, opportunity to establish relationships and understanding a wider range of
technologies were provided as possible choices. The “other” category was provided to
capture write-in responses. Only four “write-in” other response were recorded and two of
these were directly related to the first category, the opportunity to establish relationships.
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Figure 10. Question 3 from the Follow-up Survey
Question four asked how the attendees planned to follow-up. No prompts were
provided for this question. The 26 responses were categorized and then summed to
create the following chart.

Figure 11. Question 4 from the Follow-up Survey
The category “arrange meetings with Startups” was encouraging as an initial signal that
the central goal of the AutoVenture Forum may be working. Finally, question six asked
the attendees to rank the AutoVenture Forum with other or similar events. More positive
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news came via word-of-mouth later in the fall of 2010 that one of the presenters had been
approached by a major auto industry firm for a formal alliance and that collaboration was
proceeding rapidly.

Figure 12. Question 6 from the Follow-up Survey
A surprising response was the large number of respondents that ranked the Forum as a
unique event. One third of the attendees ranked the event as similar to others. It is not
clear from this preliminary survey if this “similar” ranking suggests that the AutoVenture
Forum is not unique or is being done elsewhere.
In summary, the preliminary survey responses were encouraging: the INSuM
concept for accelerating innovation through collaboration via an open innovation network
might be working. This would be tested in more detail by this investigator in the spring
of 2011.
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Post Event Follow-up
In October 2010, the lead investigator published a summary of lessons learned
from the first INSuM event (D. L. Bodde, 2010b). Many of these lessons validated the
initial INSuM model. A major challenge, but not unique to INSuM, was the
management of expectations prior to the event. The lead investigator stated:
Realistic expectations must be set for both the entrepreneurial ventures
and the auto companies. Entrepreneurial ventures must understand that the AVF
enables them to begin high quality conversations that can lead to business
relationships. But nurturing these relationships requires time and patience. The
entrepreneurs are unlikely to walk out the door with a check in hand. Auto
companies must not expect the entrepreneurs to understand their industry as well
as they do, and must exert themselves to understand how a particular
entrepreneurial venture can benefit them.
This summary provides another perspective on asymmetric relationships, but one that is
similar to those found in Minshall (2008; 2010) .
Most importantly, the comments highlight one of the unique aspects of the
AutoVenture Forum and why it is called a network and not a marketplace or some type of
alliance. The Network is designed to initiate new collaborations between startups and
larger firms. If an investment or formal alliance occurs it will be outside the scope of the
forum. The problem of absorptive capacity, inferred by the investigators comments,
imply a role for the INSuM team in coaching the larger firms in how to “manage the
expectations” when working with the small firms.
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Detailed Survey of the Participants
At approximately six months after the event, the INSuM team began the final and
most detailed analysis of the INSuM model and the AutoVenture Forum Event. While
the initial survey provided some indications that the overall model proposed by the
INSuM team for innovation was working, a more detailed survey was needed to examine
many of the concepts about the hub firm and its role in facilitating innovation.
The master survey instrument was separated into three slightly different subsurveys, each with a different perspective and slightly phrasing of several questions.
Figure 12, below shows a simplified version of the basic INSuM model. One survey
targeted the startups, one targeted the large industry firms or innovation customers and a
third survey targeted all other categories.
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Figure 13. Simplified INSUM Model
The first section of the survey was designed to capture impressions and thoughts
from all attendees if the AVF event value created value. This section also collected
responses about collaborations between attendees. The second section of the survey
solicited responses about the hub firm. More specifically, the interviewees were given a
scenario that INSuM organization was now a permanent entity. This was followed by a
series of questions that probed how the hub firm should be organized, managed,
governed, and pay for its operating costs. The final section of the questionnaire targeted
the issue of government participation in the INSuM model and the AVF events in
particular.
In the event that the interviewee only allowed a short interview, three questions
were used as “priority questions”. The first question asked if the interviewee found the
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forum valuable and to explain the value they perceived in attending the forum. The
second question asked if any relationships with the startup company presenters were
created or formed due to the AVF. The third question asked about the possible
relationship between the network and government.
A total of 35 interviews were conducted, representing 29 of the 40 total different
organizations attending the conference. Among the twelve startup companies, one was
acquired shortly after the AVF and no longer returned calls. Two others startup did not
respond to repeated phone calls and emails.

Results from the Survey- The Auto Industry Perspective
Thirteen interviews were conducted with representatives from USCAR, the major
auto OEMS, tier 1, tier 2, and tier 3 suppliers. In general, the reaction from the auto
industry, including USCAR, was that the first event created value. Interviewees were not
asked to quantify the value.

Value was perceived, via content analysis, in different

ways such as scouting new technology, finding new ways to solve internal problems, low
cost way to evaluate numerous technologies, and understanding the emerging business
models. The strongest support for the concept of value creation came from the tiered
suppliers and USCAR representatives. Some firms that had headquarters outside the US
were more pessimistic about the value of the network due to the preference of the home
office to source all innovation in the home country. Most importantly, the auto industry
OEMS and major suppliers wanted the answer to a single question: Did the event cause
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some new collaborations to take place between the tiered suppliers and the startup
companies that would not have occurred otherwise?
The answer to this question came swiftly. A summary of the collaborations
started by the first AVF in shown in Table 5:

P13
P27
P30
P6
P3
P20
P11

Q1 Startup Description: discussion  proposal  signed
agreement to collaborate
signed a collaboration agreement with an industry firm
shortly
Startup P27 reported ongoing meetings and discussions
with an industry association and one auto firm
meetings and ongoing discussions with an industry firm
some new contacts but no new collaborations or
discussions
new discussions and meetings with two different industry
firms
a new discussion and a proposal with an audience
participant outside the auto industry
ongoing discussion with other presenters

P24

ongoing discussions and some meetings with two
different industry firms.
P4
ongoing discussions with an industry firm and a venture
capital firm
P1
Firm was acquired shortly after AVF (not as a result of
the AVF)
Table 5. Summary of Collaborations with Startups
One auto industry firm reported that collaboration had already started with startup P13, a
cross-network effect and the most anticipated outcome of the event. Many of the auto
industry participants reported various stages of emails, meetings (both before and after
the event) with the startups but none were mentioned by name. This was consistent with
a question from the initial survey conducted in October 2010 just after the event.

In a

“same-side” effect, one of the tiered suppliers in the audience was very enthusiastic about
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a new contact and potential deal with another much larger firm that resulted directly from
contacts made at the event.
The following quote from auto industry participant A1 is indicative of those that
found value in attending the first AutoVenture Forum:
From my perspective, it was extremely valuable…I really liked the
breadth of the technologies…The spectrum of the presentations was very broad.
Companies range from real early to SMEs that were profitable. Within that
constrained area, I was impressed with the quality of the presentations
Clearly the startup companies did a good job communicating their value in the view of
Auto Executive A1.
One of the more pessimistic views expressed by A3 indicated that the forum was
of little value. A3 indicated that all of the technologies presented would have to be
translated into a foreign language and sent to the home office for evaluation. This created
problems because the home office wanted to keep innovation in the home country.
However, other questions answered by A3 generally supported the idea that some
innovation could come from the startups. A3’s explanation show’s a common perception
that also surfaced at the January 2011 Industry planning meeting and was incorporated
into the guidance for the first event:
Electronics is the best way to break into the auto industry because
electronics is not hardware based, but, is more programming based, software, for
transistors and diodes and all that stuff can be assembled. A lot of companies
know how to do that, the industry knows how to do that. It’s the idea of what is
being outputted or managed. So I think electronics are better suited than someone
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with airbag technology or someone with new steel technology or something like
that.
Industry executive A4 did not criticize the forum so much but was skeptical of the
outcome. Early on in the formation of the project, it was clear that the innovation
network outcome should be new collaborations. A4 put his skepticism in the post event
interview this way:
The value is actually for me is hard to see right now…Bottom line, did
you get an inventor to actually connect with the audience/potential customers?
Did you get follow-up calls?
The simple answer to A4’s challenge is yes: there are documented collaborations that
occurred as an outcome of the event.

The challenge to answering the question is that

until collaboration occurs between A4’s company and a startup he may be skeptical of
reports of similar collaborations among his competitors.
Several questions probed the attendees about the challenges of doing business
with small companies. Firms that had implemented open innovation strategies had much
more positive attitudes toward working with startups than other firms. Firms practicing
open innovation are determined by publications from senior managers or pages within the
company website dedicated to open innovation. Attendees from the OI practicing firms
did not express any reservations about the traditional issues of asymmetric relationships.
Attendee A8 had this to say:
We are skilled to participate at any level in terms of maturity of the
technology. Obviously we don’t want to get stuck into a research loop. Other
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than that, we are setup so we can work with smaller companies. So, whether they
are self funded, angel or VC, we are fine with that...Their (the startup) singular
focus on specific technology is advantageous.
A second set of questions targeted the AVF as an organization. The goal of these
questions was to see if an organization boundary, a set of rules, and business model for
the AVF could be suggested by the auto industry attendees. These questions also
provoked a wide range of responses. Many of the attendees at the conference were in
either technology scouting or affiliated in some way with corporate venture capital
efforts. In some interviews, the interviewer attempted to suggest possible business
models. The responses from industry concerning possible business models were
consistent with how two-sided networks are operated: the larger well funded companies
subsidize the recruiting and selection of new AVF startups (Rochet & Tirole, 2004).
Several of the interviewers jumped immediately into explanations about reductions in
transactions costs, a fundamental concept behind the economics of innovation networks
(Pyka, 2002).
Simplistically, the AVF or innovation network was seen by some participants as a
way for large companies to reduce their search costs for potential partners. By
collaborating with other industry firms in supporting the operation of the network, the
cost of finding candidate startups is spread across the membership. It is important to
distinguish the use of term “search costs”, a component of transactions costs. Coase
(1960) showed that firms exist because cost of contracting with individuals is higher than
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simply hiring the same people as employees. At some point though, firms find that some
processes can be done less expensively by using outside contractors.
A limitation of the transaction cost view though is two-fold. First, the search for
startups is only secondarily about cost reduction. The primary goal is finding ways to
reduce ongoing and ever present R&D risk and uncertainty in emerging technologies.
Participation in the network allows the firms a close, ringside seat to the turbulent world
of emerging technology. By funding the network, the auto companies can operate a filter
that brings the most promising early stage ventures to their doorstep at a reduced cost and
without the attendant risk associated with direct involvement.
This view then lends itself to a more important observation that participation by
the larger firms in the AVF or any industry-scale open innovation network is equivalent
to a purchasing a real option (Vanhaverbeke, Van de Vrande, & Chesbrough, 2008) and
(D. L. Bodde, 2011). Auto companies pay an option fee to participate in the network
then use the option to identify and then collaborate with promising candidate firms
selected by the AVF. The AVF uses the option fees to operate the network.
The most diverse set of responses came from questions in the third section of the
survey targeting the possible of role of government in the network. Some respondents
claimed that they would back out of any future events if the government became a
partner. Others were more nuanced in their answers claiming that some agencies that
had traditionally supported innovation, such as the Department of Energy and the
Department of Commerce, might be better partners than independent regulatory agencies
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or those charged with consumer advocacy responsibility such as the National Highway
Transportation Safety Administration and the Environmental Protection Agency.
When time allowed, additional follow-up questions were asked by the interviewer
about the type of government involvement. Responses from industry strongly supported
the view that a partnership between INSuM and the federal laboratories was highly
valued. Some responses suggest that government participants in future AVF events could
help the innovation process by providing incentives. Overall though, the benefits and
costs of having government participation in the network will require a more detailed
study if the AVF team attempts to bring government into the operation of the network.
This is the most critical issue facing the future of open innovation networks.

Results from the Survey- The Startup Companies
Eight of the nine startups interviewed found value in the event. The same eight
reported a combination of ongoing or follow-up visits and discussions with the auto
industry participants. One firm reported the start of a formal collaboration underway
with a major automotive firm, confirming the information that came from analysis of the
auto industry side of the network.
The challenges to doing with business with the auto industry varied widely across
the startup companies. The list of challenges cited by the small firms did not include any
surprises: (a) long time lines associated with doing business with the auto industry firms,
(b) knowing the right people to contact , and (c) being too early in the marketplace. The
answers to questions about government participation were not as strident in tone as the
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auto industry responses and also did not suggest any ideas about how the government
should be involved in the operation of the network.
Not all of the startups perceived a problem with doing business with the large
firms. Startup P13, as an example, did not see any particular challenges in dealing with
the auto industry due to their size. Possibly this was due to experience of the CEO of the
startup or the presence of former auto executives on the management team. The
experience of the senior management of the startup and their ability to create new
relationships has been covered extensively in other research.

Results from the Survey-Other Attendees
Other attendees surveyed included academia, regional economic development
agencies and networks, consultants, and early stage venture capital firms. All of these
attendees were supportive of the value creation, as mentioned by the other groups. There
were a number of collaborations discussed by these attendees. Some of the regional
economic development group or academic research centers saw opportunities where the
startup presenters had not really taken advantage of existing test facilities and capabilities
that could have strengthened the startups value proposition. This observation is
insightful, as it directly supports a claim made by the AVF team that the network can add
value by brokering an array of services to the startups.

Discussion
The primary expectation from the view of the auto companies was the creation of
new and unique collaborations. This expectation was met, to some degree, by the
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collaboration reported by P13. The summary of startup company collaboration from
Table 4 indicates that a range of new collaborations can be facilitated via the OIN
concept. There is insufficient data to determine if P13’s relationship will accelerate the
rate of innovation at their partner firm.
The primary research question asked if an OIN can “lower the cost of
innovation”. The interviews are not clear that the OIN represents a “lower cost”
innovation process. None of the firms interviewed objected to paying annual
membership dues or paying to attend the event. In the experiment, the real “cost” of the
AVF was paid for via grant money from the DOE and ASME.
An unanticipated problem was the challenge of finding and recruiting startups for
the network. Based on the INSuM model diagram, we expected that using multiple
channels to reach the regional investor and economic development networks would be
sufficient. Multiple efforts and extensive follow-up were needed to identify the possible
candidates. Conventional wisdom, such as using lists and government databases proved
to be unproductive. One list contained data on 350 small firms that had received
government small business innovative research awards. Yet only one of these firms was
recruited for the network.
All of the major OEMs interviewed stressed that more supplier involvement in the
OIN was necessary as innovation was being “pushed” into the supply chain. Future
events like the AVF will need to accommodate the more diverse needs of the supplier
base. The diverse businesses within the auto supplier network could also be seen as
broadening the technological reach of the OIN. For example, existing auto suppliers
116

include not only traditional suppliers such as Magna (seats) and Michelin (tires), but also
Motorola and Intel in semiconductors, and Google and Microsoft in the software
industry.
Despite much of the overwhelming positive support for the first AVF from all
participants, the issue of government involvement causes the most concern and the most
strident responses among the auto industry participants and some of the startup firms.
Several questions about governance of INSuM were asked but these responses did not
yield a substantial amount of information or insight about how the hub firm should be
managed or governed.
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CHAPTER FIVE

ANALYSIS

Introduction
The case study created several significant findings. First and most important,
collaborations between small, high tech firms and the auto industry can be accomplished
with industry-scale open innovation networks. Economically and politically, this finding
is important as it suggests that the auto industry may be able to leverage a unique national
asset, our entrepreneurial culture, to re-establish their competitiveness.

Other countries

can purchase the same materials, buy the same advanced manufacturing tools, or learn
how to copy the Toyota Production system. But no countries that currently compete with
the United States have the institutional infrastructure to copy the depth and breadth of our
entrepreneurial culture as measured by the global entrepreneurship index (Acs, 2010).
The second major finding is evidence supporting two-sided market dynamics and
the crucial role of the hub firm or innovation intermediary. The need for the hub firm
was suggested by several factors:
•

The hub firm clearly provides the platform so that the two sides can transact;

•

The lack of existing interactions between startup firms and the auto industry
suggests an intermediary (the hub firm) and a platform (the AVF) in order to
transact efficiently; and
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•

The mismatch in firm size and risk between the two sides of the market requires
the OIN to price admission and participation differently for each side;

The rest of Chapter Five is organized around analysis of the research questions and a
discussion of alternative theories or explanations that could potentially lead to a lower
cost and faster innovation process within the auto industry.

Analysis of the Research Questions
The first research question asked:
Q1 What are the expected differences and similarities of OINS from other
types of open innovation or innovation networks?
Evidence from the post-event interviews supports the claim that OINS are distinct from
other types of networks. One of the claims of difference was that OINS would
demonstrate both competitive and collaborative behavior. Collaborative behavior was
documented by the role of USCAR and other industry firms assisting the definition of the
initial scope of INSuM and the investment focus for the first AVF event (D. L. Bodde,
2010a). Competitive behavior was documented by the transcripts from the major OEMs
and the tier 1 supplier firms. Competitive behavior was observed in the attitudes such as
auto industry participant’s A7’s comments:” If the objective of the event is to make
connections, then I am going to be very careful of who I approach and when I approach
them, if X, Y and the Tier1s are in the room”. Note that A7’s comments also infer
competition between the OEMs and the major suppliers. A7 also explained how they
can both benefit from the AVF but also secure some privacy in setting up meetings with
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potential firms: ” Maybe the way to avoid that is (having separate meetings)…well, one
thing we did is we went through the list of companies before the event, we contacted one
and had a call before the event.”
Deal flow is not a unique claim about the AVF. Many opportunities exist for the
major auto firms to hear about new technologies and startups. The type of deal flow,
early stage firms, is claimed as unique. Some of the startup companies were known to
some of the participants, as several had won regional entrepreneurial competitions or
been featured in different media. The large firms also acknowledged that this was the first
time they had learned, in detail, how individual startups could leverage their business
models for use by the auto industry.
The second research question was:

How does the hub firm create value?
This question is taken directly from the logic model in Chapter 3 that claims that
innovation networks are a solution to the industry’s innovation problems. The problem
with using the term “value” is that it can be interpreted by the interviewees in a variety of
ways. But as stated in the primary findings at the beginning of this chapter, the most
sought after proof of value creation was accomplished: a unique collaboration between
an auto industry firm and a startup occurred.
A more general analysis of the responses indicates a majority of participants saw
value from the event, but for many different reasons. Only 3 of the 36 attendees
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surveyed said that they would not participate in a follow-on event, all for different
reasons. A summary of the value statements is listed in table 1.
Survey participant
Startups

Value Statements
Exposure to technology scouts, customer
introductions, introductions to venture
capitalist, seeing the other new idea
Other
Watching the process, interactions
between startups and auto companies,
opportunities to help the startup firms,
nothing new or groundbreaking that I had
not seen before, one of the startups was
introduced to another firm by a VC and
potential deal is possible, meeting
companies from outside the auto space
Auto Firms
Survey of the technology, process of
selecting the startups worked well, got
exposed to entrepreneurs that we might not
otherwise have any opportunity to see, saw
concepts that we’d never thought of, not
much value as all R&D is done outside the
US, not sure- did you get a collaboration
between a small firm and a large firm?,
difficult as the startups don’t really speak
the automotive “language”
Table 6. Summary of Value Statements by Attendees
Also, within the audience at the AVF were “brokers” from other networks, such
as venture capitalists and regional economic development groups. Some of the VC firms
setup meetings after the AVF event with firms within the venture capital portfolio. This
represents a second way that small firms might benefit from attending these events. It
also provides initial evidence that brokers within the audience can add value.
Ultimately, the evidence suggests that there is substantial value from many sides
of the marketplace. Startups gain value from interaction with large firms and others in
the audience. Auto companies see value both in the process and in the initial selection of
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startup firms. The others in the audience including consultants, investors and
universities, also found value in learning about new technologies. Most of those who did
not find value were looking for highly technical content, which was outside the scope and
intent of the first AVF event.
The third question was:
Q2 What are the factors that motivate and incentivize R&D collaboration
between the two sides of the network?
This question was primarily answered by validation of the INSuM logic model: that
unique deal flow was properly created and managed by the hub firm so that startups and
industry firms and other attendees all received some value from their participation.
A secondary answer to this question comes from an early question in the survey
that asked firms why they decided to attend. The auto firm’s answers indicate they were
focused on identifying complementary technologies, technology scouting, but also
studying the process established by INSuM. The small firms were clearly drawn to
participate because of the opportunity to interact with senior managers in the auto
industry and venture investors that they might not otherwise meet. The other attendees,
many of them brokers within their own networks, were looking to see what kind of
technologies from outside the traditional auto sector were attractive to the auto firms and
eager to make new connections.
Both of the startups and large firms were asked about fees and how the network
would pay for the operation of the OIN. For those who saw value in the network, the
answers were consistent with the theory that the larger firms would subsidize the smaller
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firms. The smaller firms were all extremely price sensitive about any fees to participate
in the network.
The fourth research question was:
Q3 What economic principles govern the operation of an open innovation
network?
The data generated by the first AutoVenture Forum was provided initial support for the
assertions in chapter 3. First, evidence exists that an OIN operates or “brokers” a twosided market. Second, reducing transactions costs and risks associated with the search
for external partners are an important motivation for participation in the OIN.
Preliminary evidence document the presence of network effects, where unanticipated
collaborations occurred between startups, between startups and venture capital firms and
between small and large auto suppliers.
The role of industry structure in innovation was evident in many responses. The
fifth question asked:
Q4 What factors of industry structure affect the design and operation of an
OIN?
Industry structure, primarily through the auspices of USCAR, asserted itself from the
beginning. It was USCAR that organized and provided a forum for the lead investigator
to describe the nature of the experiment early in 2010. While USCAR primarily
coordinates research with the federal government, they have sufficient gravitas to compel
an automotive audience to listen to a new idea. Without an organization like USCAR to
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bring the industry leaders together, the challenge of organizing the AutoVenture Forum
might have been extremely difficult and much more costly.
For example, after the first AVF event, an effort was started by the INSuM team
to schedule a second event. One of the auto supplier organizations, the Original
Equipment Suppliers Association or OESA, was approached about hosting such an event.
The general concept was that OESA might do for the suppliers what USCAR does for the
OEMs. Despite their public comments about encouraging innovation, OESA did not
have the interest, ability, time, or funds to compel industry suppliers to discuss how an
event might be organized. The challenge for the hub firm is that the suppliers are, for the
most part, diversified businesses, unlike the OEMs.

They don’t control the downstream

appropriability regime; that is owned by the OEMs.
Also, some very pronounced differences were observed in supplier behavior and
attitudes. Two of the suppliers at the AVF event were clearly focused on open innovation
as a corporate strategy. Both of these firms were also very aggressive in learning about
the startup firms. And, both did not see any problem with dealing with small firms, such
as the startups at the AVF. This is consistent with data gathered in a recent survey about
open innovation practices in the European market (Ili et al., 2010). Put another way,
when the auto suppliers embrace the concepts of open innovation more broadly, it will
dramatically increase the OIN’s ability to organize these types of investment events and
create value.
Question six asked:
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Q5 How can government agencies create social value by participating in an
OIN?
Questions about government participation caught the vast majority of attendees off guard.
One startup CEO captured many of the sentiments when he stated that if the government
is involved it dramatically reduces the perception that the AVF is “purely commercially
oriented”. As mentioned earlier, the concept of government participation at any level
reduced many attendees motivation to participate in future events.
This indicates a possible disconnect in the original INSuM model between theory
and practice. There may not be an active role for government in the OIN initially. If
INSuM continues to evolve and pursues government participation or funding, it will need
to re-think how and why government should be involved if it is to retain the membership.
Since no government officials were available for interviews, there is no data to suggest
how the government agencies might view the INSuM model. This topic is pursued in
more detail in the sections below on alternatives to the open innovation networks.
In summary, partial answers to the seven research questions were found in
different parts of the case study data collection. The finding of value creation through
collaborations brokered by the hub firm remains the most important finding. The case
study data did not provide any definitive answers to the two questions about government
participation in the network. This issue needs further research.
The last research question was:
Q1 What forms of collaboration between government agencies and the OIN
maximize innovation and minimize conflict?
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The lack of government agency participation in AVF prevented any discussion from the
government perspective. Until recently, the majority of the collaborations between
government and industry were limited to research efforts organized by USCAR and
implementing regulatory mandates forced upon the industry by the US EPA and NHTSA.
If I set aside some of the immediate reactions that some of the attendees had
toward government participation, there were indications that there might be some ways
that government agencies could benefit. As documented in the case study in chapter four,
finding a way to leverage the national lab’s technical expertise could be useful. But
overall, the suggestions I made during interviews did not elicit comments or opinions
from the interviewees that indicated new concepts or ideas.
This topic was also probed via another question that asked about what other
“services should the OIN perform”. Very few interviewees came up with ideas unaided,
despite the presence of a large number of programs that are run by local, regional, state
and federal agencies to encourage entrepreneurship and technology transfer.

Alternatives for the Logic Model
A key element of the theory behind open innovation networks as a new and more
effective way to spur innovation is the underlying logic model. From chapter three, I
repeat the underlying logical model:
•

The traditional closed innovation process within the auto industry is no longer
competitive

•

The US auto industry is under persistent external stresses and must evolve
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•

A method must be found both accelerate the rate lower the cost of innovation

•

Small, entrepreneurial firms can provide a source of external innovation

•

Open innovation networks can couple the strength of the small firms to the needs
of the industry firms

While the case study provides ample support for this logic model and presents
evidence supporting the OIN framework, there are many departures from this logic model
that might also be used to increase the rate of innovation and lower its cost. The first
alternative to examine is the linear model of innovation, the dominant paradigm in public
policy.

Alternative 1 - The Linear Model of Innovation
The linear model is the traditional view of innovation held by US policy makers
and agencies (Godin, 2006) . The model postulates that innovation proceeds in a
rational, sequential process:
•

Federal funding for basic research

•

Applied Research

•

Product Development

•

Production

•

Diffusion (sales)

The most recent example of the linear model at work and the power that it wields within
congress is the 2007 America Competes Act (ACA). The ACA passed the house 367-57
and by unanimous consent in the Senate. The ACA was a direct outgrowth of a 2005
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report from the National Academies of Science (Augustine, 2005). The NAS report
claimed that there was substantial and growing “innovation gap” and that the only way to
fix the gap was to dramatically increase the funding for basic R&D and science and math
education.
The linear model justifies public support for basic research through a traditional
argument: the private sector will under-invest in R&D because of the inability of private
firms to capture all the value of its R&D effort. By contrast, public investment in R&D
attempts to encourage spillover into the private sector. The problem is that taxpayer
funded research also spills over into foreign governments and research labs.
In comparison to the OIN, the linear model is an extremely blunt instrument.
While funding for basic science research has a long established appeal, the linear model
of innovation does not provide explicit solutions to the auto industry where innovations
are already widely diffused. Second, investment in basic research can takes years or
decades for commercialization occurs. Third, despite the claims of the large social
returns from public R&D literature (Branscomb & Auerswald, 2002; Griliches, 1958;
Jones & Williams, 2000), the auto industry must generate private returns before the
public can benefit.

Alternative 2 - Innovation Driven By Regulation
This concept has caused some of the most acrimonious debate between the private
sector and government regulators, most likely because there are clear successes in
regulatory innovation but also massive failures. The auto industry, for their part, has
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issued statements that still cause one to cringe. Bob Lutz, former chairman of General
Motors, issued this assessment of global warming legislation and the effect on the auto
industry: “Global warming is a crock of [expletive deleted]”.
There have been many successes where regulation has created much social value
at a moderate cost. Seatbelts, emission controls, and airbags are all technologies that the
industry initially fought against but finally accepted (Sperling & Gordon, 2009). One can
probably count the most recent CAFÉ standards signed into law in 2007 as creating social
value. While all of these innovations added cost to vehicles, none of them created any
specific competitive advantage for the domestic auto industry.
But the converse of the regulatory argument does not hold. Reducing regulatory
restrictions on the auto industry can backfire. In early 1980’s, President Reagan and
congress put an stop to all further action to increase the CAFÉ standards from the initial
1976 fleet average requirement of 25 MPG. The Department of Transportation was
forbidden by Congress to spend any funding on new CAFÉ standards. The block stayed
in place until 2001, nearly twenty years. During this time gas prices were mostly stable,
but the US OEMs consistently lost market share to imports and made most of their
earnings through SUV and truck sales. When gasoline prices began their inexorable rise
in 2001, the industry was ill-prepared to compete.

Alternative 3- Supplier Driven Innovation
An area closer to this research claims that auto industry OEM-supplier
relationships are at the center of their innovation problems. Extensive survey data
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supports this view. Improving relationships between the two could solve the innovation
problem by leveraging more supplier-driven innovation (Henke & Zhang, 2010). The
benefits from improving relationships with suppliers include:
•

Supplier willingness to invest in new technologies spreads the cost and risk of
technology development

•

Access to successful supplier innovations increases OEM competitiveness

•

Continued collaboration between OEMS and their suppliers results in better
resource utilization and also creates switching costs, preventing OEM or
supplier from exiting the relationship prematurely

Some of these ongoing efforts with the US auto industry are slowly beginning to pay off.
The most recent 2011 Planning Perspectives OEM-Supplier Working Relations shows
that the gap between high performing foreign firms and the US OEMs is closer now than
at any time in recent history.
The initial AVF event also demonstrated the complementary nature of open
innovation networks to furthering existing supplier relationships. The first event was
focused on telematics: the process of enabling the vehicle to communicate with the
external environment. The telematics value chain is modeled in the following chart:
ONSTAR™

Human
Interface

FORD
Sync™

Microsoft™
(Tier1 )

Smart
phone

Electronics
Module

Software

Comm.
Mgt

TELCO Cellular
Provider
Secure
Comm.

Figure 14. Telematics Value Chain
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Both GM and Ford operate a telematics value chain but both systems, while radically
different in implementation, have created ample opportunity for small firms to contribute.
A larger concern about innovation with a hierarchical supply chain is how to
insure that the companies in the supply chain, some 800 different firms in the case of
Ford, are all busy doing innovative things to help Ford be more productive and
competitive. The hierarchy in the auto industry is also a type of chain-of-command,
similar to the military rank structure. OEMs don’t normally work directly with Tier 3
suppliers as that would be bypassing the Tier one, primary system integrators. One auto
industry executive put the issue of innovation and the supply this way:
So that’s where, in a lot of the cases, … is where some of the innovative
type of work is done. … but some of the Tier 1s are using Tier 3s we’ve never
heard of, and they are actually very creative. And so we have to make sure that
we are culturing, cultivating, and nurturing the tier 2, tier 3s. And, how do we do
that without circumventing the Tier1? It’s a very tricky thing.
As a result of this single experiment, it does appear that the OIN can create
collaborations between the startup companies and the tiered supply chain. The challenge
facing the OIN is convincing the bulk of the auto industry supply chain that valuable
innovations can come from outside the existing supplier network.
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CHAPTER SIX

OINS IN A POLICY CONTEXT

Introduction

Industry-scale open innovation networks (OINS) and the hub firms that manage
them are a new type of organizational structure designed to accelerate innovation, lower
its cost, and make the process of innovating more effective for participating firms.
Industries that manufacture complex assembled products such as automobiles, farm and
construction equipment, aircraft, military systems, and industrial machinery are the
primary application area at this stage of theory development. The major driving force
behind the adoption of open innovation and the use of open innovation networks is global
competition and technological change. Falling behind in the global innovation game
over time leads to a variety of problems that include: (a) lower productivity, (b) stagnant
or declining wages, (c) higher unemployment, and (d) a lower standard of living (Solow,
1957).
OINS may interact with two extreme “camps” of industrial policy: those who
oppose any government involvement in the market and those that argue that government
has a beneficial and key role to play. These two viewpoints are best summarized by the
dynamic tension between antitrust policy that encourages competition and industrial
policy that advocates government intervention in specific markets or sectors. However,
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closer inspection will show that both industry and government agencies are known to
advocate for industrial policy to serve their own needs, as pointed out by theories of
regulatory capture (Stigler, 1971) and claims of market failure. Likewise, if the situation
is favorable, large industries will lobby against any government intervention that could
limit their ability collect economic rents. To some degree, OINS may become a dual use
technology: for the benefit of industry and/or for agencies to influence the technological
trajectory (Dosi, 1982) of an industry.
The dual-use concept is easy to comprehend. The “industry-scale” scope of OINS
coupled with the need for the hub firm to encourage collaborative and cooperative
behavior among the major firms in the network raises questions about OINs as a tool for
industrial policy makers to influence which technologies get adopted in a specific
industry segment. The same terminology could attract the attention of antitrust regulators
concerned with collusion among industry firms that might use the OIN as a novel way to
create monopoly rents or limit competition via the control of emerging technology that
flows through the OIN.
Policy interactions with OINS should depend on three factors: (a) how the OIN is
funded, (b) how the OIN is governed, and (c) the operative role of government. If
government agencies decide to participate in the funding, governance, or operation of an
OIN, then concerns from the private sector about industrial policy may become vocal
depending on the specific circumstances of the industry. The type of agency involved
with the OIN, as highlighted in many of the interviews in Chapter Four, may temper the
participation of many in the industry causing the OIN to fail. Should major industry
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firms that collectively have substantial market power be the dominant source of funding
or governance, then government concerns about monopoly or cartel-like behavior within
the OIN could spur regulatory scrutiny. If the OIN seeks a middle ground where both its
funding and governance are carefully chosen to limit the influence of any one group of
stakeholders, then both anti-trust and industrial policy concerns may abate.
Determination of the “middle ground” will be an ongoing effort in the development of the
theory of open innovation networks as outlined in this research.
This chapter will examine how hub firms and OINs interact with existing antitrust
and industrial “policies”. In order to analyze the policy context of hub firms in more
detail, a functional definition of OINS using existing terminology common to economics
and finance is useful for organizing and framing the analysis.

An OIN, as highlighted in

chapter 3 of this research, can be described as an (a) independent brokerage organization,
that (b) coordinates early-stage technology transactions via a multi-sided market
mechanism, (c) between small firms and large firms, (d) in a specific industry or
industrial segment. The hub firm is assumed to be independent from the large firms and
maintains only a contractual relationship. “Brokerage” means that the hub firm seeks to
connect buyers and sellers but does not enter into the transaction between the buyer and
seller as a partner. “Brokerage” also implies that the hub firm is paid for its work through
a combination of fees and commissions based on the deal flow that it brings to the major
firms. “Coordination” implies a voluntary institutional arrangement among all parties to
abide by the rules of the networks. “Early-stage” specifically means small firms that
have received only their first round of professional funding. A “multi-sided market”
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must be designed to enable the transactions as early stage technologies have no “price
signal” that communicates value to buyer and seller. The technology, product or service
has an unknown or untested economy of scale. Risk associated with the technology is
considered very high. Put another way, extremes of information asymmetry are inherent
in the operation of the OIN.

“Large and small” acknowledges the asymmetry between

the two sides of the market. “Technology transactions” coupled with “small firms”
indicates that existing research labs and their scientists are not, at this stage, economic
actors in transactions of the OIN. The primary economic agents that participate in the
deal flow within the network are the small and larger firms. This deal flow could evolve
over time if OINS become more widely used.
Industrial policy does not have a single definition or application. In the US, there
is no single “industrial policy” agency. However, many agencies at the federal and state
level engage in what could be described as industrial policy. The framework provided by
Cohen (Cohen, 2009) is helpful in making sense of the wide ranging definitions and
applications of industrial policy. Cohen’s framework examines the evolution of
industrial policy across three “generations”: neoclassical foundations, structuralist, and
pragmatic. A deeper reading of Cohen shows that while scholars clearly see an
evolution of industrial policy, arguments from all three generations are still used to justify
or vilify policies that target a specific industrial sector. As reinforcement for this
approach, White’s analysis of anti-trust and industrial policy as being in a dynamic
tension also involves considerable effort to define industrial policy (White, 2010).
Cohen’s analysis shows that the specifics of industrial policy application depend upon a
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wide range of factors, with no single factor being sufficient to explain how the policy
instrument is designed or implemented.
In Cohen’s analysis, neoclassical industrial policy primarily uses the language of
market failures and regulatory failure to describe or justify government intervention into
the market. Failures are brought on by un-priced externalities, asymmetry of
information, and positive feedback which can lead to economies of scale that result in
monopoly rents. But these critiques do not help one understand the many factors causing
failure that could be industry specific, geography specific, or information specific.
Structuralist arguments for industrial policy correct some of these deficiencies and
are focused on knowledge based economic theories of the economy and include a wide
range of supporting theories. Evolutionary theories suggest that there is no one industrial
policy path, but that each country or region develops and adapts a successful formula
over time that leverages their indigenous strengths. Other theories look only at the
incentives and institutional arrangements that encourage innovation and collaboration.
Collaboration with government is highly encouraged via “a financial incentive for
cooperation, making the granting of public funding contingent on different forms of
cooperation between businesses” (E. Cohen, 2009).
The pragmatic view of industrial policy is driven by four major observations (op.
cit.).The first is “innovation and technological adaptation… are the main engines of
productivity growth and therefore per capita GDP growth. Innovation and adaptation take
the form of new products, new production processes, and new organizational forms
within businesses and markets. “OINs clearly fit into the description of new forms of
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organization. Second, the process of innovation occurs “largely within firms and they
depend on firms’ incentives to innovate, which are – in turn – influenced by economic
policies and economic environment (patent and intellectual property policy, R&D
subsidies, competition policy, availability of skilled workers, and so on). “. The wide
range of variables in the “economic environment” observation suggests a heuristic that no
single policy may be sufficient to encourage innovation. Schumpeter’s waves of
“creative destructive” makes a return to the forefront, reminding us how technological
change can quickly replace existing practices and/or products and services within an
industry. The consequences are clear: “innovation contributes to increasing disparities
between those who adapt quickly to technical progress and those who do not; in
particular, it generally tends to widen the income differential between skilled and
unskilled labor.” The fourth and final observation is the importance of the availability of
highly skilled labor. Skilled labor requires continuous investment in education of the
next generation engineers, scientists, and mathematicians.
The ultimate message from Cohen is that collaboration between industry and
government may be stronger than either acting alone. The challenge is to find the right
mixture of policies and engagement scenarios and rules. New concepts that enable more
successful collaboration between government and industry would be of great value. This
reinforces the claim of this research that OINs may constitute a new kind of “dual use”
technology to help industry and government achieve their goals.
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OINS and Competition Policy
Competition or antitrust policy is concerned with policies to “encourage
competition that comes with markets and encourage the allocative efficiency that comes
with competition” (White, 2010). US competition law has evolved over time as it
accommodated changes in norms and new economic evidence (Kovacic, 2003). The
future antitrust concerns about OINs will be focused around the hub firm’s need to
facilitate coordination and cooperation with multiple industry competitors and how the
governance and funding for the OIN is managed. This does not imply that large firm
members in an OIN all come from the same industrial segment. For example, a major
supplier to Ford’s new Sync infrastructure is Microsoft™, a firm not normally associated
with the auto industry. Antitrust regulators could pursue Microsoft as they feared that
the firm would attempt to use the OIN to dominate software application inside a new
platform- the connected vehicle.
As outlined in Chapter Four, the AutoVenture team spent considerable effort
encouraging auto makers and their major suppliers to participate in the 2010 AutoVenture
Forum event. But the majority of the work and meetings were coordinated through an
existing organization, the US Council for Automotive Research. USCAR is a corporation
that coordinates pre-competitive research between the Department of Energy and the
major US auto makers via a special federal contract called a cooperative research and
development agreement (CRADA). The CRADA stipulates that the private sector,
represented by the auto makers, cannot direct how the Department of Energy public funds
are spent but can only make recommendations.
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USCAR also manages a number of collaborative research programs registered
with the Department of Justice as required under the auspices of the National Cooperative
Research Act (NCRA). The NCRA provides a limit, not an exemption, to existing
antitrust litigation by removing the ability to collect treble damages from breaches of
competition law while engaged in cooperative R&D. Competitors or “non affiliated
firms” are allowed to engage with one another, cooperatively, in a range of specific
research activities. But the OIN, or more specifically the hub firm, is neither a joint
venture nor a standard organization, the two types of organizations that are specifically
called out in the NCRA statutes.
The initial experiment in the AutoVenture Forum limited the initial role of the
OIN to the “brokerage” function listed previously. This function also eliminates the role
of the OIN in participating in any research. If the OIN were to stick to the brokerage
function alone and not become party to any of the cooperative behaviors authorized by
NCRA, then the OIN may not be able to gain protection from antitrust damages. But
other aspects of OINs may suggest a different interpretation.
The creation of a “multi-sided market” in emerging technology is a solution to
overcome a problem of “thin markets”. Thin markets, such as early stage technology
firms, have few buyers, high transaction costs, and few trades. The creation of a market
for technology by the OIN does not imply that this is the only way these emerging firms
can market their products and services. However, within the two-sided market concept,
the primary issue is “who pays”. If the large firms pay the OIN under contract to
participate in the network and share information with the hub firm, then there may be an
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expectation of a joint venture as defined in NCRA. The rule of reason in the NCRA
suggests that the OIN may indeed qualify for inclusion:
§ 4302. Rule of reason standard, In any action under the antitrust laws, or
under any State law similar to the antitrust, laws, the conduct of—(1) any person
in making or performing a contract to carry out a joint venture, or (2) a standards
development organization while engaged in a standards development activity,
shall not be deemed illegal per se; such conduct shall be judged on the basis of its
reasonableness, taking into account all relevant factors affecting competition,
including, but not limited to, effects on competition in properly defined, relevant
research, development, product, process, and service markets. For the purpose of
determining a properly defined, relevant market, worldwide capacity shall be
considered to the extent that it may be appropriate in the circumstances.
A final point about anti-trust law and OINs is the management of intellectual
property. Assembling a broad portfolio of intellectual property can limit competition and
bring charges of monopoly behavior under existing antitrust statues. The AutoVenture
team initially steered clear of intellectual property law by requiring that participants sign
a “do not disclose” and “hold harmless” document that made it clear that participants
were forbidden from releasing any proprietary information to the AutoVenture team or
the any of the attendees at the investment forum. This requirement was imposed for
several reasons. First, the larger firms are cautious about being approached by small
firms offering new technologies. Second, the hub firm needs to avoid the appearance of
any type of principal-agent behavior where the hub could privately benefit from the
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cumulative acquisition of proprietary information from either side of the network in a
way that harms any of the participants.
The governance and funding of the hub firm will present the major challenge for
policy. The presence of major executives from the auto industry on a governing or
advising board of the OIN could be problematic as viewed from the Department of
Justice’s antitrust division. As mentioned earlier, OINS do not easily allow classification
as joint ventures or standards organizations. On the other hand, funding of the OIN by
the auto industry or its affiliates such as USCAR could create the appearance that the
OIN is just an extension of the joint research already explicit in the existing CRADA.
Thus, funding of the OIN via an existing CRADA may make the antitrust issues moot.
In summary, the language used and descriptive terms of how OINS operate
quickly conjures up images of traditional fears of anti-competitive behavior. However,
peering into the black box of an OIN and using a specific description of their behavior
quickly shows that many of the anti-trust concerns are more subtle. While OINS current
do not clearly fall into the two primary categories of organizations covered by NCRA,
OINs may still need to register in accordance with the Department of Justice, but this is
very low cost form of insurance. Further, funding of the OIN via a CRADA could
eliminate any concerns about antitrust or anti-competitive behavior.

OINS and Public-Private Partnerships
At the other extreme from the NCRA act are cooperative research and
development agreements (CRADAs) that enable partnerships between public institutions
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and private firms, mentioned earlier. CRADAs can be challenging for the private sector
as the agency partner has substantial control over how public funds are spent. These
agreements can constitute the voluntary engagement of private industry with industrial
policy. The writers of a CRADA must balance the needs of the agency to create public
value while the private sector will seek to maximize the firm’s competitive advantage
through the joint development and acquisition of proprietary knowledge. Existing law
allows the agency and the participants in the CRADA to keep the results of the
collaboration secret.
The auto industry has operated one of the largest and longest running CRADAscurrently called US DRIVE. US DRIVE originated as the Partnership for Next
Generation Vehicles in 1993 in the first Clinton Administration. This CRADA has been
modified by every succeeding presidential administration. Despite spending an
estimated five hundred million dollars a year, no detailed analysis of the economic impact
of this partnership on innovation has been done. Yet, year after year, the program is
thoroughly reviewed by a board appointed by the National Academy of Sciences.
The USDRIVE CRADA can be critiqued for what did not happen. Despite the
intense American-only effort to develop advanced batteries and fuel cells suitable for
passenger cars in the 1990’s, it was a “hail Mary” effort by Toyota of Japan that created
the most popular and highest selling hybrid vehicle in the US, the Prius™ (Sperling,
2001). According to sources close to Toyota, Toyota was extremely concerned by the
size and funding of the USCAR CRADA, as foreign firms were not allowed to
participate. Since Toyota did not have access to an equivalent consortium partially
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funded by the Japanese government, they decided to use the best available technology to
bring a hybrid vehicle to market. Honda followed soon after. The US manufacturers,
ostensibly benefitting from the federal government’s industrial policy of investing in next
generation propulsion, did not respond with a commercially viable vehicle until 2010
with the advent of the Chevy Volt™. By this time, however two new competitors had
entered the US market: the Nissan Leaf™ and the Mitsubishi iMIEV™ battery powered
vehicles. Sadly, fuel cells, the ultimate solution to a cleaner transport system, never made
an appearance. The Obama administration drastically reduced funding for fuel cell
development in 2009, effectively shutting down the effort for the foreseeable future.
This simplistic critique of the USDRIVE (formerly PNGV) effort is not meant to
criticize those who performed the research but to look closely only at the outcome and
goals of the partners. The CRADA is an outgrowth of major pieces of legislation from
the 1980’s, primarily the Federal Technology Transfer Act (1986). The act encouraged
interactions between publically funded research and institutions with the private sector. In
general, sharing the cost and leveraging the expertise of multiple organizations is a sound
strategy. But using the government as a partner may bring additional constraints.
Historically, the federal government invested in basic research and laboratories to find
solutions to strategic concerns of the United States (Schacht, 2010). The implication is
that private firms engaging in CRADAs with federal laboratories or agencies will absorb
some of the public partner’s goals and desires to commercialize publically funded
technology, rather than focusing strictly on bringing new products to market.
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What does the USDRIVE experience suggest about OINs, especially in the
automotive sector? Earlier, it was noted that using a CRADA to fund an OIN might have
its benefits but careful attention must be paid to the details of the funding and the
governance of the hub firm and the network. Despite the strongly worded comments
from the auto industry that bringing government as a partner in the OIN would cause
them to exit, There is in fact a real opportunity to define a novel way of engaging
government with industry via the OIN.
For example, the current Obama administration sees innovation prizes as a way to
encourage private sector innovation around a topic of importance to government
(Anonymous, 2010; Bhushan, 2010; Kalil, 2006; Maxmen, 2010). Prizes are attractive
mechanisms for the government because: (a) no cost is incurred if there is no solution,
even though the government may be the recipient of many innovative ideas, (b) it shifts
all development costs to the innovator, (c) it is a one time cost, and (d) the government
does not become a partner in the innovation. But prizes have some limitations including
the applicability to large scale or extremely complex ventures. Prizes bypass many of the
concerns about the costs and mutual obligations that come with a CRADA. But from an
innovation perspective, prizes provide no ongoing development support. The auto
industry clearly recognized this limitation and provides a cautionary example.
The automotive X-Prize contest, managed by a non-profit and funded primarily
through donations and a grant from the Department of Energy, attempted to demonstrate
that 100 miles per gallon equivalent (MPGe vehicles could be designed and developed.
The contest ran over several years, attending at approximately the same time as this
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research. But since the X-Prize completion, none of the winners or contenders in
competition have been able to market passenger vehicles that could pass all of the
National Highway and Transportation Administration’s Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standards (FMVSS). The X-Prize received no visible support or participation from the
US auto industry, despite its extremely high profile. Ultimately the competitors found
that incorporating all of the existing regulations for vehicle safety as specified in the
FMVSS would add considerable weight and structure to the cars, reducing their effective
range and efficacy. But most of all, the ten million dollar prize was vastly inadequate to
bring a new vehicle to market. The general literature suggests that designing and
manufacturing a new vehicle cost more than a billion dollars, clearly beyond the range of
any likely prize money.
The X-Prize investment by the Department of Energy does indicate that the
federal agencies may be able to fund the infrastructure for competitions. Thus, the OIN
could argue that the prize actually constitutes a “new collaboration” as outlined in
Chapter 1, and solicit funding from a federal agency for infrastructure costs, as was the
case with Automotive X-Prize. By keeping the federal agency at arm’s length through
such a funding mechanism, a hub firm might entice the major auto industry players to
participate.

Summary
The public policy context of OINS is clearly centered on the dynamic tension that
exists between antitrust policy and the wide assortment of instruments collectively known
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as industrial policy. The interaction with each policy by the OIN is contingent upon how
the hub firm is governed and how it is funded. The challenge for public policy is to find
a middle ground that provides incentives for both industry and government to participate
in the OIN while minimizing the risk of excessive regulatory scrutiny or scaring off
potential participants because of the government’s role.
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CHAPTER SEVEN

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Summary
Open innovation networks at the industry-scale have been successfully designed
and operated, creating value for all types of participants. Hub firms, the organizers and
managers of the network, are integral to network formation and operation. The case
study provides preliminary support that OINs are both complementary and beneficial to
existing firm-centric innovation efforts.
Some support exists from the case study for the creation of public value through
OINs. The public value can be achieved in two ways: (a) through the creation of
domestic jobs driven by collaboration between firms and (b) achievement of social goals
at lower cost through collaboration between the OIN and government agencies such as
incorporating all of the major sustainable mobility goals. Support of job growth could be
measured by simply counting the jobs created as a direct result of the new collaborations
brokered by the OIN. Claim (b), the achievement of social goals could be measured by
the rate of success in achieving societal benefits of reducing carbon emissions, the speed
of implementing and certifying new safety technologies, and a reduction in injuries and
death.
However, a major limitation in theory development regarding OINs is the
sustainability and stability of OINs. The first case study demonstrated many of the

147

possible benefits of OINs. More cases and examples will be needed to define how OINs
can become self sufficient and lead to long term gains in industry innovation cost and
speed.
The next few paragraphs will highlight some of the most significant findings from
this research. Following the findings, I will provide some recommendations for further
research.

Finding 1: Quality Deal Flow Was Created
Despite the mixture of skepticism and optimism among executives in the auto
industry at the outset of the case, the format used for the AutoVenture Forum created
value for all types of participants. The deal flow organized by the hub firm staff resulted
in numerous new collaborations between large firms and startups, between startups, and
between brokers and startups. To date, one formal collaborative agreement has already
been signed.

Finding 2: Two-Side Characteristics of the Open Innovation Networks
The theory suggested that one reason why large auto firms don’t collaborate with
smaller firms is because of the thin market problem; it is difficult and costly for the large
firms to find one small firm among thousands that has a “special sauce” for a particular
problem. The solution to thin markets, where barriers exist to low cost transacting, is
through the formation of intermediated multi-sided markets. Evidence was found from
many aspects of the case that “innovation markets” are inefficient and require
intermediation. This is significant as it also may explain why typical one-sided markets
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where the value of the product cannot be determined in advance yield such poor results.
The customers for technology must be motivated, aggregated by the hub firm, and then
incentivized to participate in the market.

Finding 3. Collaborative and Competitive Behavior Inside OINs
The case study highlighted an often overlooked aspect of the US auto industry:
the close collaboration created by years of participation in USCAR. Pre-event
collaboration was crucial in defining and shaping how the OIN’s first event would
progress. However, once the event went into operation, healthy competitive behavior
took over. Interviews among competing auto OEMs acknowledged this behavior. While
some suggested that they were a bit reluctant to ask many questions in front of
competitors, others were highly motivated to pursue any and all possible types of deal
flow regardless of whom else was in attendance.

Finding 4. Transaction Costs Are Not Enough to Explain OINs
While transactions costs are the most obvious theory to apply to the economic
operation of OINS, they are insufficient to explain the observed behavior. The
fundamental problem underlying the economics of OINs lies in the nature of the deal
flow. Early stage companies are high risk and have unknown value ex ante. Thus
conventional methods for portfolio analysis or return on investment are inadequate. The
most promising area for documenting and measuring the economic value of OINs is
through real option reasoning. Data to support real option thinking was found in the
interviews with select industry firms venture capital firms that attended. This is important
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as the monetary of value of early stage firms is extremely difficult to determine. Option
theory suggests that the participants make a tradeoff: paying to participate in the OIN
allows them access to deal flow with future possibility of collaboration.

Finding 5. The Importance of an Industry Champion
USCAR, the industry consortium that coordinates pre-competitive research with
the US Government, brings together fierce industry competitors in a collaborative
environment. This presence of USCAR and its long term stability, all contribute to its
instrumental value to the success of the first AutoVenture Forum. USCAR had extensive
experience with cross-industry collaborations and already had the trust of the auto
industry collective. Thus the AVF had only to gain the trust of USCAR to access all of
the major USCAR participants. Also, USCAR is staffed by major OEM executives that
participate with USCAR on a short term basis. This shared trust is what provides
USCAR with enormous social capital or gravitas, as I mentioned earlier in the case study.
I infer from my many interviews and personal experience that had USCAR not existed,
the challenge of bringing together industry participants would have been extremely
difficult.

Finding 6: Finding and Motivating Small, Early Stage Firms to Participate
The lead investigator identified this potential problem early on in the project. The
case study uncovered some of the dynamics of the problem and also some solutions. To
support quality deal flow, the hub firm must develop a way or method for finding and
motivating early stage firms to participate in future events. The experiences of the
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INSuM team during the formative stages of the first event strongly suggest that existing
brokers and their channels into various types of regional and content-specific networks
are crucial to finding these firms.
Of the firms that applied to the first OIN, nearly forty percent came from the
traditional auto sector cluster states (Wisconsin, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Western
New York). But what this also suggests is the OIN must recruit nationally to find the
best candidates. The firm that did complete an agreement was from outside the
automotive cluster region.

Finding 7: Motivating the Supply Chain to Work with Entrepreneurs
The supply chain in the auto industry, the so-called Tier 1, 2 and 3 suppliers,
become a key part of any future OIN. However, it is not clear from the first OIN how the
tiered suppliers will be motivated to work with the higher risk and usually unknown
startup firms. To some degree the OEMs must signal to the tiered suppliers that
innovation is important and can be rewarded. But the historical poor relations between
the US Auto OEMs and their suppliers as compared to Japanese firms could be a
lingering obstacle to the OIN.

Conclusions and Recommendations for Further Research
Two areas of this research stand out as major goals for follow on research. First,
additional case studies within the auto industry need to be completed to provide
additional external validity to the findings of the first case. Conducting a case study
outside of the industry may create validity problems as other industries may face
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completely different industry dynamics. The second area of research, and equally
important, is defining how an OIN can work with government in a collaborative
environment. This could lead to some firms exiting the network but perhaps over time if
the OIN is successful they could re-enter.
The importance of small, early stage companies to the Ion’s value proposition
needs more development. For the OIN to sustain itself, it must develop low cost and fast
methods for finding and recruiting startup firms. There don’t seem to be any major
technical barriers but institutional barriers and “gatekeepers” certainly exist. Likewise, it
is expected if the OIN is ongoing, a more robust and formalized method of screening and
interviewing candidate firms will be needed.
The importance of OINs toward building a national competitive strategy for
domestic industry needs to be explored. This extremely simple concept, leveraging of
small entrepreneurial firms through collaboration and not venture capital investment,
could create a competitive advantage over other nations for US firms.
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APPENDIX A. The AutoVenture Forum Pilot

The AutoVenture Forum:
Testing the Feasibility of an Innovation Network for Sustainable Mobility (INSuM)
ASME, USCAR, and Clemson University

This prospectus describes a pilot application of Network Innovation, a breakthrough innovation
process, in an arena of intense public scrutiny and private interest—the U.S. auto industry. The
partners in this feasibility test include ASME, USCAR (the R&D consortium of the domesticnameplate auto makers), and Clemson University. Success here will have national significance
by enabling an innovation process that offers lower cost, faster cycle time, and wider access to
technology.
We organize this prospectus as follows:
• Part I summarizes the motivation for the AutoVenture Forum.
• Part II explains the results that can be anticipated.
• Part III describes the preliminary plan for the AutoVenture Forum in greater depth.
• The APPENDIX provides background information on the network innovation project,
which we call the Innovation Network for Sustainable Mobility (INSuM). 1

PART I – THE AUTOVENTURE FORUM IN SUMMARY
The traditional innovation process that has served the auto industry well for 100 years is falling
under increasing stress:
• Public concerns with climate change require decisive reductions in the greenhouse gasses
emitted by road vehicles;
• Volatility in the price of motor fuels leads to rapid shifts in the type of vehicles preferred
by customers; and,
• Intense international competition requires faster, less costly innovation cycles.
Clemson University, USCAR, and ASME are testing the feasibility of an open-source innovation
network to supplement the more internally-focused process now in place. The core idea is to
enable collaboration among entrepreneurs, corporate innovators, technologists, investors, and
customers. The network could speed the transition to sustainable mobility by linking the
1

Clemson is developing the network innovation concept under a grant from the Department of
Energy. For further information, please contact: David Bodde, 864-508-0571,
bodde@clemson.edu; or Robert Leitner, 864-656-2267, rleitne@clemson.edu.
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innovative capacity of entrepreneurs with the technology base, systems integration,
manufacturing, and market channels of the auto industry, as described in the Appendix.
The first pilot test of the network innovation model will be a project called the AutoVenture
Forum. This forum will directly match selected entrepreneurial ventures with auto industry
incumbents with the intent to create superior business opportunities for all—partnerships,
investment opportunities, and/or customer relationships. Based on the lessons learned from this
pilot test, we anticipate the AutoVenture Forum would become the anchor service for the mature
innovation network.
ASME, USCAR, and Clemson University are designing and organizing two pilot AutoVenture
Forums, one to be held in early 2010 and a second in the late spring. These would be held at
Clemson’s International Center for Automotive Research (CU-ICAR), a newly-built research
laboratory with excellent conference facilities located in Greenville, South Carolina.2 In addition,
a third lessons-learned forum would be held, either at the location of ASME or of USCAR. Its
purpose would be to capture the lessons learned and feed them into a larger proposal for ongoing
support from the Department of Energy and from the U.S. auto industry.

PART II – ANTICIPATED RESULTS
Taken together, we expect these two trials to validate the basic network goal of connecting
entrepreneurial companies with opportunities in the emerging auto industry. In addition, we look
for concrete economic results—partnerships, joint R&D, sales, investment, and so forth—even
from these pilot forums.
The lessons learned from these first pilot tests of the AutoVenture Forum will be captured and
analyzed through:
• Follow-up questionnaires and interviews with the industry participants.
• Follow-up questionnaires and interviews with entrepreneur participants and with their
investors.
• Observations of colleagues at participating companies, ASME, USCAR, and Clemson
University.
• A lessons-learned meeting of the key participants.
A third meeting of the partners, together with selected invitees, will be held in the late summer of
2010 to analyze the results. From this meeting will come a set of proposals to the Department of
Energy (funder of the original Clemson grant) and to the auto industry to support the Incubation
Phase of the project, which we now imagine to occupy three years. During this phase, the project
team will introduce additional services, especially those that enable entrepreneurs without
2

For more about CU-ICAR, please go to: http://www.clemson.edu/centers-institutes/cu-icar/
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professional investment support to build their ventures to the maturity required for participation
in the forum.
To the extent that this pilot test confirms its value, the AutoVenture Forum will become a selfsustaining anchor-activity of the network innovation project.
PART III – PRELIMINARY PLAN FOR THE AUTOVENTURE FOURM
The AutoVenture Forum will provide a neutral venue for structured public discussions and
unstructured private conversations. The participants on either side include: (a) new ventures
relevant to the automotive transition; and (b) innovators in established auto-related companies.
By “auto-related companies,” we mean the OEM, key suppliers to the OEM, and after-market
suppliers. Participating auto-related companies would begin the process by identifying general
areas in which they would be interested in hearing of opportunities offered by entrepreneurs.
The entrepreneurial companies will be nominated by their venture capital investors or by a
responsible support agency. The sponsors will also be invited to accompany their new ventures
to the Forum. This nomination process ensures that the entrepreneurial companies have been
vetted by interested and skilled analysts and so are deal-ready. Thus, the participating auto
companies can expect immediate opportunities for product or service purchases, joint ventures, or
investment. Nominations would be screened for relevance, maturity, and likelihood of success.
Eight will be chosen for each of two trials of the AutoVenture Forum.
For each forum, the structured discussions would be held in a panel format, as shown in the draft
agenda below. Representatives of the incumbent auto-related companies would form the panels.
Each new venture would have 25 minutes before a panel: 15 minutes of presentation, and 10
minutes of feedback from the panel members. (Note that 5 minutes are allowed for transition
between presentations, so that 2 presentations per hour can be held.)
In addition to the formal panel discussions, ample opportunity for private conversation would be
provided. Each entrepreneurial company would be given a private meeting area, and time would
be set aside especially for these meetings.
Prototype Meeting Agenda
08:30 – 09:15 Plenary Session
• Welcome speaker
• Explanation of rules of engagement
09:30 – 11:30 First Forum panel (4 new ventures)
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11:30 – 13:00 Lunch and informal meetings
13:00 – 15:00 Second Forum panel (4 new ventures)
15:00 – 17:30 Informal meetings -- Tours of CU-ICAR facilities for those interested
18:00 – 20:30 Cocktail reception, dinner, and evening event (informal meetings as needed)
Two-Forum Logic and the Pathway to Sustainable Mobility
The transition from what we drive today to fully sustainable road vehicles must proceed through
several stages. The pathway to sustainability begins with improvements to the current internal
combustion engines and fuels, progresses through hybrid and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, and
culminates in all-electric or hydrogen fuel cell vehicles. The two pilot tests of the AutoVenture
Forum would support this pathway.

First Forum
The first AutoVenture Forum would focus on near-term technologies and opportunities. Because
of that focus, this forum would seek venture capital backed companies offering products and
services relevant to the next generation of ICE, hybrid, and battery vehicles. The first forum
would be offered in early 2010.
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Second Forum
In contrast, the second forum would focus on advanced technologies or business models3 that
offer longer term payoff. Consider, for example, the opportunities that increasingly dwell at the
convergence of the three distinct business models shown in Figure 2 below:
•
•
•

Those of the auto companies, now requiring innovation by suppliers at all tiers, but able
to benefit from systematic contact with entrepreneurs and new ventures;
Those of the energy companies, traditionally commodity energy providers, but now
facing competition from “smart” electricity; and,
Those of the information and communication companies, offering smart devices and
systems that manage electric energy onboard vehicles, among energy-using devices, and
within smart grids4.

Entrepreneurial companies operating in that convergence would be among those invited to the
second forum.

3

By “business model” we mean the formal explanation of the forces behind a company’s present
and anticipated success--how the firm will create value for its customers and the public, and how
it will capture enough of that value to provide a return for its investors.
4
The “information and communications” business model includes Google, which announced its
entry into the micro-grid market in February of 2009. AT&T, Verizon, and Microsoft followed later
that year with similar announcements.
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Venture companies participating in the second AutoVenture Forum might or might not be
supported by professional venture investors, but all would be vetted by some external agency and
by the project team. The second forum would be held in the Spring of 2010.
A third wrap-up meeting of the partners, together with selected invitees, will be held in the
summer of 2010 to analyze the results. From this meeting will come a set of proposals to the
Department of Energy (funder of the original Clemson grant) and to the auto industry to support
the Incubation Phase of the project, which we now imagine to occupy three years. During this
phase, the project team will introduce additional services, especially those that enable
entrepreneurs without professional investment support to build their ventures to the maturity
required for participation in the forum.
Beyond the Incubation Phase, we anticipate that the network innovation model will become fully
self-sustaining by providing value commensurate with its cost to operate.
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APPENDIX B. THE INSUM PROPOSAL

Innovation Network for Sustainable Mobility:
Accelerating the Transition in Autos and Energy
INSuM Project Team
Clemson University5

We propose a fundamentally different innovation process for the transition to sustainable
mobility—an open-source innovation network that would enable collaboration among
entrepreneurs, corporate innovators, technologists, investors, and customers independent of their
location. The network could speed the sustainability transition by connecting the innovative
capacity of entrepreneurs with the systems integration, manufacturing, and market channels of the
industry incumbents.
We are now seeking strategic partners to join in designing and implementing this innovation
process, which we call the Innovation Network for Sustainable Mobility (INSuM). With startup
funding from a Department of Energy grant, INSuM will link entrepreneurs and industry
incumbents through high-value services such as market access, technology demonstration and
validation, rapid prototyping, investment capital, and other services described in Appendix A.
As the INSuM process grows in scope and capacity, we can expect:
• Job creation through the success of new ventures nationwide;
• A more innovative and economically competitive auto sector; and,
• A more rapid and efficient transition to sustainable mobility for the auto and its fueling
infrastructure.

THE TRANSITION TO SUSTAINABLE MOBILITY
We use the term “sustainable mobility” to include three essential goals:
• Improving national and economic security by depending less on oil;
• Reducing the environmental footprint of road transportation;
• Building an economic and profitable auto sector with the help of more agile innovation
processes.

5

Concept developed at Clemson University under a two-year grant from the U.S. Department of Energy.
For further information, please contact: Dr. David Bodde, 864-508-0571, bodde@clemson.edu; or Robert
Leitner, 864-656-2267, rleitne@clemson.edu.
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Achieving these goals requires a patient revolution—patient because their full realization will be
marked in decades, not in years; a revolution in that the current infrastructure of autos and fuels,
which has served well for over 100 years, must give way to something else. The process of
inventing that something else can benefit from the systematic engagement of entrepreneurs and
innovators in the United States and around the world.

WHY ENTREPRENEURS?
Revolutionary technologies from steam to microelectronics have been launched by entrepreneurs
and not by industry incumbents. But to achieve their full impact, all these technologies
eventually made the transition to large, integrated systems—Edison’s Menlo Park laboratory
became General Electric, the Bell Telephone Company became AT&T, Bill Gates’ startup
became Microsoft, and so forth. Our thesis holds that the urgent transition required for
sustainable mobility can be accomplished more effectively if the innovative technologies of the
new, entrepreneurial companies enjoy better opportunities to link with the systems capabilities of
the industry incumbents.

THE OPPORTUNITY
Entrepreneurs are especially active at the interface among the traditional business models for auto
companies and energy companies because many attractive opportunities to accelerate the pace of
change reside there. New technologies and business concepts now offer compelling opportunities
as three traditional business models,6 formerly distinct, converge around the electric drivetrain
vehicle7. These traditional business models (illustrated in Figure 1, following page) include:
•

•

Those of the auto companies, once vertically integrated, now requiring innovation by
suppliers at all tiers, but still lacking systematic connections with entrepreneurs and new
ventures;
Those of the information and communication companies, offering smart devices and
systems that manage electric energy onboard vehicles, among energy-using devices, and
within smart grids8; and,

6

By “business model” we mean the formal explanation of the forces behind a company’s present and
anticipated success. It is the shared story of how the firm will create value for its customers and the
public, and how it will capture enough of that value to provide a return for its investors.
7
Within the term “electric drivetrain vehicle” we include hybrid electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric
vehicles, hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, and all-electric vehicles. Each of these can be considered a mobile
infrastructure of electronic systems that provide motive power, information, navigation, entertainment,
and similar services.
8
For example, the “information and communications” business model includes companies like Google,
which in February of 2009 announced its entry into the micro-grid market, connecting energy-using
devices to each other, to electric drivetrain vehicles, and to distributed sources of electric generation.
AT&T and Verizon followed with similar new-ventures announcements in March of 2009.
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•

Those of the energy companies, traditionally commodity energy providers, but
increasingly facing competition from “smart” electricity and renewable electricity
generated from distributed sources.

In isolation, the current business models of auto companies, energy companies, and
information/communication companies cannot take full advantage of the opportunities at the
intersection of these domains. To fully succeed, corporate innovators need to draw upon the
worldwide entrepreneurial community, the abundance of new ventures funded by professional
investors and offering creative business models and innovative technologies.

Figure 1
Within this convergence of business models can be found game-changing opportunities that
would accelerate the pace of change. For example, consumers could realize more value from
their plug-in hybrid or all-electric vehicles if they had the opportunity to recharge at any place
and time. That would extend the electric range of these vehicles independent of the pace of
battery improvements. Further, the energy supplied to the recharging stations could be derived, at
least in part, from renewable sources. And because the renewable energy could be stored on
vehicles at the value of transportation fuel rather than the price of grid electricity, many electric
utility companies would find an incentive to meet their renewable portfolio requirements in
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vehicle charging. Thus, any parking spot so equipped could become a marketplace where
vehicles exchange electric energy with each other, with the grid, and with local renewable electric
generation.
A network process can bypass the limitations of vertically integrated innovation models to realize
opportunities like this. And in doing so, network innovation could accelerate the transition to
sustainable mobility.

ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION
The Innovation Network for Sustainable Mobility (INSuM) serves as a bridge between the
innovative capacity of entrepreneurial ventures and the systems integration, manufacturing
capacity, and market channels of the industry incumbents. Experience gained in other openinnovation processes suggests that INSuM can execute this mission most effectively by operating
under the following principles:
1. Neutrality INSuM must remain pre-competitive, a good-faith broker for all partners. It
must be a catalyst for opportunity, but not become involved in deals between partners.
Here, fact and perception must align well.
2. Leverage INSuM should reinvent nothing, but rather adapt success from experiences
gained elsewhere.
3. Learning The first business model for INSuM is unlikely to get everything right—thus
INSuM must learn from its own experience and adapt effectively.
4. Partnership The value of a network is proportional to the number of active members.
Thus, INSuM should attract a variety of participants and remain open to new members
whose presence can add value.
5. Service Designing and delivering useful, cost-effective services will prove essential to
attract entrepreneurial ventures. A healthy “deal flow” of partnering opportunities
provides the greatest value for the industry participants.
Figure 2, on the following page, illustrates how INSuM could be organized. The network would
contain four basic components: (a) a Management and Operations Group to organize and
maintain the network and its services; (b) a set of state and local entrepreneur support agencies as
partners; (c) a set of industry partners; and (d) a set of specialized service providers, who provide
specific services upon request, but are not considered partners in the INSuM network.
Management and Operations Group
INSuM will require leadership, administrative, and governance functions for the network to
operate and maintain its services. Most fundamentally, the management and operations function
would not itself provide most entrepreneurial services, but rather would seek out the most
qualified providers nationwide. (Appendix A, below, describes the complete set of service
packages.) In cases offering exceptional opportunity, INSuM might provide funds to procure the
needed services. In addition, the management team would nurture and refresh the network itself,
and establish and maintain a brand identity for the packaged services.
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Because the management group would not provide most services, it could remain small, perhaps
limited to 20 people when the network fully matures. Limited size would minimize overhead
expenses and leave most funds for projects and outreach. Nevertheless, INSuM will need a
source of revenue to exist, most likely an annual subscription from the industrial partners with
some contributions from the entrepreneur partners as well. In addition, government support
would be sought in due recognition of the public mission of INSuM. The management group
would operate the INSuM under a Board of Directors and a governance process to be devised
with the partner and supporting institutions.

Figure 2 – INSuM Network and Organization
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Entrepreneur Partners
INSuM would secure the “deal flow” needed for open-source innovation through partnership with
state and local entrepreneur support groups. That channel would serve two primary purposes: (a)
ease the administrative burden of maintaining contact with new ventures around the nation; and
(b) provide some first-level validation mechanism for the quality and maturity of the new venture.
In return, the entrepreneur support agencies would gain an important outlet for their participating
enterprises, and hence stronger economic development opportunities. They would be expected to
contribute something to INSuM support, as free goods tend to be valued at just that price.
Industry Partners
Industrial partners could include energy companies, auto companies (and suppliers), and
information/communication companies. Equally important, associations of companies
participating in the sustainable mobility market would be invited as partners. These partners
would gain timely, cost-effective access to a wider range of technologies, teaming opportunities
with entrepreneurial ventures, and investment opportunities—the well demonstrated benefits of
an open-source innovation process. (See Appendix B, also below) Industry partners would
provide financial support for the INSuM network.
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APPENDIX C. SERVICES FOR NETWORK INNOVATION
COMPONENT SERVICES FOR NETWORK INNOVATION
The value of an open-innovation network depends on the number and quality of its participants.
The principal challenge for INSuM will be to attract a high quality deal flow of entrepreneurs and
new ventures. To achieve this, INSuM will develop and market a set of services to provide
entrepreneurs with a superior opportunity to build their enterprises while serving the transition to
sustainable mobility. 9
As a practical matter, most of these services would probably be performed by specialized support
organizations participating in the innovation network, thus taking full advantage of unique
competencies and investments already in place. For example, vehicle-grid compatibility might be
tested through the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), and the effect of an innovation on
the overall performance of the vehicle system at Argonne National Laboratory. If a venture
capital service is initiated, it might be operated by an entirely separate entity, governed but not
operated by INSuM.

Technology and Market Validation
Neither seed capital investors (also termed “angel” investors) nor venture capitalists have
demonstrated an enthusiasm for funding technology development projects. Hence, entrepreneurs
with advanced technologies at the proof-of-concept stage find it difficult to secure the resources
needed for demonstration or market research. Recent evidence shows that proof-of-concept
services can accelerate the pace of innovation by offering third-party confirmation of the
performance of the underlying technology or of the market demand.10
To meet this need, technology and/or market validation could be offered through specialized
laboratories located throughout the network of partner institutions. A source of funding would be
needed to support this service.
Systems Validation
In addition to validating the stand-alone characteristics of component innovations, their
performance could be estimated within the larger context of the complex geometry and functions
of contemporary road vehicles. Such services would be offered through a variety of partner
institutions, including Argonne National Laboratory (hardware-in-the-loop), Oak Ridge National
Laboratory, or Clemson University’s International Center for Automotive Research.

9

Transitions to Alternative Transportation Technologies: A Focus on Hydrogen. Committee on Assessment
of Resource Needs for Development of Fuel Cell and Hydrogen Technology, National Academy Press,
National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C. August 2008.
10
See, for example, Proof of Concept Centers: Accelerating the Commercialization of University
Innovation, Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, January 2008.
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In addition, some special demonstration facilities might be constructed—for example a facility to
explore alternatives for refueling electric vehicles. Rapid prototyping for whole-vehicle test and
demonstration could become an essential validation service. As above, a source of funding would
be required to develop this capability.
Channels to Market
Incumbent companies could seek specific product offerings, technology partners, and/or business
partners through the INSuM network. This could provide an important channel to market for the
entrepreneur members and significantly increase the value of their participation. Similarly, new
enterprises could market their solutions to the industry through the INSuM.
Solutions Network
The pace of innovation could be accelerated if innovators and entrepreneurs could gain access to
a wider pool of technology solutions. A “solutions network” could accelerate the innovation
cycle of auto, fuels, and infrastructure companies by posting technology needs for which
entrepreneurs and independent technologists can propose solutions, presumably with the
expectation of some economic reward.
In other industries (computers and life sciences, for example) prizes offered by individual
companies for the solution to specific technology challenges have proven effective in accelerating
innovation. Offering these prizes through a neutral third-party like INSuM could provide a wider
pool of participants, including members of the INSuM partnership itself.
Early Stage Seed Capital
Investment for the early stage company is like blood for the human body—there are not many
good substitutes for it. However, venture capital investors have tended to migrate away from
early-stage companies to focus on more mature investments. Even some Angel networks have
drifted toward later-stage investment. Seed capital could be offered as another service of INSuM
in consonance with the services above. This could be offered through established investment
organizations or perhaps through a specially constituted venture finance arm operating under the
governance and charter of INSuM. Investors could include the incumbent
auto/fuels/infrastructure companies as well as independent investors.
However organized, an early-stage venture investment fund could support the mission of INSuM
in several ways:
•
•
•
•

Stimulate innovation for sustainable mobility, much as the Small Business Innovation
Research (SBIR) program does for mission-agencies of the federal government;
Provide a window on new technology developments and on emerging threats and
opportunities for the investment partners;
By including entrepreneurial ventures, broaden and deepen the supplier base and
diversify the supply chain;
Leverage the venture investment resources of the INSuM partners; and,
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•

Provide an attractive return to the investors in the fund.

A New Venture Farm Club
Few baseball players enter the major leagues directly, but rather improve their skills with a few
years in a “farm system.” Similarly, an INSuM farm system could begin preparing entrepreneurs
well before they are ready for professional venture investment.
Numerous models for this can be found. For example, the NextStart11 program in upstate South
Carolina provides entrepreneurs with mentors, technical assistance, business plan development,
connections with market opportunities and with other entrepreneurs, and limited funding
($10,000 limit). The core idea is to prepare new ventures to compete effectively for first-stage
investment or for proof-of-concept funding from the federal SBIR program. Thus, INSuM could
provide the “farm system” for the seed capital fund discussed previously.
The farm club concept might be adapted to sustainable mobility in partnership with institutions of
special competency like the Ewing Marion Kauffman Foundation, which focuses on improving
methods for entrepreneurial support.
Center for Lessons Learned
Much is being learned throughout the auto/fuels sector about innovation in the complex business
environment of the automotive transition. But these lessons are neither systematically captured
nor widely disseminated. A networked “Center for Lessons Learned” could achieve this. In
addition, it could collect data on the performance of vehicles and fuels in the hands of customers
or in demonstration fleets.
Lessons from the entrepreneurial sector could become especially valuable for public policy
development. The American economy draws strength from its ability to experiment, and
entrepreneurial startup companies become the drosophila of this economic laboratory. Real-life
experimentation has proven effective in industries like biotechnology and software. There,
dozens of business models might succeed, and no one can know in advance which will and which
will not. Entrepreneurs, investors, and participating companies could draw benefit from the
networked delivery of lessons learned from the auto-fuels markets.
Workforce Development
A skilled workforce is essential to any technology revolution. INSuM partners, working with
community colleges and technical schools could help ensure that the relevant technical skills
become available on a timely basis.
Internet-Enabled Working/Collaboration Space
Open-architecture collaboration might be implemented in part through an Internet-based
platform. Three operating characteristics could distinguish this open-architecture platform:
11

Full description available at: http://nextstart.org
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•
•
•

Offering synchronous or asynchronous collaboration and communication, thus helping
the innovation process depend less on geographic proximity;
Enabling learning and collaborative research by partner companies and institutions, either
on a non-proprietary or a secure, proprietary basis as required; and,
Growing in scope and capacity as the open-architecture network accumulates the
experience and learning of its members, thus creating a virtuous cycle of use and value.

In addition to the generally open collaborations envisioned here, the internet platform will need
private spaces where proprietary information can be discussed. These must be protected with the
vigilance and security now provided for financial transactions, a function of either the
management and operations group or perhaps some third party. The figure below sets out a
preliminary illustration of some of the elements that might be included within a
working/collaboration space.
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APPENDIX D. THE NETWORK INNOVATION PROCESS
NETWORK INNOVATION
A “network innovation process” would not replace the current RD&D processes of the
established industry. Instead, it would supplement those business processes by providing access
to a wider field of advanced technologies and innovative ideas, especially those arising from
outside the domain of traditional business models. Indeed, the most attractive opportunities to
accelerate the pace of change reside at the interface among the traditional business models for
auto companies, intelligence companies, and energy companies. In that business environment,
competitive success requires a wider field of vision than vertically integrated business models can
afford.
Network innovation works through intermediate markets, a process in which networks of
companies—some sources of technology ideas, some market ideas, some manufacturing, some
intellectual property, and so forth—participate in value creation and value capture.12 In the
auto/energy transition, a network-enabled innovation process could offset many of the
inadequacies of the current practice and become the industry standard for complex, advancedtechnology projects—those with high risk arising from multiple participants, untried
technologies, and uncertain consumer preferences. These networks can provide a highly effective
supplement to traditional RD&D processes, and in some cases have changed the basic character
of vertically integrated innovation.
Consider computers and pharmaceuticals, for example, which have seen intermediate markets
emerge to fundamentally change the traditional business models for innovation. The computer
industry has become progressively less integrated since the 1960s. Specialty firms now push the
frontiers of research, innovation, and manufacturing for the chips, the chip fabrication plants,
displays, games, and so forth. Thus, the computer industry has become more of a network and
less a competition among self-sufficient, integrated companies.
The network we propose would provide a platform for a national, perhaps global, open innovation
process. Incumbent companies would gain a more rapid cycle time for innovation, 13 and
entrepreneurs would gain access to value-added services tailored to sustainable mobility.

12

Ashish Arora, Andrea Fosfuri, and Alfonso Gambardella The Economics of Innovation and Corporate
Strategy, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2001.
13
Gary P. Pisano and Roberto Verganti “Which Kind of Collaboration is Right for You?” Harvard Business
Review, December 2008, pp. 78-86.
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APPENDIX E. LETTER TO INTERVIEWEES

Information about Being in a Research Study
Clemson University
8 March 2011

The AutoVenture Forum: how open innovation networks can accelerate
innovation

Description of the Study and Your Part in It

Dr. David Bodde with John Skardon are inviting you to take part in a research study. Dr.
Bodde is Professor and Senior Fellow at Clemson University. John Skardon is a Phd
student in policy studies at Clemson University, running this study with the help of Dr.
Bodde. The purpose of this research is to investigate how the AutoVenture Forum, as an
example of an open innovation network, can accelerate the rate of innovation within an
industry.

Your part in the study will be to respond to questions from Mr. Skardon regarding the
recent AutoVenture Forum held on September 22, 2010.

It will take you about 30-45 minutes to be in this study.
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Risks and Discomforts

We do not know of any risks or discomforts to you in this research study.

Possible Benefits

We expect that you may experience some benefits from participation in this survey.
Benefits can include: a) a broader understanding of how open innovation may be
implemented at the company, region or industry level, b) a better understanding of the
potential benefits and value propositions that may accrue to participants in subsequent
forums, and c) new ideas on collaboration and open business models for your
organization. We also intend to publish a summary of the survey to the participants.

Protection of Privacy and Confidentiality

We will do everything we can to protect your privacy and confidentiality. All
participants and their responses to the survey will be assigned an alphanumeric code that
is kept solely by the principal investigators. No individually identifiable comments or
answers to specific questions will appear in any publication. We will not tell anybody
outside of the research team that you were in this study or what information we collected
about you in particular.
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Choosing to Be in the Study

You do not have to be in this study. You may choose not to take part and you may choose
to stop taking part at any time. You will not be punished in any way if you decide not to
be in the study or to stop taking part in the study.

Contact Information

If you have any questions or concerns about this study or if any problems arise, please
contact Dr. David Bodde at Clemson University at 864-508-0571. If you have any
questions or concerns about your rights in this research study, please contact the Clemson
University Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at 864-656-6460 or irb@clemson.edu.
If you are outside of the Upstate South Carolina area, please use the ORC’s toll-free
number, 866-297-3071.

A copy of this form will be given to you.
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APPENDIX F. THE INTERVIEW INSTRUMENT

The AutoVenture Forum: how open innovation networks can accelerate
Innovation
Survey for organizers, participants
John Skardon
Clemson University
DO NOT COPY | DO NOT DISTRIBUTE

Contact Process
Contact attendee via phone. Leave message or explain to attendee the purpose of the call,
confirm a date and time for the interview.
Follow-up with email and letter
Sections

Applicants who submitted documents but were not selected to present
Applicants who submitted documents and were selected to present
Auto Industry Companies and Suppliers
Government attendees
All other attendees

READ TO ALL INTERVIEWEES
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Good (morning/day). My name is John Skardon. I am a doctoral student at Clemson
University. I am calling about an email you may receive from me concerning the
AutoVenture Forum: an investment conference accelerating innovation in the automotive
industry that was conducted in September 2010 In Detroit. The purpose of this call is to
follow-up on the conference and ask a few questions about the event. This data is being
collected as part of my Phd program. No identifiable information about you or your
organization will appear in any public documents. However I will make available to you,
a summary of the interviews that I conducted as part of my research. May we continue?
I would prefer to record this conversation so that I may accurately transcribe it later. Is
that acceptable to you? No electronic copy of the recording will be made available to any
outside person or organization except my dissertation advisor, Dr. David Bodde. I can
provide you with a copy of the recording if you would like to have one for your records.

If the interviewee says “NO”, then go the section and transcribe manually. If the
interviewee says “YES”, then turn on the VOIP recorder and begin the interview.

This survey will take between fifteen and thirty minutes of your time. We can skip any
question that you do not want to answer.
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APPENDIX G. SAMPLE QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN SURVEY

1. SKIP: Confirm that the role at the event was either presenter or company
representative.
2. How important were your personal or professional contacts or membership in
organizations in learning about the AVF or influencing your decision to attend?
3. Is your company located close, within 100 miles or so, of a major university or
automotive facility? Do you have business relationships with either?
4. Do you have any other university or research lab associations that are very
important to your business?
5. How do plan to leverage your intellectual property, such as patents and
proprietary know-how? Have you considered licensing your property or
acquiring licenses to other property that could strengthen your company’s
business model?
6. Was your participation in the AVF forum valuable?
a. Can you provide some specific examples?
7. What were your costs of participation in the AVF? What were the benefits?
8. Overall, what was the primary value you/your company gained from presenting
and attending the event?
9. What problems did you encounter in explaining or discussing your company’s
value proposition to the audience during the breakout sessions?
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10. What kind of new relationships did you form at the event? Of these relationships,
which have been the most valuable to your company? Why?
11. Since your presentation at the AVF, please describe any interactions you have had
with major auto manufacturers or their suppliers.
12. What challenges and opportunities do you see in further developing a new
business relationship with the auto industry?
13. How could the AVF staff facilitate your relationships with the auto industry
beyond the investment forum? For example, should the AVF offer a “technology
validation” service?
14. Apart from the auto industry representatives, the audience also contained a
number of hand-selected venture capitalists, members of academia and members
of state and federal agencies. Did the presence of any of these non-automotive
industry attendees create any concern during your presentation or follow-on
discussions?
15. Assume that the AVF becomes a formal organization that connects
entrepreneurial startups and the auto industry and you have been invited to join:
a. What kind of institution should manage and run the AVF? For example:
USCAR, or a for-profit intermediary such as a NineSigma? Other ideas?
b. How would you define the value of participation for your company?
c. What factors would encourage you to join?
d. What factors would cause you not to join?
e. Who else should be allowed to join the network?
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f. How should the cost of operating the network be paid?
g. What kind of rules should be in place?
h. Who should enforce those rules?
i. Government (state and federal) see innovation as a way solve “social
problems” such as reducing the number of car crashes or increasing
employment through commercialization of new technologies. If
government agencies were involved in a “formal” network version of the
AVF, what should their role be?
j. If you see a role for government agencies, is there a type or specific
agency that should or should not be involved?
16. If another event in the automotive sector is conducted, will you be interested in
participating?
17. May we contact you later for follow-up questions if our conversations with other
attendees yield new insights?
Thank you for your time

STOP
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